


THE GATHERING STORM


BY "A RIFLEMAN"



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THE
GATHERING STORM
BEING STUDIES IN SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC TENDENCIES

BY "A RIFLEMAN"

Victor Wallace Germanins

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THE GATHERING STORM

THE GATHERING STORM

I

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY : TO THE DAWN OF HISTORY

ERE we discuss future tendencies of civilisation or schemes of Social Regeneration it were well to begin from a secure starting-point by forming a just conception of the system of Society under which we at present live, and of the various processes by which this system of Society has come into being.

Webster defines "Society" as "a number of persons associated for any temporary or permanent object; an association for mutual or joint usefulness, pleasure, or profit," and the earliest grouping of Man into such associations "for mutual or joint usefulness, pleasure, or profit," must in all probability have been anterior to the full development of the human faculties. Organised Societies are not confined to Man, they are to be

found lower in the Animal Kingdom. Beavers, for instance, know how to co-ordinate their labour in the construction of a dam and, further, to vary the mode of construction of this latter to meet the special conditions, width, strength of current, etc., of the stream ; they also build themselves "lodges" which, in size, strength, and neatness of construction, can compare favourably with many a human habitation ; prairie-dogs build great cities stretching sometimes over many square miles and laid out with the regularity of a military encampment ; in the insect world are to be found the well-known and highly organised societies of ants, bees, and wasps. The circumstance, therefore, of these societies having been developed by creatures certainly inferior in pure reasoning power to the lowest orders of mankind, forces one to the conclusion that the co-ordination of effort is not dependent upon fully developed reasoning power, and that in its origin, instinct, and communication by sensory nerves, principally smell, must have led to the organisation of Society previous to Man's definite differentiation from the Animal Kingdom. We may go even further : obviously the development of human faculties can only have been the result of the long-continued contact of Man with his fellow-Man in partially organised communities. Speech, for instance, can only have been evolved by the necessity of Man communicating with Man and the possession of ideas in common, such as a sense of danger, desire

for food, and the attempted co-ordination of effort. But for all this it is essential that communities of considerable size should have dwelt together; which brings us to the paradox that it is not Man who has made Society, but Society which has made Man.

According to the theories of Haeckel and Darwin, which are supported by an overwhelming weight of evidence and accepted by practically all educated men, all life evolved from the spontaneous generation of a primordial plasm, the *monera*, by the action of the vital heat of the world upon the chemical agents in water. Haeckel writes: "The organic history of the earth could not commence until it was possible for water to settle on the earth in fluid condition. Every organism without exception needs fluid water as a condition of existence, and contains a considerable quantity of it. Our own body, when fully formed, contains sixty to seventy per cent of water in its tissues, and only thirty to forty per cent of solid matter. There is even more water in the body of the child and still more in the embryo. In the earlier stages of development the human foetus contains more than ninety per cent of water, and not ten per cent of solids. In the lower marine animals, especially certain medusæ, the body exists to the extent of more than ninety-nine per cent of sea-water, and not ten per cent of solid matter. No organism can exist or discharge its functions without water. No water, no life!"

In passing, however, one may remark that Haeckel's dictum that, "The organic history of the earth could not commence until it was possible for water to settle on the earth in fluid condition," would have been more correctly written, "The organic history of the earth could not commence until it was possible for *matter* to settle on the earth in *solid* condition"; for, by reason of centripetal force, those heavier gases which go to form solids must have been nearer to the centre of the world's heat than the lighter gases, hydrogen and oxygen, and therefore must have cooled more slowly than these latter, thus the exterior of the world must have been enveloped in a vast ocean, whilst the interior was yet in a gaseous state: all life, however, be its structure soever slight, *must* have *some* proportion of solid matter. Haeckel, in assuming that the formation of solids preceded the formation of water, is really putting the cart before the horse.

As the earth cooled from its primary state of a vast body of incandescent gas divorced from its parent body, the sun, first the outer gases condensed from steam to water, then the interior became molten rock and earth, and finally the outer surface of the molten solids hardened to a crust beneath the outer envelope of seas. This crust, owing to volcanic action which at that period of the world's history was incessant and on a tremendous scale, was in parts upreared above the surface of the waters, whilst great rifts were torn

by similar action in the sea-bed, which, of course, created a subsidence in the sea-level due to the flowing of water into these fissures ; thus there formed the nuclei of continents in the form of tiny islands which, along with incessant change by volcanic action and owing to the steady contraction of the seas due to the dissipation of water in the form of gas by the molecular action of such gases, have gradually during countless millions of years enlarged to their present dimensions and are enlarging still.

With the hardening of the world's crust into solid matter, life was generated spontaneously by the chemical action of the vital heat of the earth upon the water and solids ; the primordial plasm, the *monera*, was generated which, owing to the incessant change in the world's surface, gradually evolved into higher forms in the effort to subsist in the altered environment, *monera* cast up on land evolved into worms and other invertebrates ; the constant struggle against environment led to an incessant variation of form and species among those organisms forced to struggle for existence, whilst those brother-organisms more favourably circumstanced continually reproduced the parent form almost unchanged. Thus, with the continual alteration in climatic and physical conditions due to the gradual diminution of the earth's heat, there ensued a continual evolution of life into higher forms. The primitive aquatic invertebrate organisms evolved into fishes ; as the

proportion of land to sea increased some of the fishes were forced to adapt themselves to living on land; thus there arose a class of amphibia from which developed a lizard-like species, the ancestor of the reptiles. There followed the age of reptiles, giant serpents, sea-serpents, and flying lizards, from which latter, as proved by comparative anatomy, there evolved the bird class. Following fishes and reptiles there came the class of mammals, which again differentiated into the two classes of land and sea mammals with an intermediate class of amphibia. From the mammals there evolved, along with a variety of other forms, an ape-like type, the ancestor of Man. We must, however, beware of the popular view that Man is descended from an Ape, a view expressly repudiated alike by Haeckel and Darwin. The truth, of course, is that Man and the various species of Apes are all evolved from a common type, probably differing beyond recognition from either Man or Ape. Man, the Apes, and the various other animals, are not descended from one another, but have evolved simultaneously side by side from a common ancestor in accordance with varying conditions of environment. In some cases the older forms have become extinct, in others they survive with comparatively little changes; it is, however, beyond all probability to assume that any of the higher forms of life exist on this world exactly similar in form to the parent types of twenty or thirty million years ago.

In all probability Man evolved in at least three distinct species in three distinct centres, either simultaneously or successively, whilst it is far from improbable that alike the number of species and of centres of evolution were much larger. Three distinct types can at least be recognised beyond all doubt, the Indo-Caucasians or Aryans, the Mongolians, and the Africans or Hamitic type. It is, moreover, eminently probable that the Melanesians are a distinct type indigenous to Australia, and that the American Indians, generally regarded as immigrants from Asia, were in reality evolved in that continent. The African Bushman type, moreover, and certain Indian tribes undoubtedly represent a distinct species of mankind, and are probably a survival from a much more numerous ancestry. Again, to judge from remains, there must have been a distinct European type analogous to the Basque peoples ere the coming of the Indo-Europeans. All of which would seem to indicate that Man as a type originated at no one spot and from no single pair of ancestors, but from widely distributed centres and under widely differing conditions of evolution; in considering, then, the evolution of Society among the European peoples, with whom, of course, this thesis is mainly concerned, one feels the danger of taking it for granted that the usages and customs of the primitive peoples existing to-day necessarily represent a phase of evolution through which our own ancestors must have passed: it is convenient

and tempting to regard the Melanesian peoples as representing the dawn of culture and pass therefrom through Polynesian, American, Asiatic, and European peoples as up successive steps of a ladder until we reach the highly developed civilisation of our own day ; unfortunately, however, it is a method of enquiry which ignores climatic influences, and it is, when one comes to think of it, obviously absurd to imagine that the customs of the Australian Aborigines, under the climatic influences of Australia, can afford any real clue as to the customs of our own forefathers under the climatic influences of Great Britain and Europe generally. Whilst then an intelligent study of the manners and customs of present-day savages can undoubtedly afford us invaluable help in picturing the manners and customs of the primitive Europeans, one should beware of making any dogmatic assertions based upon such a study. Climatic conditions, with all their reflex action upon Man's temperament and economic resources, are undoubtedly the most potent of all factors in moulding his social ideals ; thus it is impossible to make any genuine study of Sociology without considering these.

The exact place of origin of the Indo-European peoples has long been a matter of dispute, but is generally assigned to the uplands in the region of the Caucasus Mountains, from which reputed origin, indeed, the Caucasian race takes its name ; certain light, however, can be shed upon this

subject by the very circumstance of Man's origin. The human kind is distinguished from all other species by the circumstance of walking erect on two feet, a fact which would certainly point to the origin of Man *qua* Man in a treeless or semi-treeless district, or in a forest region the climatic conditions of which rendered the trees barren of fruit and foliage during a very considerable portion of the year. All of these conditions are more or less fulfilled by the region adjacent to the Caucasus Mountains ; there are grassy uplands, semi-wooded country, and during the earliest historical period there were forests of considerable size, all within a radius of two or three hundred miles from the Caucasus. This, then, would appear to be a natural enough centre of evolution for the Caucasian race.

The fact would appear to be that Man has evolved not under a single set of conditions, but under a variety of sets of conditions. In some regions, owing to climatic conditions, the primitive Marsupial type would evolve into a semi-tree-climbing, semi-land-abiding branch of the Ape family and ultimately into Man ; in other regions the tree-climbing Apes having overflowed the supporting power of the forest, a struggle for existence would result, and the weaker Apes be thrust from the forest-region either into desert, grassy prairie, or maybe hill-tops ; and the struggle to adapt themselves to the new environment produce Man. Again, under other circum-

stances a semi-tree-climbing branch of Marsupials having taken, as is far from improbable, to a fish-diet from being in the vicinity of a lake, the lake-dwelling type of Man would be evolved in due course. The origin of Society must, however, have been anterior to even these early stages of evolution. The old mythology which attributed to a single ancestral pair the origin of the human race ignored the fact that in all primitive forms of life creation and propagation is not by individuals, but by broods, and the size of the brood increases with each step down the scale of creation. A savage mother, for instance, will bear twenty or thirty children to a civilised woman's three or four; a cat or bitch or other animal brings forth a litter more or less numerous at each birth; whilst the fish or insect tribe pro-create by enormous larvæ: thus the spontaneous generation which produced the primordial plasm must have produced not one plasm but millions, which, in fact, would be necessary were the plasm to survive the various dangers from volcanic action which must have destroyed hundreds of thousands at one fell swoop; just as but for the enormous child-bearing capacity of the savage woman, these primitive peoples would speedily cease to exist from the great mortality among the children, which cuts off the greater proportion ere they reach the age of puberty. Thus the pro-creation of each successive form of life from the primitive plasm type must have been by succes-

sive broods, ever decreasing in number with each successive step up the ladder of evolution. Or, to put the matter more simply, the conditions which first led to the evolution of life by spontaneous generation must have been in operation over an enormous area, with the result that throughout this area must have germinated countless millions of plasms to every square mile : as, however, owing to the continual cooling of the world, the primitive simplicity of environment continually changed into more varied forms, and owing to the continual effort of organisms to adapt themselves to a continually altering environment, there followed a continuous evolution of plasms into higher forms, the ever-increasing variety of which increased with the ever-increasing variety of environment. But with each evolution of life upwards the effort at reproduction imposes an increasing strain upon the individual, thus decreasing the rapidity of reproduction, whilst the growth of the organism in physical power and intelligence by enabling it to protect its young renders the enormous larvæ of the lower organisms unnecessary to secure the reproduction of species.

The evolution of species then is not by individuals, but by swarms ; the circumstances which produce one individual of a type will produce others, and these circumstances will be in operation throughout the environment which has produced this special type. Take, for instance, our suggested origin for Man, a struggle for exist-

ence among the tree-apes and the expulsion of the weaker apes from the forests. Obviously these conditions would be in operation not at a single spot or with a single pair of apes, but wherever there were apes and forests with treeless regions adjacent, and always provided that the tree-apes had bred to overflowing and that there was a consequent struggle for existence among them. Thus it is only in accordance with this law that the environment which will produce an individual will produce a brood, and that wherever these conditions of environment are to be found will be evolved a similar type, for us to find that Man has evolved not from one single region, but from many and widely distributed centres. Wherever there are treeless regions adjacent to great forests we can perceive a centre of evolution for one of the various types of Mankind : America, Africa, Asia, Europe, and Australia, in all five continents ; whilst local climatic conditions have produced local variations of type, yet the same broad features have produced the same general type : Man.

In this law, that the evolution of species is not by individuals but by swarms, we have unquestionably the true key to the origin of human society. Long anterior to the definite evolution of Man *qua* Man there must have evolved, probably as far back as the Marsupials, the progenitors of the Ape-like ancestors of Man, the primitive herd which represents the earliest effort at an organised Society. In its origin the herd is the result of

circumstance and instinct ; the instinct of hunger sets the animals seeking for food, and since, belonging to the same species, they seek the same nutriment, the whole herd under normal circumstances moves together : it is the instinct of danger which leads to the first rudimentary attempt at combined effort. The animal world in its primitive condition, and even now in certain regions of the world, was in a state of perpetual warfare. The danger of attack by the great winged reptiles and other extinct monsters must have necessitated incessant vigilance among the primitive Marsupials, and the oldest and most experienced members of the herd, from the fact of their more developed senses, would naturally act as leaders to the rest of the herd. To-day flocks of wild reindeer are guided and protected by the old males, who act as sentinels whilst the others are browsing or resting, and who act as whippers-in for laggards whilst checking the impetuosity of the younger members of the herd. Similar phenomena can be observed in numerous other animal groups. Upon consideration the explanation is simple ; that animals have memory can be easily demonstrated, it would be impossible to train them to the performance of tricks or labour otherwise ; again, memory denotes rudimentary reasoning-power, for otherwise the animal would be unable to distinguish between cause and effect : that a burnt dog dreads the fire is proverbial, which conclusively proves that the dog can understand

the relationship of cause and effect. Animals, then, possess memory and rudimentary reasoning-power; it follows then that those males among the Marsupials whose experience was longest and instincts were finest would appreciate the necessity of guarding against danger: again, by reason of their finer instincts and superior strength, they would on all occasions act as crowd-leaders to the rest of the pack. This brings us to an interesting point in psychology. Even among civilised peoples, as is demonstrated by the brothers Le Bon in their interesting "*Psychologie des Foules*," the vast majority of men when under impulse of excitement act not from reason, but from instinctive imitation of a "*crowd-leader*," some one man among the crowd who thinks more rapidly than the majority and whose suggestions are blindly accepted. Among animals who depend entirely upon instinct this dependence upon a crowd-leader must obviously be even more absolute, and in the absence of any form of speech it must be the *actions* of the pack-leader which must determine the actions of his fellows. Here, then, we see the first example of the co-ordination of effort, the guidance of a pack by the pack-leaders in the effort to attain an object recognised as desirable by the general instinct of the pack. And among these pack-leaders there will, under ordinary circumstances, be some one leader whose more finely developed senses will secure him the general leadership of the pack. It is remarkable,

one may add in passing, that in no class of mammal do we ever find this leadership or even a sub-leadership held by a female.

The co-ordination of effort under guidance of the pack-leaders would tend to the attainment of two objectives, the provision of food and security against danger. In the provision of food each individual member of the pack would be guided by the instinct of hunger and the instinct of imitation. We have observed that animals have memory; the faculty of memory together with the sense of smell, which is the earliest means of distinguishing objects, would teach the animals to distinguish between those foodstuffs which produced injurious after-effects and those which were satisfactory, and the older animals which had gained such experience would be imitated subconsciously by the younger ones. There would thus result the formation of tastes for certain foodstuffs, which since the period of evolution for each type has lasted for millions of years would, from being constantly handed down from parents to offspring, become instincts which would, although with ever-weakening influence, survive an entire change from the environment which originally produced such tastes. A petted, pampered domestic kitten, for instance, which has never known what it is to feel hunger will stiffen involuntarily at the sight of a mouse, although seeing it for the first time in all its young life. On the other hand, the change of environment will ultimately revolu-

tionise hereditary tastes : horses can be trained to eat fish in preference to all other kinds of food. It is, in fact, the constant variation of environment and acquirement of new tastes in food-stuffs which is primarily responsible for the evolution of types. An animal, for instance, which has developed a taste for nuts will transmit this taste to its offspring, which, in the constant endeavour to obtain nuts, will evolve a type peculiarly suited in physical structure to obtain nuts ; but place this type in an environment where there are few or no nuts obtainable and the weaklings will die off, whilst the stronger ones will find new food resources and ultimately develop into the type most suitable to the new environment.

We have seen that animals have memory and rudimentary reasoning-power, we have seen that tastes in food are formed by experience and circumstances of environment, and that the effort to gratify such tastes leads to a development of the physical structure of the animal and variation of type ; alteration of environment then leads to variation of species ; there must, however, with all species arrive a phase of evolution when the development of animal life has struck a balance with development of environment, and under the circumstances of such environment further progress is impossible. The otter, the horse, the reindeer, the ant, and countless other types have all in their natural state struck such a balance with

their environment, their forms have reached the perfection of physical development requisite for the attainment of their food-supplies, their mental development is equally adapted to their surroundings ; the beaver, the ant, the wasp, the bee, for instance, have all made the maximum physical and mental progress attainable under their natural conditions of life. Nor is this coincidence between development and environment confined to the Animal World, it applies to the majority of Mankind ; the indigenous American, African, Arabian, Chinese, Indian, Australian, and Polynesian peoples have all struck a similar balance with their environment and have remained without development for thousands of years.

This factor, that coincidence between environment and evolution means arrested development and the negation of progress, is a most interesting and important point to the student of Sociology and will be returned to later ; continuing, however, our study of the evolution of Society, it is obvious that the evolution of the highest forms of life and of organised effort is purely a matter of climatic and geographical conditions and of adaptability of type. Forms unable to adapt themselves to altered circumstances perished and became extinct, the more adaptable forms evolved into higher types.

Returning to the herd or pack as the genesis of Society, it can be seen that with such packs there is a rudimentary attempt at the organi-

sation of effort, and that with the increasing strain upon this rudimentary organisation caused by the struggle against a continually altering environment there has followed the development of human faculties and of Society in its highest form. The “pack-leader,” superior alike in strength and mental development to his fellows, guides the efforts of these latter alike consciously and subconsciously, he is the first to scent a foe, the foremost in attack, and the first to recognise favourable grazing-grounds ; he also, as we have seen, appreciates the necessity of watchfulness against attack whilst at rest and of vigilance whilst on the march. But be it noted, the “pack-leader” is no philanthropist—he does not give his service to the herd without exacting recompense. First come is first served, and the choicest of the food-stuffs fall to the pack-leader’s share, and to his share also fall the choicest of the females. The seasonal period of *rut* is a period of fierce, furious fighting among the young males of all mammal species, and death or disablement is the fate of the vanquished in these homeric contests ; in all the mammal world, as with Man, only the brave, strong, and cunning in fight are held to deserve the fair. Nor is copulation a mere act of instinct, selection according to individual taste is not unknown among the higher forms of mammals ; stallions have been known to take a violent fancy for certain mares and decline copulation with others, whilst highly bred bitches have been

known to develop a furious passion for mongrel curs. Owing to this furious fighting among the young males and the number of deaths caused thereby, when the sexes are fairly even in number polygamy becomes inevitable among the higher mammals : only when there is a dearth of females would monogamy be possible. And the circumstance of the pack-leaders securing the choicest of the food-stuffs and of the females would naturally tend to the formation of a stronger hereditary type.

The development of organised effort would naturally proceed with the development of an environment which called for mental rather than purely physical powers. With the cooling of the world's surface, the equatorial conditions of vast forests and tangled jungle prevalent in what are now the temperate regions of the world would, during thousands of years of evolution, give place to conditions more in accordance with those to-day prevalent, and in consequence the primitive gorilla type of tree-ape must either adapt itself to altered conditions or become extinct. The northern winter, with trees barren of foliage and a scarcity of animal food, would demand foresight during the short summer and the provision of food-supplies and shelter for the inclement season. Slowly during thousands of years, just as the squirrel has learnt to gather a hoard of nuts, the bee to prepare a honeycomb, and even the bear to provide himself with a lair, so the primitive

gorilla would learn to make a store of nuts and roots, to construct a rough habitation, and to prey upon the animals weaker than himself ; the pack-leader would develop into the chief, the herd into the semi-nomadic horde. During long periods of the year the barren trees would afford no food-supplies ; the gorilla thus forced to the ground would slowly adapt his physical structure to the new necessities of life. Since the anthropomorphous monkeys of the present age know how to hurl stones as missiles and use fallen branches of trees as clubs, it is probable that the northern gorilla was not less advanced, and that even at this early stage Man had learnt the use of weapons ; certainly to use a stone as a missile or branch as a club does not require any greater intellectual effort than to build a dam like the beaver or the honeycombs of the bee. The probabilities are, in fact, that the first use of weapons was purely instinctive : the use of missiles would be learnt by accidentally dropping nuts ; of clubs by accidentally picking up broken branches : the natural playfulness common to all animals would do the rest, and finally learning their effectiveness they would be used as weapons of offence. Man, forced to descend from tree-branches and cope with far swifter four-footed creatures, would find the use of stones as missiles of enormous value ; although not at this time distinctly a biped, the short forearms and long hinder-limbs of the Anthropoid would produce a bounding gait analo-

gous to that of a kangaroo; ultimately, with the necessity of developing speed, and the constant hurling of stones with its effect in throwing back the upper part of the body, Man would take a more and more erect posture; in feeding and work, such as the fabrication of weapons, which would be done in a squatting posture, the hands would naturally be used in preference to the nether extremities; thus there would evolve the definite distinction between hands and feet, with a certain degree of loss of the prehensile qualities of the toes. Again, the tail being no longer necessary either to beat off flies or assist in swinging from branches, would, from lack of use, dwindle away and drop off, just as mice if continually bred in utter darkness will eventually lose the, to them, useless faculty of sight. These changes in physical structure would be accompanied by an analogous mental development. We have seen that animals possess memory and rudimentary reasoning-power. Man, therefore, having passed through winter seasons and suffered from scarcity of food, would learn to anticipate such periods of inclement weather and prepare for them; the bitter cold too of a northern winter, and the necessity of providing some storehouse for the provision laboriously acquired, would lead to the formation of settlements. Where there were caves available Man would become a cave-dweller, but in forest lands rude nests built of mud and small branches and situated close to running water would serve the

turn of caves. At first, no doubt, these nests would be built on platforms in the trees for sake of security ; such nests are occasionally built by the anthropomorphous monkeys of to-day, and it would be from the wide leafy canopy overhead that Man would take the first idea for a thatched roof, the leafy canopy would disappear during winter, and the nests be drenched in the furious downpours. It would not be long, therefore, with the memory of similar tempests passed dry-skinned under cover of the leafy foliage, ere the idea of roofing the nests was conceived and acted on.

We have seen that creation is by swarms, not by individuals ; the swarm, however, is obviously far too large a unit for unorganised undeveloped creatures, and therefore breaks up into small packs centring around pack-leaders. Man arrived at the phase of evolution described above would be grouped into a vast number of tiny semi-nomadic communities ; in the summer they would travel in search of game, in the closing weeks before the winter they would construct a permanent camp in which to weather the inclement months. All this would mean combined effort and a division of labour ; the hunters would learn to combine their efforts in search of game, to exchange grunt-like sounds, and make gestures expressive of ideas : the females, unable to keep up with the more powerful males in the chase, would build the camp and collect roots, herbs, and nuts, all of which would equally lead to attempted co-ordina-

tion of effort among the females and the development of a rude language, partly by gestures, partly by grunting sounds. The governance of this little community would be by might and custom. The strongest and quickest-witted male, the most skilful hunter, and boldest warrior would naturally sway the opinions of his fellows; for the rest an infinitude of half-understood customs would sway the community with the force of instincts. Of the course of evolution by which these customs had come into being the primitive savage would, of course, have no inkling; but as a result of hundreds of years during which it had been handed down from father to son to do such and such a thing in such and such a manner, to do this thing in the manner customary had become an instinct. Nevertheless, changing environment would ultimately mean that new customs would be formed whilst old ones would fall into desuetude. It is, however, when we remember how the life of primitive Man must have been at every point bound by iron unreasoning custom that we begin to appreciate the immense length of time necessary for the development of the human race and the higher forms of Society.

Within the bounds of custom physical force would, with early Man, enjoy unlimited sway. Whilst in this early phase marriage in any sense of the term is unthinkable, it is however certain that the physically strongest men would assert their right to prior possession of the females. The

young boys and girls would pair to a certain extent naturally, but there would certainly be contests for the most attractive females, whilst the elder and more powerful men would claim their right to the enjoyment of any female. From this circumstance the paternity of children would be always a matter of considerable doubt, and ancestry would be calculated in the maternal line. For the rest, whilst woman, from her physical weakness and periodical loss of blood, would no doubt be regarded as inferior to the male, the statements as to the absolute slavery of savage women are undoubtedly much exaggerated.

The use of stones as missiles must speedily have led to the discovery of the cutting qualities of the sharp flint. The jagged edges would cut the hand when grasped for hurling ; the use of such sharp edges for cutting food or trimming branches for clubs would speedily ensue ; the rough flint would develop into the knife, whilst there would be an attempt to trim off the jagged edges of the flint by chipping, thus rendering it more suitable for throwing. And having thus learnt the art of shaping weapons, the axe, the spear-head, and hammer would be speedily evolved. The chipping of flints in the effort to manufacture weapons was doubtless responsible for the discovery of fire. Sparks from the flints alighting on dead wood or dry moss would set up a blaze, to the amazement and terror of the shaggy warriors. The phenomenon, however, being repeated frequently would lose its

terror, and by degrees and mainly by accident the useful qualities of fire would be discovered. Its pleasant warmth would be welcome on cold nights, its value as a protection against wild animals would be appreciated after short experience, whilst the accidental partial burning of meat or fish would lead to the evolution of cookery. The discovery of the art of kindling fire from rubbing sticks together would also probably result from the attempted fabrication of weapons. The care and patience which savage Man gives to the manufacture of these is well known. He will sit for hours patiently occupied in trimming a spear, etc. Doubtless then it was the act of rubbing two sticks together to smooth an arrow-shaft or kindred implement which, continued for a length of time of which no civilised man would be capable, gave rise to smoke and sparks, which, falling upon dead wood or shavings from shaping the shaft, would set up a blaze. The art once learnt would be gradually developed with practice ; the advantage of using a hard and soft piece of wood instead of two pieces of equal hardness would be realised with time ; it would then be found advantageous to point the hard piece and use it drill fashion, which would finally evolve into the bow-shaped drill. In Europe, however, and other countries where flints are plentiful, the art of kindling fire from the use of two pieces of wood can never have been important.

In the north and cold regions generally, Man,

like other animals, must have been protected from inclement weather by a thick, hairy hide ; nor even without this protection would the use of clothing be necessary. Man can be hardened to endure any climate. A Terra Fuegian mother will stand naked in a snowstorm, her baby sucking at her breast. *Clothes, therefore, can never have been adopted as a protection against climate by a race indigenous to that climate.* It follows, then, that a desire for ornament and distinction must have been the primary origin of garments. At first, whilst emerging from the animal state and waging a desperate struggle for existence against a hostile environment, Man could not have afforded to throw away the smallest particle of food, and must have devoured those animals he killed raw, hide, entrails, and every scrap, save such portions as were indigestible. As, however, Man's command of weapons increased, his food-supplies increased proportionately, whilst with cutting weapons it would be no longer necessary for him to tear the tough hide with his teeth. He would learn to skin the animal in fragmentary fashion, whilst with more food available the entrails, being uninviting to the human palate, would be cast aside. These fragments would have the effect of attracting hordes of dogs to the vicinity of the camp, which would gradually result in the alliance between Man and dog, which has lasted so long and been so beneficial to both. Having learnt to tear off great patches of hide to get at the underlying meat, Man

would discover that these patches could be of use in the manufacture of ropes, bags, etc. He would with practice learn to take off the skin intact, and such skins would be found useful for a variety of purposes, whilst the hides of animals noted for strength and valour, such as the bear, the boar, the leopard, lion, and tiger, would be immensely valued and worn by prominent chiefs as a symbol of prowess. And the use of skins for ornament would develop into the use of skins for clothes *when there ensued a sudden migration of southern tribes north, or more generally a migration of tribes from a warm region into one perceptibly colder.* This is a point of considerable ethnographical importance, as it clearly demonstrates that the most highly civilised races of Man all originated in a much warmer climate than they at present inhabit. Were they indigenous to a northern latitude they would not find clothes necessary. It would be those much less hairy species of Man evolved in a warm climate which would feel the chill of a more rigorous winter and resort to an artificial covering. The indigenous types protected by a thick coat of hair could brave the climate with impunity.

We have seen that primitive Man was, at the phase of evolution we are considering, semi-nomadic. During the summer months his range of wandering was only limited by the necessity of finding game and the danger of trespassing upon another tribe's hunting-grounds. Here we

see the first instance of property in land ; the semi-nomadic hunting-tribe was vitally dependent upon game, and the game during certain seasons of the year moved within certain circumscribed limits. As a result of experience, therefore, the tribe would learn to vary its movements around a certain radius, all ground within which would be held to be the property of the tribe by right of priority, and any intrusion upon which would be hotly resented. The trespasses, therefore, of one tribe upon another's hunting-grounds would be a fruitful source of wars, which wars would lead to the evolution of marriage by slavery. We have seen that in the primitive tribe there existed a state of promiscuity. Boys and girls growing up together coupled naturally, although the elder and more fully developed men from superior strength asserted their prior right to the females as to all other articles of request. Nevertheless, Man being in that phase little removed from the beast, save whilst under the animal impulse of reproduction, there could be little sexual jealousy. It is only during the season of *rut* that the animal males fight for the females, and similarly it is only whilst under impulse of sexual excitement that primitive Man will fight for the female ; the impulse satisfied he ceases to feel jealousy. Whilst then an exceptionally pretty girl would be fought for and obliged to live in forced or voluntary union with the strongest male, and whilst the elder men would indulge in sexual intercourse at their pleasure,

temporary unions by mutual consent with a constant change of partners would be the general rule. The entry of captured women into the tribe as slaves would however introduce a new factor. In the constant wars of tribe with tribe at first all members of the vanquished would be mercilessly slain by the victors ; it would not be long, however, ere the desirability of reserving such of the women of the hostile tribe as could be seized alive, for slaves, would be realised. From the less warlike and enterprising character of the women neither attempts at escape nor plottings for vengeance were to be feared, whilst there were many spheres of action in which a woman's labour would be useful in a tribe engaged in a constant struggle with Nature. When the first animal lust for slaughter had passed these considerations would doubtless prevail to preserve the lives of such women as were yet living. Cannibalism, by leading to the seizure of prisoners alive, may have had some influence in the matter.

Those warriors who had been foremost in the fight would naturally claim the captured women as their special property, less as wives than as slaves and chattels. The woman would be her captor's property, her very life dependent upon his whim, nor would she be free to dispose of her own person in sexual intercourse without his consent. Private property in women would be established, and the idea once grasped the possession of a slave-wife would soon be considered a highly desirable

object by the bold young bucks, and kidnapping expeditions to seize the women of hostile tribes be of constant occurrence. The permanent unions thus established would have many and varied results, the "double moral code" would be introduced by which, whilst indiscriminate sexual intercourse would be permitted to the male proprietor, the slave-wife would be permitted no embrace save from her owner. Again, the children of the slave-wife would be her husband's property, and descent would be traced in the male line instead of the female. Not least important, to avoid the continual wars caused by the constant kidnapping of women, there would be arranged a system of compensations, the aggrieved tribe being compensated by payments in pelts, weapons, etc., thus paving the way to "marriage by purchase." This, in fact, would be a rapid development. Owing to constant kidnappings from tribe to tribe, the original class of free women held in common by the tribe must have been materially reduced. There must, however, as among all primitive peoples of the present day, have been a continued promiscuous intercourse between girls and boys : it is only among highly civilised peoples that the virtue of the young girl is deemed worthy of safeguard. This being the case, in the primitive society we are considering, it would be for her services that the wife would be desired rather than for purpose of sexual intercourse. The wife would be desired as a useful domestic animal, a beast of

burden and labourer, and her chastity would be the husband's property merely as was the right to her labour. Thus among all primitive peoples it is the women who carry burdens and perform the drudgery of savage life ; there is promiscuous intercourse between boys, men, and girls, and it is only when the girl has been married, i.e. sold to a proprietor, that her chastity becomes an object of importance, and then only insomuch as it is a breach of the property-right of the husband. The husband's consent having been obtained by presents, the woman can indulge in sexual intercourse with a stranger without blame from public opinion as regards wife, husband, or the temporary lover.

The wife then would be desired primarily as a domestic animal to render the conditions of life easier for the male, and the idea of "marriage by purchase" having been conceived from compensations arising from "marriages by capture," it would not be long ere the young bachelors conceived the idea of purchasing the daughters of those who possessed slave-wives, or of conciliating the male relatives of free-born girls by means of presents, instead of encountering the manifold dangers of an attempt at kidnapping. It must be remembered that among the free-born members of the tribe relationship would be recognised on the female side, and the male relatives from their superior strength and the general impression of women as an inferior caste would certainly assume

a certain amount of authority over them, alike in the way of protection and for more selfish reasons. The eldest brother, for instance, would in the absence of any recognised father be regarded as the head of the family, and inheritance pass from uncle to nephew on the uterine side. An aspirant for a free-born wife would thus pay his addresses to the eldest brother, or rather the most influential brother, for the purchase of a young sister or niece. And the number of wives a man might purchase would be limited only by his purchasing-power ; the greater the number of wives the greater the wealth and consideration of the husband. Whilst, however, marriage originated in the slavery of captured women and the desire for a domestic animal, the statements frequently made as to the absolute slavery of savage women are not quite correct. The division between the spheres of activity of man and woman would be in its origin a natural one. Woman, less from her inferiority in strength and activity than the strain of child-bearing—a savage woman becoming nubile at the age of twelve or even earlier will bear children annually, if not more rapidly, for ten to fifteen successive years, at the end of which time she is already a prematurely aged woman—would be unable to follow the chase, and be perforce relegated to the gathering of berries, roots, etc., and the building of the camp. Again, when on the march the constant danger of attack would oblige the men to move arms in hand and unencumbered,

thus rendering it necessary for the women to carry the various impedimenta of the settlement. Ere marriage or permanent unions of men and women had evolved, this division of labour would be by family groups of brothers and sisters; captured women, however, would naturally be relegated to the women's sphere of activity, with the exception of working for one particular master instead of a group, and private property in women having originated, it would, as we have seen, soon become the ambition of each man to have a servant to perform the more arduous and distasteful forms of work. But marriage being thus evolved would not, so far at least as the free-born wife was concerned, be absolute slavery. She would have friends and relations ready to take her part in any breach of habitual custom. In theory, no doubt, the power of the husband over his purchased wife would be absolute, but in practice it would be strictly circumscribed by the general customs of the tribe, any breach of which would be hotly resented alike by all free-born women and their free-born relatives. General custom would hold that woman was inferior; general custom would support the husband's claim to authority over his wife; general custom would hold that it was the wife's duty to build her husband's hut, gather esculent roots, herbs, etc., bear burdens on the march, and generally co-operate by relieving him of burdensome, tedious tasks which a man, weary from a long day's hunting, could hardly be

expected to perform for himself. But general custom would also assert the wife's claim to a certain amount of consideration at the hands of her lord ; excessive ill-treatment, for instance, would speedily provoke remonstrance from the wife's relatives, whilst for punishment and divorce he must have the consent of the tribal gathering, and the killing of a free-born wife, save under circumstances of gross provocation, would be likely to be avenged by her brothers. Finally, it may be added that savage women are, as a rule, bright-faced and happy-looking, whilst instances of mutual affection between husband and wife are by no means rare. It will be seen, then, that the statements occasionally made as to the absolute slavery of savage women are far from accurate, and are probably due to a confusion of the position of the captured slave-woman with that of the purchased free-born wife. In the former case the captured woman with no friends or relatives to whom to appeal against ill-usage is naturally at her master's mercy, but where the wife has relatives these do not, even among the least civilised communities, permit sisters or daughters to be cruelly ill-used with impunity. Where marriage is mainly exogamic, i.e. the women are taken by purchase or capture from another tribe, the woman being parted from her relatives will naturally be more wholly in the power of her husband ; on the other hand, where marriage is endogamic the influence of relatives will materially curb the husband's

power over his wife. Accordingly, as local conditions favour endogamic or exogamic marriage, so will the position of woman vary from tribe to tribe. It is then obviously impossible to make any dogmatic statement as to the general condition of primitive woman. In some parts of Australia, for instance, there are hen-pecked husbands, whilst among other tribes the position of woman is little better than absolute slavery. We may only surmise generally that the division of labour between man and woman is a natural one, and that where the wife has relatives her position is far from being as wearisome as is generally painted.

It remains for us to consider how soon Man, arrived at the phase of evolution described above, would strike a balance with his environment, and under the conditions of such environment cease to progress. Here we touch upon a bewilderingly complex problem involving an immense variety of considerations, which cannot be fully dealt with in a work of this description. Briefly considering the problem, however, it is obvious that semi-nomadic Man of this phase of evolution, a forest-dweller and dependent upon the chase and such esculent herbs, roots, and berries as could be gathered by his womenfolk, would not, so long as both varieties of foodstuffs could be readily obtained, feel any impulse to permanent settlement, the tapping of new food resources, or the domestication of any animal save the dog, which latter would be useful in the chase. Manufactures, therefore, would be

confined to weapons and utensils for carrying food or water during the constant journeyings, and since, owing to the necessity of constant migrations in search of game and scanty means of carriage, all impedimenta would need to be reduced to the irreducible minimum, there would be no impulse to accumulate manufactures or even food-stuffs save just before the winter season. The evolution of the bow, therefore, would represent the last step in evolution possible under such conditions of environment, an invention doubtless developed through successive steps from the accidental discovery of the "springald" properties of certain reeds and branches, their use in traps, and finally the evolution into the arrow-propelling bow. Here, so long as the conditions of environment remained constant, evolution would cease, a balance would have been reached beyond which it would be mere wasted effort to struggle. Flocks, if gathered, would be speedily broken up and scattered in the thick forest, the constant migrations would give no opportunity for agriculture. Above all, so long as game and herbs were plentiful, it would be mere waste of time to attempt the domestication of animals or tillage of the soil ; the same amount of effort expended in normal directions would produce a far greater result. Obviously, then, under such conditions, so long as there was an unlimited extent of forest land in which to roam, so long as game was plentiful, and esculent herbs and roots and fruits to be picked up by the womenfolk,

mankind would have struck a balance with environment and attained the maximum of development possible under such conditions. The next step could only come with the increase of population beyond the supporting-power of the food-resources previously available, with its result, an intensified struggle for existence among the forest peoples. The first consequence of these altered circumstances would be a series of wars and migrations, in which the weaker peoples would be forced into open lands, hill-tops, prairies, or deserts ; the second would be the gradual evolution of agriculture. We have seen that the strain of excessive child-bearing upon savage woman renders it impossible for her to follow the chase. When, therefore, game became scarcer, and more prolonged and arduous efforts became necessary to follow the chase, hunting-parties would be obliged to make expeditions of great length, lasting for many days, away from the base-camp where were left the women and children. In consequence it would become the custom to erect a more or less permanent settlement in a favourable situation, which would act as the general head-quarters of the tribe, and in which under guard of a few warriors would be left the women and children, whilst hunting-parties of men scoured the country around at favourable seasons in search of game. The semi-nomadic hunting-tribe would thus be more or less settled down, the women would occupy themselves in gathering herbs, nuts, etc., fishing,

building and improving their huts, and other sedentary occupations. Doubtless it was the occupation of the women in gathering herbs and roots which introduced the science of agriculture. Ears of wheat, barley, etc., would be discovered in their wild state and used for edible purposes. In course of time the women would note the natural growth of the grain and strive to aid it artificially ; they would note that a hot sun would wither the tender shoots and grasp the idea of watering them artificially ; the necessity of driving off birds would be speedily perceived : thus step by step as a result of the habits of keen, careful observation of the things a civilised man or woman passes by lightly as of no account, which are to be found in all savage peoples, there would be evolved the great science of agriculture. And with the evolution of agriculture would come a development of manufactures and the domestication of food-producing animals. The semi-nomadic hunting-tribe requires no special tools, the spear, the knife, and the axe satisfy all needs alike as weapons and tools ; but agriculture requires special implements distinct from weapons : manufactures, therefore, would have taken a distinct step forward. Again, with permanence of settlement, fowls would be attracted around the village in the hope of picking up scraps, whilst the huntsmen having captured young lambs, calves, or foals and brought them to the village to be killed for future eating, the idea of permitting them to breed and thus ensure a

permanent meat-supply would be grasped : from this it would be but a step to utilising sheep's, cow's, or mare's milk for drinking, butter, and cheeses, and the use of the stronger animals for beasts of burden, and finally riding and driving. All this, however, must have been the result of a period of transition lasting many hundred years, during which there were incessant wars and migratory movements of tribes. Man habituated to the chase would be reluctant to renounce it for the more tedious and arduous labour of agriculture ; the development of this latter science must, moreover, have been so gradual as to render the tribe, during the infancy of the evolution of agriculture, mainly dependent on the chase. As therefore game became scarce there would result a movement of the tribe into more favourable hunting-grounds : but these being already in possession of another tribe, this would be obliged to either repel the invaders by force of arms or itself invade the territories of some weaker tribe. And this tendency would be constant throughout the forest-belt, which was the breeding-place of Man as a species. So the period we are now considering must have been a welter of wars and bloodshed. We have all read in our histories of the series of great invasions which at this time swept over our island. Palæolithic Man was overwhelmed by Neolithic, Neolithic Man by the Iberians, Iberians by the Celts. These invasions represented the high-water marks of successive

tidal waves of migration which, spreading from the central breeding-place of the Caucasian peoples, swept west and north-west to Central Europe, the peninsulas of Greece, Italy, and Spain, to France, Germany, and the British Isles, the outermost limit of the great migrations. Nor was the movement solely from east to west; the tidal wave spread south-east to Asia Minor, Arabia, Egypt, and the southern Mediterranean coast, south to Assyria, Chaldea, and Babylonia, and east to Afghanistan, Beluchistan, and India. As tribe after tribe in the central breeding-place found the struggle for existence intensifying it fought for new hunting-grounds, driving the weaker tribes before it, and these weaker tribes drove others, and these again others, and so on, to the edge of the forest-belt, with the result that the tribes living on the extreme confines were pushed out of the forest altogether. Barren hill-tops, the prairie, or desert received this human refuse, which having no domesticated animals, and being ignorant of agriculture, was reduced to the level of the present-day Bushmen or Hottentots, or the ancient Picts and Highlanders. And as the more fortunate tribes continually exhausted their hunting-grounds, so the migratory movement would be continually repeated, thus continually expelling fresh denizens of the forest-belt to join the human refuse in more barren lands. But, despite the migratory movements of the tribes, game would become scarcer and scarcer, the permanent settlements would

become of increasing importance as the hunting-parties required a longer and longer range for their operations, and agriculture slowly developing would become of ever-increasing importance. Nevertheless, the tendency of population to increase beyond the supporting-power of agricultural science would continually render migratory movements by at least a portion of the inhabitants necessary : even the present age is no exception to this rule ; the emigration of the European peoples to "new lands," such as the United States, Canada, South America, and our colonies, during the last century has been on a larger scale than any preceding migration, and this emigration still continues.

With the formation of permanent settlements, however, and the evolution of agriculture as a science, albeit rudely practised, the migratory movements of tribes would be confined more and more to the younger members in excess of the supporting-power of the soil, and the simultaneous movement of a whole people be the result of altogether exceptional circumstances.

Considering the tribal community of this period, it will be remembered that in the primitive hunting-tribe chieftainship was exercised by the most physically and mentally powerful male. With the evolution of paternal descent, however, chieftainship would inevitably tend to become hereditary in a particular family : there would be no right of primogeniture, and the selection of one particu-

lar son of the hereditary family would be by general consent of the tribal elders, or, in other words, the ablest of the sons would succeed to the paternal power ; the genesis of a monarchy would, however, have been evolved. Whilst there would be little real union beyond the tribal community, yet the tie of a common speech would link tribes of the same race together, common action would have been imposed to a limited extent by the necessity of resisting invasion by an alien people or of migrating and attacking some weaker race. In either of these enterprises the need of a common head would be realised, and some one chief who had distinguished himself above his fellows would enjoy temporary authority during times of emergency, and general respect at all times. His services would be requested as arbitrator, etc.

The village community itself would be a family group or clan, all families being more or less related to one another, whilst the family of the chief held general authority. The term village, however, should not lead us to conceive invariably a group of houses built side by side. Local circumstances must have led to so much variety as to render it unwise to make a dogmatic statement : in forest land, where the amount of open ground would be small and clearings only to be made by dint of arduous labour with axe and spade, houses would naturally be built close to one another and a great deal of labour be done in common by the whole community : where, however, a tribe already

habituated to agriculture had been forced into more open land, homesteads could be built more loosely around the fortified residence of the chief. It would be in a community of this description that the idea of private property in land would be most likely to germinate. At the phase we are now considering, however, land would naturally be held in common by the clan, and there would be a certain amount of co-operation in labour. The probabilities are that the cultivated land was allotted by strips to each head of a family in rotation with each sowing, and that the work of ploughing, etc., was done in common.

The discovery of the art of working in metals was in all probability coincident with the evolution of agriculture : certainly it must have been posterior to the formation of permanent settlements. Doubtless, like most other important discoveries of the primitive period, it was the result of accident and environment. A tribe in a region where metallic ores lay close to the surface would naturally be likely to happen upon such ores in the search for suitable stones to manufacture weapons, and similar stones would also be used in the construction of fire-places. Nothing then would be more likely than that stones containing metallic ores, such as copper or tin, would "run" when exposed to heat. It must also be remembered that amongst primitive peoples who have not yet acquired the art of fabricating pottery, it is a common device to boil water by heating stones to a red-

heat and dropping them into a shallow vessel partially filled with the fluid. In this manner also when such stones contained metallic ores the smelting of metals would naturally evolve. The conventional division into Stone, Bronze, and Iron Ages, be it remarked, is only partially correct : doubtless there was a well-defined Stone Age ere the art of working in metals had been acquired, but the discoveries of iron, bronze, and other metals must have been wellnigh simultaneous. In Africa, for instance, where iron is plentiful but copper scarce, the natives passed direct from the use of stone to iron, and among the Aryan peoples the extensive use of bronze was in all probability due to a comparative scarcity of iron : the Spartans, for instance, used iron money during the earliest period of their history.

The use of metals for weapons and implements of industry doubtless originated from their use as ornaments. The bright shining surfaces of copper, tin, and even iron when polished would render them highly attractive to a savage people. At first the irregular lumps of metal would be suspended from the neck as charms or amulets just as they had been picked from amid the ashes. The susceptibility of metals to a polish would, however, be realised, leading to an attempt to give the ingots a flat surface by hammering ; as a result of observation the superior malleability of the metal when heated would be discovered, together with the art of casting ; rings and armlets would

be manufactured as ornaments ; and finally, copper and tin having been accidentally fused together, it would be discovered, doubtless as a result of painful accident, that the alloy thus produced could acquire a sharp cutting edge, rendering it immensely superior to flints or obsidian for use with weapons or implements of agriculture and other industries.

As we have seen, clothing as a protection against the climate must have originated from the movement of a southern people into the more rigorous climate of the north ; the use of clothing as ornament would, however, be anterior to this. Rare skins, the painting of the body in vivid colours, tattooing, and the use of rings, armlets, anklets, and ear-rings were doubtless the genesis of the sartorial fashions of to-day. With the movement of the Aryan tribes into colder regions and the evolution of agriculture with its concomitant the domestication of animals, there would naturally follow the development of the arts of weaving wool and flax, and dyeing. The skins of animals would form the earliest garments, but with the use of sinews and strips of hide for ropes, the idea of plaiting the patches of fleece rubbed off by the overladen sheep into string-like thread would necessarily follow, and in due course, by a process akin to crocheting, the thread would be woven into cloth. For the crochet-fork to develop into the spinning-wheel would follow in natural process of evolution. The use of flax doubtless

originated from the gathering of pliable osiers by the waterside for the making of baskets, and developed along similar lines to the spinning of wool. The art of dyeing would develop coincidently with the arts of spinning wool and weaving flax ; the desire for ornament would be as strong as the desire for clothes.

As we have seen, the primitive promiscuity of the semi-nomadic hunting-tribe gave place to "marriage by capture," which in turn evolved into "marriage by purchase"; we have traced the evolution of descent in the paternal line and of the "double moral code," which condemned in the married woman as a serious offence the sexual laxity permitted to her husband. This "double moral code" originally applied only to married women, young girls among all primitive peoples being permitted to dispose of their persons at their own free will; with, however, the growth of "marriage by purchase" and of the demand for chastity in the wife, it followed in natural course that the freedom hitherto permitted to the young girl should be replaced by a system of iron restraint. For a girl accustomed to dispose of her person in accordance with the fancy of the moment was scarcely likely to develop into a chaste and faithful wife! And with the growth of the system of tracing descent through the male line, this question of the chastity of the wife acquired an altogether new significance, for obviously an infidelity by the wife might result in the offspring

of a stranger acquiring considerable rights of inheritance in lieu of the lawful inheritors. So, to ensure the chastity of the wife, it became necessary to ensure the chastity of the young girl ; the relations of the bridegroom insisted that the bride should come to them unsullied, and a girl known to have had sexual intercourse outside lawful wedlock lost her reputation for unsullied chastity and all chances of marriage. And as no father wished to be left with an unmarried daughter on his hands —be it remembered that this meant the loss of a considerable purchase-price—it became regarded as a first essential to watch over the chastity of the young girl. Thus chastity was dinned into the ears of this latter from morning till night as the first duty of woman, and when in spite of all precaution a young girl was known to have “fallen,” the other women hastened to prove their own chastity by vehement repudiation of the offender, whilst husbands and fathers held her up as an awful example to wives and daughters.

And woman, from the circumstance of inferior strength and more peaceful industries, was regarded as naturally inferior to Man; whilst in these agricultural settlements she occupied a definite economic sphere, she could render valuable aid, for instance, in farm labour, whilst household work, the spinning of cloth and fabrication of flax, together with the grinding of corn, were spheres of industry in which her supremacy was readily acknowledged. A large number of female slaves,

therefore, could render valuable productive labour in return for their keep, and a wife trained to the supervision of such industries could render valuable service merely as forewoman. Thus we find a certain definite standard of education insisted on in the case of the young girl of the primitive Greek, Roman, or Hebrew (after the pastoral period) wealthy family. She must be chaste, submissive, first to her parents and after marriage to her husband and her husband's family, and last but not least, in her own special sphere she must be a hard-working, energetic forewoman to her husband's female slaves. The primitive Athenian preferred in his wife the solid qualities of the well-trained housekeeper to the superficial brilliance of the *Hetairæ*.

Lastly, we must consider the evolution of religion. Primitive Man lived surrounded by a host of demons : in the gloomy depths of the forest he heard the voice of some strange evil being in the sighing of the wind, the thunder and lightning were symbols of the dread rulers of the heavens, and in the most natural phenomena ignorant superstition saw the work of supernatural beings. So there evolved a mythology based on nature-worship ; the old men weaved strange fancies even as children will frighten one another with the "Bogey-Man," and with the belief in the existence of powerful sentient beings capable of gratifying desires or avenging slights there would naturally follow the attempt to propitiate such beings by

sacrifices and prayer. And from this it would be but a step to reinforcing the power of the community by attributing to the special intervention of these divinities those laws which were the product of Social necessity. "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not commit adultery," etc., all those fundamental laws which, as a matter of fact, we find to be taught by all religions, would be attributed to divine revelation in place of being the slow product of thousands of years of evolution. In similar fashion special gods are credited with the invention of the various arts and sciences. Agriculture, War, Justice, etc., has each its own special god, whilst each special trade, even to that of robbery, is under protection of some divinity.

From the circumstance of the outward phenomena of death resembling sleep, there would arise the theory that death itself is but sleep, and of the Immortality of the Soul; there would from this develop the idea of a future state, the "Valhalla" of the Norsemen, "Elysium" of the Greeks, and "Happy Hunting-Grounds" of the Red Indian. Ultimately, with the conception of the punishment of evil and reward of virtue, this would develop into the gloomy "Hell" of Christian mythology and the somewhat uninviting "Heaven."

At first, religion would be expressed coarsely in the worship of monstrous idols to which sacrifices would be made in times of national danger or individual necessity; with the growth of civilisation, however, there would be evolved a more

spiritual form of Idolatry, Man would conceive of gods made in his own image and endowed with like passions unto himself : thus there would arise the graceful Græco-Roman mythology and the conception of the arrogant, vindictive Jew of the Old Testament. And this latter, it may be remarked, was not in reality a monotheistic conception ; the Jews conceived of their God as a God among other gods and the special protector of the Jewish race. There is nothing more monotheistic in this than in “ Great is Diana of the Ephesians ! ”

With the conception of a “ human ” tribal God, there would follow the building of special temples and the formulation of a fixed ritual in honour of the divinity patterned upon the forms of respect paid to a temporal monarch, and with the grouping of many tribes into a nation of considerable size there would ensue the conception of a “ Supreme Being ” representing the nation generally as compared with the tribal divinities, whilst these latter, although still considered the patrons of special localities, would acquire new *rôles* as the protectors of the trades or industries originating at or most prevalent in such localities. Thus in the Græco-Roman mythology we have Jupiter, the Lord of the Universe, and a host of lesser deities connected with localities and industries ; in the Hebrew mythology we have Yahveh, the supreme God, a host of archangels and angels, a “ Devil ” and a host of “ demons,” and the “ patriarchs.” The Scandinavian myths bear a family likeness to

the first quoted. Here, for the moment, we must pause in the consideration of the subject.

We have seen that with the formation of permanent settlements there would follow the evolution in rudimentary form of the most important of the various arts and sciences; we have traced the evolution of sexual morality, and it is easy to realise that what may be for convenience termed property morality must have progressed along similar lines: in fact, have been anterior to the growth of sexual morality. For this, as we have seen, owed its genesis simply and solely to an existing sentiment of respect for private property. The sentiment of ownership must, in fact, have existed in Man ere he evolved from the beast stage: it is to be found even among animals: the dog which has seized a bone will furiously combat any attempt of another dog to share in his spoil. Whilst, therefore, there must even in the earliest stages of the evolution of Man have been a certain amount of co-operation in the procuring of food, yet it is obvious that this co-operation must have been limited to the satisfaction of the most obvious needs: that the division of the spoils of the chase must have been decided mainly by the principle of the strongest grabbing as much as he could, and that so far as regards weapons, amulets, etc., the instinct for individual property must have been strongly developed. And this instinct applied to captured women developed ultimately, as we have before seen, into sexual

morality. With the growth of organisation among the community the primitive law of brute force—

“The good old law, the simple plan
That he should take who has the power
And he should keep who can”—

would become veiled in a general sentiment in favour of the “sanctity” of private property. Theft, were the individual left purely to his own resources, would result in an incessant series of brawls, and no man could feel his property safe. Thus it became to the general interest of the property-holders to punish theft, just as it became to the general interest of all married men to punish adultery, and of fathers to safeguard their daughters from illicit sexual intercourse. And with the evolution of religion, property morality, like sexual morality, was held to represent the revelation of a divinity instead of the general interest of a community of married men and property-holders as developed through a long course of evolution; thus a breach of property morality was, like a breach of sexual morality, held to represent not only a crime against the community to be punished in this world, but a breach of “divine” law to be punished by “Hell,” “Hades,” and other supernatural terrors in the life hereafter. Theft and adultery were thus not merely breaches of law, but “sins.” The further development of the community would carry property morality another step in advance; homicide, brawls, etc., if permitted to rage un-

checked, would result in a series of outrages and vendettas; it would thus become the general interest of the community to check such occurrences, and there would thus ensue the tables of compensations to be found even yet among primitive peoples, whereby a man who slew a fellow-man was obliged to pay a definite sum in compensation to the relatives of the deceased, the sum varying with the rank of the deceased, and in which a graduated scale of payments provided for all manner of offences down to outraging a female slave. But, needless to say, the luckless wight unable to pay these charges received scant mercy.

II

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY : TO THE FALL OF ROME

WE have traced the evolution of the clan and of the tribal monarchy, the development of this latter into its hereditary and centralised form would be an essential factor in the evolution of Society. The small village community with its circumscribed environment and limited range of ideas, bound down to an unvarying routine by the iron laws of custom and holding but slight intercourse with the surrounding villages, could not possibly rise above a certain dead-level of semi-barbarism, the reflex action of the circumstances of its environment. It could not be until there had ensued widespread intercourse with neighbouring peoples, with the comparison of products and exchange of ideas resulting from such intercourse, that *civilisation* could develop. And yet obviously there could be no such widespread intercourse until there had evolved some bond of union linking together the scattered villages : for it is considered no crime among primitive peoples to steal from or ill-treat a stranger ; thus travel or intercourse, save

by large and well-armed parties, would be impossible, whilst it would be the evolution of the tribal monarchy which could alone provide the link which would draw such large parties together. The evolution of a monarchy would, therefore, be an essential phase in the evolution of Society ; in its origin this monarchy, like the clan-chieftainship, would be of an elective character, some conspicuous clan-chieftain being elected as a temporary leader. This temporary leadership would, however, soon become permanent and elective in a particular family, whilst the elective monarch would, by force of arms, impose his rule upon hostile peoples, and by the grant of lands among these to his most prominent followers ultimately materially increase his influence among his people. It may be added that in the occasional gathering of the oldest and wisest of the clan-chieftains as a consultive body we get the genesis of a Senate, whilst in the gathering of the great mass of tribal warriors ranged in order of clans to witness the inauguration of a new monarch, the proclamation of a law, or in times of national emergency, we have the germs of parliamentary government. The primitive Roman assemblage by Curiæ, be it remarked, must have been a gathering not unlike that pictured above.

It is in accordance with the law previously noted, that the evolution of the highest forms of life is dependent upon a continually changing environment with its reflex action in stimulating

thought and energy, that civilisation developed most readily in regions peculiarly favourable to widespread intercourse with the consequent comparison of products and exchange of ideas between peoples existing under varying conditions of environment, which can alone give rise to a higher form of combined effort than the narrow stereotyped customs of the village-community. Thus we find that the civilisation of Egypt developed along the banks of the Upper Nile under circumstances of environment which, requiring considerable mental effort in the regulation of the Nile floods, could not fail to evolve exact sciences such as geometry and mathematics, whilst the river afforded a convenient highway alike for social intercourse and the exchange of products, whilst communicating in its lower course with the Mediterranean coast countries and by desert routes with the Red Sea, Arabia, and on the west the oases of Libya. Here obviously we have a set of natural conditions eminently favourable to the development of civilisation.

Again, in Babylonia we have an open treeless region, watered by the two great rivers Tigris and Euphrates, the fertile delta of which was obviously suited to become the nursery of an important civilisation, whilst in the Punjab, the "Land of the Five Rivers," the great rivers of China, and the primitive Aryan civilisation which developed along the Elbe, we discern equally the nurseries of the Indian, Chinese, and Scandinavian civilisations.

These kindred phenomena operating over a vast area and under widely varying local conditions lead one to conclude that the great rivers are the natural nurseries of civilisation, from which there ensues a steady flow of colonisation to island states such as Britain, Crete, and the *Ægean* archipelago, and Japan ; and also to fertile peninsulas such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. We must in this connection distinguish clearly between two distinct lines of migration : that by sea and that by land. Now the development of shipping would naturally proceed most rapidly with a river civilisation such as that of Egypt, and the development of commerce would naturally lead to the planting of colonies in favourable sites, e.g. Crete and the Greek archipelago. It appears to me, therefore, to be a fair enough inference that the "Minoan" and "Etruscan" civilisations were offshoots from Egypt by Egyptian colonies, and eventually overborne by the landward migration from south to north of the Caucasian peoples.

Passing this question, it will be remembered that we traced the migrations of the various Aryan tribes east, west, north, and south; the probabilities are, therefore, that the progenitors of the Egyptian and Babylonian civilisations belonged to the same stock, and that the divergencies of their descendants, alike in speech, physical structure, and culture, were the result of differing environment. Again, we have traced the evolution of agriculture with its auxiliary arts and sciences,

and have noted its gradual development coincidently with increased range of migration, i.e. as the nomadic hunting-tribe progressed farther and farther from its centre of evolution it would, from the increasing scarcity of game, become more and more dependent upon agriculture. We have also noted that repeated waves of migration from the centre of evolution expanding outwards would continually evoke fresh impulses of migration. In considering then these waves of invasion we note that each successive wave of invaders would be a little superior in general culture to the tribe it drove before it. This is a most important point, as it explains a fact which has often baffled historians : that the Greek, Egyptian, and Babylonian civilisations even in the most rudimentary stages known to us appear to start "full-blown" with a highly developed pottery and a general level of culture far surpassing the most primitive present-day savages. The explanation obviously is to be found in the fact that the Egyptians, Chaldees, and Greeks had attained this level of culture ere they had arrived in Egypt, Chaldea, or Greece. It is, in fact, when one comes to consider the question, obvious that only a people possessed of a considerable level of primitive culture could have survived the natural conditions of Egypt or Babylonia. How could a people, ignorant of agriculture and devoid of domesticated animals, have found means of existence and to develop a civilisation in open gameless land such as Egypt

or Chaldea ? However suited to become the nurseries of civilisation, these regions could never have acted as breeding-places for a purely indigenous type of Man. A people possessed of flocks and herds, of a degree of social organisation, and of a certain degree of general culture could alone have survived and flourished under such conditions. The types commonly regarded as "indigenous" were probably the outpourings of the earliest migrations, the primitive hunting-tribes early expelled from the forest-belt and forced to eke out a squalid existence under overwhelmingly adverse conditions as best they might. But these weaklings could never have developed a civilisation.

It may be taken then as proven that the development of the Egyptian, Chaldean, and Indian civilisations was preceded by the colonisation of these regions by a people already possessed of a level of culture akin to that reached at the end of our last chapter. Just, in fact, as Celts and Saxons had reached a high level of culture, had a recognised form of marriage, domesticated animals, metal weapons, and were acquainted with the art of agriculture ere they invaded Britain. These arts were acquired in the process of the great migrations across the continent of Europe, migrations which lasted thousands of years.

Egypt, Chaldea, and India were recipients of constant waves of immigration in like manner to Britain, and each set of invaders would have

reached a slightly higher level of culture than the preceding invaders. We must carefully consider this point. The first set of invaders into regions such as Egypt and Chaldea unable to breed an indigenous type of Man would be the refuse from the forest regions, the primitive nomadic Bushman type, which would either perish under the adverse conditions or from ignorance of agriculture and absence of domesticated animals be unable to rise above barest subsistence-level. The next set of invaders expelled by growing pressure in the forest-belt would possess some slight knowledge of agriculture and small herds. These would develop into a pastoral people, the open prairie land would be good grazing for their herds, and these could supply all the wants of a primitive community—milk, butter, cheeses, leather, wool, and animal flesh being provided by the herds there would be little inducement to the development of agriculture, whilst war and the practice of infanticide would check any inconvenient tendency to increase beyond the supporting-power of the herd. Here, again, we have another instance of a coincidence between the development of Man and the circumstances of his environment. The pastoral peoples are to-day in much the same state of civilisation as that described in the early chapters of the Old Testament.

It would be the influx of a fresh set of invaders possessed already of a highly developed agriculture which could alone upset this balance and

lead to the development of a higher form of civilisation. Game would have become yet scarcer in the forest regions, agriculture would have developed, whilst tribes in barren lands would cast envious eyes upon the more fruitful regions occupied by their neighbours. So after a few bad seasons the tribesmen most badly circumstanced would gird up their loins, sharpen swords and spears, and set out for the lands "flowing with milk and honey" adjacent, and from this there would follow a whole series of wars and migrations throughout the forest-belt. The inevitable result of all this would be a fresh influx of immigration along the "land bridges" to Egypt and Greece, north-west to Central Europe, and the Carpathian ring, and south to Chaldea. In this latter immigration the pastoral peoples would inevitably be driven south and east to Arabia or to the adoption of other means of existence by the break-up of their grazing-grounds.

With what we may broadly term the third series of migrations, the advent of peoples comparatively highly skilled in agriculture and kindred arts into open regions most favourable to the development of these sciences and to human intercourse generally, the dawn of civilisation would have truly begun. In the open land of Egypt, Chaldea, and the Punjab agriculture would naturally develop more rapidly than in forest regions where painful toil with the axe would be necessary to clear ground for tillage, whilst the facilities for

intercourse given by navigable streams and the possession of good natural resources such as mines would naturally result in a more rapid development of civilisation than in wooded regions less favourably circumstanced. It is, therefore, eminently natural that Egypt, Chaldea, and India should have developed complex civilisations whilst Europe was plunged in barbarism. Again, however, the early matured civilisations of Egypt and Babylonia could not fail to react upon one another, on Europe and on the surrounding peoples. Asia Minor generally would develop a system of civilised states under Babylonian and Egyptian influences, even as later Roman and Hellenistic culture diffused itself over the whole civilised world. It is scarcely necessary to remark, for instance, that the creation mythology of the Old Testament was borrowed from the mythology of Babylon. The influence of these old civilisations would, however, reach yet further; colonies from Egypt and states under influence of Egyptian and Babylonish culture, such as Phœnicia, would materially influence Southern Europe. The peninsulas of Greece and Italy and the islands of the AEGEAN archipelago would obviously be favourably circumstanced for intercourse with Egypt and *via* Syria, Phœnicia, and Asia Minor with Babylon, and thus could not fail to develop a civilisation much more rapidly than the less favourably circumstanced tribes north of them. The "Etruscan" and "Minoan"

civilisations would be the first results, and these alien civilisations would inevitably, in course of time, become absorbed by the native races just as the Norman civilisation was absorbed by the Saxons or the English settlements in Ireland by the Irish. The first result of such absorption of a higher race by one inferior in culture would, no doubt, be a temporary recrudescence of barbarism ; the alien ruling race would sink to the level of the inferior, and the stilted artificial civilisation would decay just as would English culture in India were the Indian peoples to be left to their own resources. Given, however, a virile native race, this could not fail to develop a native civilisation influenced by, but not mainly dependent on, the alien influences : thus the "Minoan" civilisation would develop into that of Greece just as the civilisation of the Normans developed into the civilisation of modern England, and, later, in like manner, the civilisation of the Etruscans would give place to that of the Latin peoples and of Rome.

Greece and Italy, more favourably circumstanced than the races further north, would naturally develop their civilisations much more rapidly. The development of the northern peoples, dwelling in small communities isolated by vast tangled forests, would proceed much more slowly and painfully. First, as we all know, there ensued that vast cataclysm, the fall of the Western Empire. This brings us to a point which I should like to make clear. I have said that each successive wave of

migration is by a race slightly superior in general culture to *the previous invaders*. This is quite different from saying that each set of invaders is superior in culture to the people invaded : it would be obvious folly to assert that the Barbarians who overran Rome were superior in culture to the peoples invaded : on the other hand, it is quite certain that the hosts led by Attila were better armed, equipped, organised, and clad, i.e. had reached a higher level of culture than any previous Barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire.

The races, therefore, which brought about the fall of the Western Cæsars were races already developing their own civilisation, and with the settlement of the lands of the Western Empire by these peoples they continued to develop their own civilisation : no doubt considerably under Roman influences, as, no doubt, Greek civilisation must have developed under Minoan influences and Roman culture been influenced by that of the Etruscans ; nevertheless the probabilities are that the civilisation of the West would have developed with equal rapidity and altered in no material degree if the Roman Empire had never existed and the name Christ had never been written. There would still have been the great movement of the tribes north and east, for this was due to economic causes, and the colonisation of England by Saxons ; there would still have been the later outburst of the Scandinavians and the successive infusions of Norse and Norman blood into the

Saxon strain, the development of English civilisation must have followed in due course, and alike our moral standards and level of general culture would to-day be unaltered. The genius of the West for patient observation and practical experiment is entirely distinct from the speculative bent of the theorists of the Classical period, and the progress in mechanical science which, with its aftermaths, is the outstanding feature of Western civilisation, has in no material degree been influenced by our inheritance of Classical literature.

In countries such as Egypt and Chaldea, favourable to the rapid development of civilisation, the primitive tribal monarchy must, during the course of a few centuries, have given place to an hereditary military empire. Unfortunately we know so little as to the actual origin of Egyptian and Babylonian institutions that it would be unsafe to dogmatise : our knowledge of both civilisations comes in the main from periods during which they had reached a comparatively high stage of development, and of the Formative Period, during which institutions were in process of evolution, we know sadly little. Nevertheless we may fairly assume that the colonisation of Egypt and Chaldea must have been along lines not dissimilar to the colonisation of our own country by Iberians, Celts, Saxons, and Danes. Successive waves of invaders from the great forest-clad Armenian uplands, which formed the central breeding-place of our race, would swarm in all directions, and the Chaldean plains

to the south would be one of the very first regions to receive the overflow of the migrations. For this reason it appears to me that the Babylonian civilisation must have been hundreds if not thousands of years older than that of Egypt. This latter country, which could only be reached by a much more circuitous route, *via* Syria and the isthmus of Suez, could only have been colonised by a race capable of developing civilisation at a considerably later period than the first-named region.

As we have seen, it would not be until the advent into these regions of a race already mainly dependent upon agriculture that the development of a civilisation would begin : the evolution of Babylonian civilisation would, therefore, begin with the arrival of a race already at a level of culture certainly not inferior to that of our own Celtic invaders. They came probably in war-bands akin to those of the Saxons sweeping through the country in tumultuous hordes, now and then temporarily united in some common enterprise, but generally acting each little band or clan at its own sweet will and settling down at whatsoever spot seemed best suited to its purpose, the primitive inhabitants being exterminated, seized as slaves, or driven to flight. So there would arise along the fertile river-valleys a series of clan-settlements, each ruled by a clan-chieftain. In these settlements the land would be held as common property to the clan, and divided in strips among the free-

born members either by lot or in rotation with each sowing. The conception of private property, however, would certainly exist as regards weapons, clothes, slaves, herds, etc., and it would certainly happen that those members of the clan who supplied a larger proportion of draught-oxen to the common plough, or in other ways undertook a larger proportion of the labour of agriculture, would demand a proportionate share of the crop. From this it would obviously be but a step to the conception of private property in land.

With the growth of permanent settlement it would speedily happen that some one among the clan-chieftains would acquire authority over his neighbours. The rivers, whilst affording a ready means of intercourse, would be no less dangerous avenues of attack, and the necessity of gaining the protection of some chief pre-eminent in military skill or of otherwise combining for mutual protection would be speedily borne upon the weaker chieftains. Two forms of monarchy would thus arise—one partially elective by an assembly of clan-chieftains and, no doubt, hereditary in a great family, the other of a more purely military character : in both cases, however, the tendency would be to the concentration of power into a single pair of hands. And as with the gradual absorption of weaker monarchies by more virile ones the numerous petty kingdoms would be merged into fewer but more powerful sovereignties, this tendency would operate with increasing vigour. In

fact, in like manner as the petty Celtic and Saxon chieftainships in Britain merged into powerful tribal lordships, so there would be a similar process of evolution with the immigrants to Egypt and Chaldea ; but from the circumstance of the greater facilities to social development afforded by the natural features of these regions the process was in all probability developed with much greater rapidity than was the case in our own country. In an open region, threaded by navigable waterways and devoid of rocky hill-tops to act as natural fortresses, the influence of a military conquest would necessarily be more widely felt than in a country where such conditions were absent : the Celtic or Saxon clan-chieftain could flee to the depths of a forest or take refuge in a hill-fortress, from whence the monarch could only with difficulty procure his capture or subjugation, whilst under all circumstances the chastisement of a rebellious chieftain meant a military expedition through dense forest with all its attendant delays and dangers. Far different, however, the case in Egypt or Babylon. Here to flee far from the river-belts would mean in all probability to perish in the barren lands, whilst to remain in the inhabited region meant merely to fall a helpless prey to the royal forces, to which the river would afford a safe and easy highway. Obviously under such circumstances the growth of a centralised monarchy must have been a matter of great rapidity, whilst there could have been no such

assertion of power by the semi-feudal tribal chieftains as in Britain forced a *Magna Charta* on the reluctant John and repeatedly curbed the power of the Crown. With the development of this centralised monarchy there would necessarily follow the development of *trade* as distinct from mere casual barter within the village community. The king would require acts of homage from the subordinate chieftains, whilst the founders of the royal power idealised in the memory of their followers would be credited with superhuman virtues and qualities and raised to a semi-divine pedestal. The legends about King David in the Old Testament show us this process at work. This general belief, however, in the divine origin of the royal race would impose important religious duties upon the king as representing his people. He would be the chief pontiff who propitiated the spirits of the river; upon him it would devolve to make sacrifices, etc. And in these sacrifices it would, of course, be necessary for him to be attended by his most influential followers. So there would come about periodical gatherings of the subordinate chiefs together with trains of followers at the royal residence for semi-political, semi-religious reasons, and these gatherings could not fail to result in the development of trade. Such assemblages would last for many days and be attended by peoples from villages separated by considerable distances and living under a variety of conditions of environment: a com-

parison of the products of one village with those of another could not fail to result, and it is equally certain that there could not fail to ensue a widespread exchange of articles by barter or, vulgarly, by the simple process of "swop." One man would see a sword which was more handsomely ornamented than his own, another would be attracted by a brightly dyed mantle, pottery of varying form and ornamentation would attract attention, whilst weapons, tools, and a thousand and one other objects lead to widespread bargaining and exchanges. Ere long, therefore, these assemblages of tribal chieftains would acquire commercial as well as religious and political signification. The monarch would naturally fix as the meeting-place for these gatherings a village situated in a central position and readily accessible from all parts of the kingdom, and which would, therefore, be a natural centre for the exchange of products; thus it would follow in natural course, that the inhabitants of this centre would not only have an excellent opportunity to dispose of their own products by an advantageous exchange, but also to act as "middlemen," acquiring the products of one region not only for their own use, but to re-exchange them, advantageously, for the products of another, and by continual re-exchanges, always with "middleman's" profits, acquire a surplus of wealth to be used in the purchase of articles of luxury, jewellery, handsome slave-girls, etc., or to be used still further in developing the system of

"middleman's" exchanges. A distinctly mercantile class would thus arise in the capital, and along with the growth of a mercantile class there would develop a monetary system. This would evolve very naturally; the merchant class of whom we are speaking would speedily discover that some one article was in general demand among the inhabitants of the surrounding districts—gold, silver, and copper, for instance, would be in universal demand for ornaments and, similarly, bars of iron for the manufacture of tools; again, bulky heaps of merchandise would be difficult to carry about and be but a cumbrous means of exchange, it would follow then that it would be much more convenient for the merchant to exchange his goods for some readily portable article generally in demand, and afterwards re-exchange this article at his leisure for those goods he desired, than to lug cumbrous heaps of merchandise in search of a customer who had to sell in exchange those very articles he desired. It must be remembered that with a system of barter it would be a matter mainly of chance for two men to meet each of whom possessed for exchange the very articles they respectively desired. One man, for instance, might possess pottery and desire to purchase knives, whilst another man possessed knives and desired to purchase rings. If under a system of barter or "swop" those two men were to meet, obviously the only thing to do if they meant to effect an exchange would be for the man who

possessed the knives to accept the pottery in exchange and trust to luck to meet a customer possessed of rings ; a course which would mean general inconvenience. The use of a general medium of exchange would be the natural solution of this difficulty. The man possessed of pottery would under such a system seek a customer who wanted pottery and was possessed of that quantity of the general medium he deemed its equivalent value, then he would seek the man possessed of knives who, having in like manner exchanged his knives for the necessary quantity of the general medium, would in like manner seek a man possessed of rings which he desired to sell. This general medium of exchange would thus naturally become a standard of value by which all commodities would be measured ; people in asking themselves the value of goods would mentally enquire how much of a definite weight or quantity of the general medium these goods would be likely to exchange for. In West Africa, for instance, during the early days of European intercourse, trade was just merging from the barter into the monetary system, and iron was rare and considered of great value. A bar of iron, therefore, became a definite standard of value and medium of exchange. People spoke of a "bar" of cotton, ivory, or other trade-goods, meaning the quantity of such goods a bar of iron would exchange for, and bars of iron acted as money. Cowrie-shells similarly being in

general demand acted as a recognised medium of exchange.

The earliest form of copper, gold, and silver money was probably provided by rings and bangles, these being readily portable and in general demand, whilst bars of these metals of recognised weight would also provide a means of exchange: the English pound, for instance, originally signified a pound's weight of silver. As, however, money came to be regarded more and more as a means of exchange instead of ornamentation or means of ornamentation, it would gradually acquire the form suitable for purposes of exchange: at first a flat disc form perforated in the centre to be strung on a string, and finally the form in which we now know it—circular, engraved, and alloyed with baser metals to give it strength against wear and tear.

The development of the mercantile class doubtless proceeded coincidently with the development of the monetary system. As the primitive barter system gave place to an exchange by a general medium the idea of *profit* would necessarily originate. Even with barter it would naturally be the endeavour of each party to the transaction to obtain the utmost value possible for the minimum of value in exchange: the man with the pottery, for instance, would make every endeavour to gain as many knives as possible in exchange for the least possible number of pots. And in these transactions the sharpest-headed customers would

naturally acquire a certain surplus of value. With the introduction of the monetary system, even in its most rudimentary form, the natural tendency to obtain the maximum of value for the minimum of expenditure would receive a further stimulus, and the idea of buying goods cheap and selling them dear would be a natural evolution. The man with the pottery of our analogy, if he happened to be a resident at the capital and knew that the man with knives wanted rings which were manufactured in a village to the north, whereas the man with the knives lived many miles to the south, would, were he a smart fellow, soon hit upon the idea of using his central position to buy rings cheaply from the man who made them, and sell them as dearly as possible to the man with the knives, and in like manner he would buy knives from the man with the knives and sell them to the man with the rings, making a like profit on the transaction.

The most probable course of evolution would be that the shrewdest craftsmen in the capital, be they spear-makers, potters, or followers of any handicraft, would purchase such objects among the visitors to the capital as caught their fancy—a bangle from one, a dagger from another, and so on; these put down for the nonce among their own merchandise would promptly attract notice among others of the visitors and be asked in purchase. Thus these craftsmen would discover that there was profit to be made by acting

as "middlemen" to the visitors from various regions, and from thence it would be but a step to systematically purchasing goods for purposes of retail. Again, it must be remembered that the semi-religious fairs having given the original impulse to commerce and the rule of a strong monarchy enforcing order, the capital would form a natural centre for the exchange of products all the year round as well as at festival time. The ring-maker in the north who wanted knives would find it cheaper and more convenient to go to the capital and buy knives from a "middleman" than to make the long journey to the knife-maker in the south, and the same considerations would apply with equal force to the latter. So the temporary traffic of the fairs would develop into a steady all-the-year-round flow of commerce.

Along with the development of this latter there would develop the specialisation of industry. Those villages situated near copper or other mines, discovering that there was a demand for copper and other metals, would devote their energies to mining, exchanging the ore produced for the various luxuries and necessities of life; and with the increased attention to mining there would develop increased skill in extracting the ore. Similarly, with the increased demand for metal ornaments, weapons, and tools, those people most skilful in working in metals would devote more and more of their time to these handicrafts, to the exclusion of all other forms of industry, such as

agriculture or weaving, and with the increased attention given to working in metals there would develop increased skill in such industries—Jack-of-all-trades is master of none. The same thing would apply to all other forms of industry, weaving, architecture, brick-making, carpentry, and scores of others ; villages most favourably situated for the practice of such occupations would develop them to the exclusion of all others, and with the specialisation of industry there would follow an all-round increase of skill ; civilisation would have commenced to develop.

We have seen that the growth of a strong centralised monarchy would be a necessary phase in the evolution of Society ; coincident with the growth of the Egyptian and Chaldean monarchies there would necessarily proceed alike the evolution of an official caste and of a landed aristocracy. The king would require tribute from the subordinate chiefs and levy taxes upon trade, all of which would necessitate tax-gatherers, and, the earliest taxes being paid in kind, storehouses. Again, justice would be in the hands of the king, private warfare between chieftain and chieftain would be suppressed as a breach of the royal prerogative, and clans at issue must appeal to the king for arbitration and bow to his decision ; thus there would originate a class of royal judges with attendant scribes and pleaders.

With the growth alike of private property and of the royal power, the primitive conception of

land as being the common property of the clan would undergo a corresponding modification. As we have seen with the development of inequalities of wealth, those clansmen who provided a larger number of draught-animals to the common plough or otherwise undertook a disproportionate share in the labour of agriculture would naturally claim a proportionate share in the harvest, and the obvious solution would be for the clan-chieftain to allot to them a larger number of strips in the annual allotments than would be received by their poorer neighbours. It must be remembered in this connection that the permanent enclosure of fields is a purely modern device scarce a century and a half old. With the primitive community, even when private property in land had existed for many centuries, the arable land would be divided into two or three fields which would be cropped in rotation, as was the case in Great Britain up to the latter half of the eighteenth century. And with each sowing the land to be cropped would be divided into strips proportionate to the number of freeholders in the community and ploughed with a common plough.

The tendency of wealth being to accumulate, it would necessarily follow that in the course of a few generations the longest-headed and shrewdest family among the community would acquire the land-rights of their neighbours: loans made in times of scarcity would doubtless be the general means of acquisition; anyhow, it would in the

course of a short time come about that the great majority of the community would have bartered away their rights to the land, which would mean that they must either emigrate, find other means of livelihood, or starve. But the landlord would require labour to cultivate his newly acquired land, whilst the landless man would, in most cases, be loath to leave his friends and kinsmen and venture into the unknown. The obvious solution in those days, when money was scarce and the idea of paying regular wages scarcely conceived, would be for the landlord to give the landless man a small piece of ground to support himself and family on condition of his working so many days a week in cultivating the land belonging to the lord, which in natural evolution would give us the English manorial system of the tenth to thirteenth centuries, a system, be it remarked, which, either in its germs or its more highly developed forms, can be traced in every agricultural system in the world.¹

¹ There is so much popular misconception as to the manorial system that it is as well to make it clear that this system was a natural economic growth in no way based on "robbery and spoliation." The system had already developed in England a full century ere the Norman Conquest, and the coming of the invaders found the bulk of the Saxons landless men. The idea that under this system the cultivators of the land were serfs devoid of rights has in reality little basis in fact. No doubt in a lawless age might would be right, and an arrogant, overbearing lord would ruthlessly trample upon the rights of the villagers. But obviously such instances must have been the exception, not the rule, and there is ample evidence to show that the villagers in reality possessed distinct customary rights.

Among the Egyptians and Babylonians the development of landed property must have proceeded along lines little different from the above; the feudal system, however, which in our own country accompanied this development, could among these peoples have had little importance. No doubt, landholders who defied the royal power would be deprived of their lands, and the domains thus confiscated would be bestowed on royal favourites; but from the more rapid development of the royal power and of the mercantile class in these countries the hierarchy of feudal lords would be speedily replaced by paid officials, viceroys, governors of provinces, etc., whilst a professional or semi-professional army would, from its greater mobility and generally superior efficiency, replace the tumultuous feudal horde.

The growth of commerce and of wealth would naturally lead to a development of the various arts and sciences. The art of writing, no doubt, originated at a very early period as a means by which chiefs could communicate for purpose of attack and defence. Rude pictures traced on smooth skin or flat wood with the end of a burnt stick would doubtless be the earliest means of exchanging ideas at a distance; whilst just as nowadays a civilised girl will tie a knot in her handkerchief to remind her of some trifle she fears to forget, so the primitive hunter and warrior resorted to similar measures. With the evolution of the tribal monarchy this last means of record

would undergo a considerable development, as was the case in Peru ere the Spanish Conquest—tribute paid in kind would have to be collected and accounted for, and for various other reasons records would have to be kept, for which the primitive picture-writing would be but a clumsy medium. So there would develop a class of men charged with the keeping of accounts, and these would use as their account-books strings of various colours, each colour having a special signification as equally would have each knot. Red, for instance, might mean rice, and each knot might represent ten bushels. Thus ten knots tied on a red cord would mean that one hundred bushels of rice had been paid into the royal storehouses.

This method, however, whilst not unsuited to keeping accounts, would be very cumbrous and obviously incapable of being used as a medium for the exchange of ideas, thus picture-writing would continue to be used and, with the increase of civilisation, develop equally. Thus the draughtsman would not have time to make elaborate drawings, but would scratch off a few lines roughly representing the pictured object; thus eventually these few scratches would become a conventional sign representing a definite *idea* or word, but bearing very little resemblance indeed to the object indicated by this word, i.e. ideographic as distinct from hieroglyphic writing would have developed. There would also have developed a system of phonetic spelling; for instance, a

scribe who wished to write the word "buttercup," instead of making a special sign to represent this flower, would use the two signs for "butter" and "cup" and join them together. The next step would be to represent the ideograph by abbreviated signs, in fact, develop a sort of shorthand; the "hieratic script" of later Egypt, and finally the custom of using such of these abbreviated signs as most nearly resembled the root-sounds to build up words by phonetic spelling, would give us alphabetic writing with vowels and consonants. The superfluous signs would gradually drop out of use, and only those which represented root-sounds would survive.

The "cuneiform" script of the primitive Chaldeans or Sumerians possesses a peculiarity in that it was written not upon papyrus, but upon wet clay: thus the artist in roughly scratching his picture with a sharp-pointed stylus would find it difficult to make curves and scratch his picture in a series of straight lines roughly representing the pictured object, whilst again when writing rapidly there would be at the end of each stroke a sharp downward pressure resulting in a series of wedges instead of straight lines. Thus there would evolve the peculiar wedge-shaped characters of the Sumerians, Babylonians, and Assyrians, which ultimately developed into the Persian symbols and, *via* Phoenicia, into the Greek alphabet. And from the fact that these clay tablets were afterwards baked there has come down to us a

host of documents preserved in the debris of Chaldean civilisation, to which is almost entirely due our knowledge of this early period.

Along with the development of writing would proceed the development of numerals and Arithmetic. The distinction between numbers must have occurred very early in the history of the human race, and the fingers would be the earliest means of representing plurality. Numbers up to ten would be represented by raising a varying number of fingers, whilst numbers such as twenty, thirty, etc., would be represented by opening and closing the fingers and thumbs of both hands successively. The intermediate numbers, such as twenty-seven or thirty-eight, would be represented in like manner. When, however, it came to representing numbers in writing this method would be obviously impracticable; figures up to ten could, no doubt, be represented by upright strokes, but for high numbers representing hundreds and thousands more convenient symbols would be required. The natural solution would be to take a symbol as representing ten, the limit of the upright strokes, and represent twenty, thirty, etc., by two or more of these symbols side by side, intermediate numbers being represented by adding upright strokes, thus, in the well-known Roman system, **XXXII**=thirty-two. To carry this system further by taking symbols to represent fifty, one hundred, and one thousand, would be in natural course of evolution, and with the development of

alphabetic writing the most natural symbol would be the initial letter of the name by which the number was known, e.g. the Roman C representing one hundred was the first letter of *centum*, the Latin name for one hundred. The final stage would be the use of figure-symbols as distinct from letter-symbols and the zero as a multiple of values. Even with the letter system of representation there is a natural division into tens, hundreds, and thousands ; the idea then of taking a distinct symbol to represent this transition of values would be a natural evolution, whilst the desire for convenience would lead to continual abbreviations of the letter-symbols for numbers up to nine ; these alphabetical signs, therefore, would develop into hastily scratched conventional figures, whilst tens, hundreds, etc., would be represented by adding zeros, and intermediate figures by their position in the units, tens, or hundreds columns. The so-called Arabic system would thus have developed, but, of course, neither Egyptians, Babylonians, Greeks, or Romans developed beyond the letter or ideographic symbols.

Along with the development of writing and arithmetic there would proceed a corresponding development of architecture and various other arts and sciences, whilst the use of money would naturally develop into the credit system. Gold and silver bullion is heavy and cumbrous to carry about, and men known to possess large sums of money are in constant danger of

attack and robbery. Travellers from one city to another, therefore, would hesitate at carrying large sums of money with them from fear of robbers, whilst merchants would seek to place their valuables in strong safes where they would be safe from plunder. From this variety of causes there would develop a system of banks, banking, and Letters of Credit. The wealthiest merchants would dwell in fortified houses with strong safes, and those of their neighbours who were less secure but had property to lose would, knowing these merchants to be honourable men and worthy of trust, place their valuables in their hands for safe-keeping : they would retain on their premises only such money as was necessary for current expenses, any heavy payments received would be at once paid in to the strong-rooms of the banker, whilst when heavy payments had to be made the merchant would merely write a draft, authorising his banker to pay such and such a sum to such and such an individual, and when this individual presented it to the banker the latter would, on satisfying himself that the signature was genuine, pay out the required sum in gold. So there would develop a system of payments by bank-note or cheque. But it would obviously be most improbable that all the people who had money on deposit with the banker would want to withdraw all their money simultaneously on one and the same day ; so long, therefore, as the banker kept in hand a "gold reserve" sufficient to meet all

probable demands for withdrawals he could, with very little danger to either himself or his clients, use the bulk of the money deposited in speculations for his own benefit. Thus it would become to the banker's interest to have people bank with him and he would be prepared to pay them interest for the use of their money.

Again, however, as we have seen travelling with large sums of money would be dangerous, besides that gold is itself cumbrous to carry, merchants, therefore, leaving the city on business would take with them only such money as would be required for everyday expenses, the sums necessary for their mercantile operations they would carry with them in the form of a written promise by some prominent banker to pay such and such a sum in cash whenever this written promise was presented to him for payment ; and since this prominent banker would be well known in the mercantile world as an honourable man both able and willing to redeem his obligations, none of the merchants of that city to which our travellers were journeying would make any difficulty in accepting this written promise in payment of their goods, nor would our travellers have any difficulty in exchanging this promise for cash. So there would grow up the system of payments by bank-notes ; these written promises of the banker to pay would develop into bank-notes, which, from the continual intercourse between merchants from different cities, would come to be used as a general currency. And just

as it would be extremely unlikely that all the depositors of the bank would at one and the same day desire to withdraw their balances, so it would be extremely unlikely that all the notes issued by the banks would be presented for payment simultaneously. As a result banks could issue notes for many times the value of their gold reserve, which would have the effect of immensely cheapening the value of gold. Notes, for instance, could be issued for ten or twenty times the value of the gold reserve, which would naturally render money ten to twenty times as cheap as would otherwise be the case. In 1911, Great Britain did trade to the value of £1,237,562,434, but this enormous sum could not have been realised in gold, such a sum in gold coin does not exist in the whole civilised world ; this great commerce was carried on by means of cheques and bank-notes, and if by some happening the mutual confidence which is the basis of banking and the credit system were to be destroyed the value of gold would leap up twenty-fold.

The credit system is not, as is popularly supposed, a modern development, but is in reality very old ; it undoubtedly existed in a very highly developed form among both Babylonians and Chinese many thousand years before the birth of Christ.

Along with the development of civilisation there would naturally proceed a development of social, sensitive, and affective life. We noted in our previous chapter the evolution of "marriage by purchase" from "marriage by capture," and the

influence of relatives in raising the position of woman ; we also noted that with the development of agriculture and of a wealthy caste, not only would woman acquire a definite economic sphere, but that the daughter of a wealthy family would, in the supervision of the female labour, have a definite sphere of action. The husband would doubtless cohabit with his slave-girls, and these would be "little wives" ; nevertheless the free-born girl with powerful kinsmen would naturally take precedence over less fortunately circumstanced rivals, and a form of monogamy, a distinctly recognised "great wife" as mistress of the household, would come into being among the wealthy, who were able to have several wives, as also amongst those whom poverty forced to be contented with one. The next step would be for the wife to be made a partner in her husband's enterprises by the introduction, among the wealthy classes, of the dowry system. The father, in order to secure consideration for his daughter in her husband's household, besides providing for her after his death, would give her a substantial marriage-portion to be joined to her husband's goods and render her a kind of "junior partner" in his enterprises. In modern China or Japan we can, where the people are untouched by European influences, note the germs of this custom. Woman in Japan has, as is well known, a very inferior position ; the wife is the personal servant of her husband, and not only of her husband, but of her husband's family.

She waits upon her lord, dresses and undresses him, and in addition acts as a lady's maid to his mother, besides being subservient to his father and any of his womenfolk older than herself. Besides this she may be divorced at her lord's sweet will, and general custom gives the husband the right to use her maids as concubines and introduce fresh women into her house. As a result, it not infrequently happens that a wealthy father chooses a poor man for son-in-law and gives with his daughter a substantial marriage-portion, which, of course, raises her position immeasurably. Here obviously we have the origin of the dowry system.

At first, as with the Greeks, the dowry would be paid entirely into the husband's hands and be under his sole control ; it would, however, be a natural evolution for the wife's family to gradually insist upon contracts placing either a portion of, or the whole of, the dowry at the wife's disposal. And with the acquisition of wealth and the control of property by the daughters of the wealthy families, alike the social and legal position of these latter would be gradually raised to almost entire equality with that of men. There can be no doubt that the position of women in the later civilisations of Egypt and Babylon was far superior to the position of women among the Hebrews or that of the Englishwomen and European women generally of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It was not until the "seventies" of the last century, and in spite of fanatical opposi-

tion by the clergy and repeated refusals by the House of Lords to pass the Bill, that the English married woman was accorded the same rights over her own property as were possessed by the Egyptian and Babylonian women thousands of years before the birth of Christ, whilst even at the present day our laws with regard to divorce are in every respect less enlightened than those of the ancient civilisations.

Along with this gradual amelioration of the lot of the educated or wealthy women, however, would proceed a development of the "double moral code." With contracts arranging for rights of inheritance, etc., the chastity of the wife would become of yet greater importance, this, of course, would react upon the education of the young girl, as we noted in our last chapter. There would follow a rigid separation between the woman who had "fallen" and the "innocent" girl; whilst since only the older and wealthier men would be in a position to marry, it would follow that a large proportion of young and virile men would, with general insistence upon the chastity of the young girl and married women, have no legitimate outlet for their passions. The evolution of a class of prostitutes would from this be inevitable; poor girls sold by their parents, weak girls "betrayed" and "fallen," slave-women hired out by their masters, all these would form a society of outcasts rigidly barred from intercourse with "honest" women. The next

development would be the idea of chastity for the young man. Not even prostitution could safeguard the wives and daughters of the married men from illicit intercourse with the other sex, stolen fruit proverbially tastes sweetest, and young blood would liefer turn to the fresh beauty of the innocent girl or delights of an intrigue than the easy mercenary charms of the courtesan. The "single moral code," therefore, imposing chastity upon young men and girls alike, would be the next step evolved in protection of the wives and daughters of the community. Sexual intercourse out of the lawful bonds of wedlock would be held to be "sin" alike for man and woman, fornication would be considered as evil as adultery. There would, with the continual amelioration in the lot of the wealthy woman, follow the conception of marriage as a sacrament, "They twain shall become one flesh," "Whom God hath joined together let no man put asunder," and an idealised conception of monogamy. Efforts would be made to suppress prostitution by penal laws. Up to the nineteenth century such women were publicly stripped naked and flogged in Great Britain ; and the prostitute, at first permitted to freely ply her trade and if barred from intercourse with "honest" women at least treated with general consideration, would sink to her present degraded state. It is not, however, until the days of the later Roman Empire that the development of the "single moral code" can be discerned. Popularly

ascribed to Christianity, it was in reality a natural evolution, and borrowed by this creed from the various mystic cults and philosophies which followed the breakdown of the primitive nature-worship. Needless to say, however, that the "single moral code" has always remained a matter of pure theory, and that in practice the "double moral code," which treats as a deadly sin in a woman what is regarded as a venial offence when committed by a man, has survived until this day, and is still in practice among us.

Moreover, the actual effect of the introduction of the "single moral code" and theory of marriage as a sacrament was to degrade women to a level from which they have only recently emancipated themselves. The Roman women had gradually risen to the control of property and possession of full legal and social rights in like manner to the Egyptian and Babylonian women, whose social evolution into legal equality has been already traced. With the advent of the spiritualised form of marriage, popularly ascribed to Christianity, however, the wife was regarded literally as forming part of the body of her husband, "bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh," and thus could hold no property separately. With the general conception of woman's inferiority, faithfully reflected by St. Paul, the founder of "Christianity," and which yet survives among us, it occurred to no one to suggest that the wife could just as logically claim supremacy over her husband's affairs as he over

hers : under the new theory of marriage the lordship alike over his wife's person and her property was placed unreservedly in the husband's hands. He was " lord and master " whom the wife vowed to " love, honour, and obey," and whatsoever property she possessed passed into the husband's uncontrolled power. The actual effect, of course, was to place the wife wholly in her husband's power ; she had lost the right of divorce, " Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder," or to safeguard her own property. Thus, as in the classic instance of the luckless wife of Barry Lyndon, her fortune might be squandered and herself ill-treated with no means of redress. On the whole—when one considers the savage persecution to which " unfortunate " women were exposed from the advent of " Christianity " even to the present day, the thousands and hundreds of thousands of women flogged through English streets, ducked in rivers, and otherwise tortured, not to speak of those who have fallen victims to disease ; and the widespread misery caused by the fettering of ill-mated couples in iron bands, husbands mated to drunken, dissolute, and criminal wives, and vice versa—one feels that it is not putting it too strongly to speak of the theory of marriage as a sacrament as having been from first to last a curse to the human race.

The development of Babylonian, or, more correctly, Chaldean civilisation must, for the reasons previously given, have proceeded with

considerable rapidity. Originating in a dozen or more centres in the fertile delta, each ruled by a petty king and the germ of a nascent civilisation, these were gradually consolidated under a "Great King," whilst Babylon, the most favourably situated, formed the natural centre of commerce for the entire region. There sprang up a complex social system such as we have described, the fertile fields gave forth abundant crops, whilst the entire region was favourably situated to act as the centre of a widespread commerce. To the north were fertile uplands, rich in timber and stone, commodities of immense value to a treeless region of alluvial soil in which stone is conspicuous by its absence. Metals, too, dyes, and other commodities were to be gained by travelling to the head-waters of the great rivers, whilst east and west from their mouths ships could coast to Arabia, the Red Sea, and Egypt, also to India. The head-waters of the Euphrates, too, would act as avenues to a trade with Syria and Mesopotamia. Manufactured articles, weapons, fine wools and linens richly dyed to catch the barbarian eye, beads, ornaments, and rare goods of every kind would be the natural exports by which Babylonia would pay for her imports of raw materials and slaves.

It remains for us to consider this subject of slavery. The salient difference to a thoughtful mind between ancient and modern civilisations lies in the existence in the one civilisation of a system of chattel-slavery absent from the other. We will

deal with this subject more extensively later on; for the present it will suffice to say that, after careful examination of the subject, I have come to the conclusion that the true cause of the phenomenon of chattel-slavery in the ancient civilisations was that these civilisations had developed more rapidly in comparison with increase of population than has the civilisation of the modern world. This sounds an extraordinary statement in view of the conventional claptrap anent the immense development of modern science, and yet it can be easily shown to be fully justified. Babylonia, which developed a civilisation which compares in many respects with that of modern Europe and America with a population of upwards of four hundred millions, did so from a population which during the formative period certainly did not exceed two millions: the population of the Greek city-states, which to this day mould our ideals of art, and produced some of the world's most brilliant reasoners, did not individually equal the population of a modern English county; whilst the population of Italy in the period between the Hannibalic and Mithradatic wars, during which period she conquered the bulk of the then civilised world, did not exceed four millions. The entire population of the Roman Empire at the height of its power did not exceed sixty millions. From these statements it is obvious that my assertion that the ancient civilisations developed much more rapidly in comparison with the natural

increase of population than the European civilisation of to-day is literally accurate, and it would necessarily follow that this rapid development would have the effect of greatly enhancing the value of labour. Putting the matter in its simplest form, the organising power of the community would have developed more rapidly than the labour-power available, and just as in the modern offshoots from a highly developed civilisation, Canada and the United States, a community possessed of sufficient intelligence and organising power to develop the natural resources which lie to hand finds itself handicapped by lack of labour-power, with the result that there is an importation of labour, so for precisely similar reasons Babylon, Greece, and Rome would find it necessary to import labour-power. But whereas the United States and Canada receive the natural outpourings of a highly developed civilisation, Babylon, Greece, and Rome were surrounded by barbarian tribes at an immensely lower level of culture ; the manorial system, therefore, the evolution of which we have traced, and which has the natural effect of creating a landless proletariat which drifts into towns and factories, could have no such influence as has been the case in Europe and America, whilst to attract the free tribesmen to steady industry by any amount of wages whilst he had his native villages open to supply his necessities would, as anyone who has had anything to do with modern savages will agree, be a hopeless enterprise. The natural

outcome of these conditions would be a system of chattel-slavery such as actually evolved ; barbarian prisoners or children sold by their parents, criminals, and debtors would be sold into a system of compulsory labour for the benefit of the organising class in the community. And this system would naturally develop until the labour-power available had become equal to the organising power of the community, when there would ensue a steady movement to free labour. The value of slaves would steadily depreciate with the consequent depreciation in the value of labour, and the capitalist would gradually find it more to his interest to promise his slave freedom after a certain number of years, and make this promise dependent upon good behaviour and steady industry, than to rely upon watchfulness against escape, chains, and blows. This would be the stage reached by the later Roman Empire, and with the movement of the barbarian peoples south, their settlement in the Roman provinces, and the development among them of the manorial system with its concomitant, the steady drift of a landless proletariat to the towns, together with the much slower development of civilisation among the northern peoples, the organising power of the European communities would naturally develop coincidently with the amount of free labour available.

Like Greece and Rome, Babylon was surrounded by barbarian tribes, and in like manner as the Roman Empire was ultimately overwhelmed by

a flood of barbarian invasion, which barbarians settled down in Roman provinces and absorbed a certain degree of Roman culture—the Latin characters and numerals, the Latin religion, and fragments of Latin and Græco-Latin literature—so successive tidal-waves of migration overwhelmed successive Babylonian Empires. There was not one Babylonian Empire, but a whole series, and there was not one fall of Babylon, but several. Semites, Hittites, Elamites, Assyrians, Persians each successively overwhelmed the primitive Sumerian civilisation, and each flood-tide of invasion carried on part of the institutions of its predecessors, and in part developed newer and higher forms peculiar unto itself. The Babylonian schoolboy of the Semitic era learnt Sumerian as the modern English schoolboy learns Latin, and the Semites worshipped the Sumerian gods and absorbed the Sumerian mythology and prayer-ritual in like manner as the barbarian conquerors of Rome absorbed the Christianity and prayer-rituals of the conquered but more cultured race. Egypt, China, and India have also in like manner been swept by successive waves of invasion.

The civilisation of Egypt undoubtedly progressed along lines of development strictly analogous to those of Babylon. The Greek and Roman civilisations, however, which successively replaced and surpassed the earlier cultures, are remarkable for the development of the city-state. This is a line of development which, strictly differentiated

as it is from alike the powerful highly developed centralised monarchies of Egypt and Babylonia on the one hand, and the national representative governments of modern Europe on the other, undoubtedly merits close attention.

First, it is well for us to remember that all these city-states originated in tribal monarchies. The evidence upon this subject is perfectly clear. Alike Rome, Athens, Thebes, Lakadæmon, and every other important city-state had well-defined traditions of monarchy, and in many cases a survival of monarchy stripped of all power analogous to the English monarchy of to-day. It follows then that in studying the evolution of these forms of government we must carefully refrain from the too common error of picturing at the very outset a great mercantile city such as later evolved, a town such as modern London, Paris, or Berlin. Primitive Rome, Athens, Sparta, or Thebes must in reality have been tribal monarchies of a type strictly analogous to the tribal-monarchies of the Saxon Heptarchy in Britain, and the terms Rome, Athens, etc., must have applied not so much to the village which formed the residence of the monarch as to a considerable district, in like manner as the terms York, Lincoln, etc., applied not merely to the county-towns, but to the whole county.

In this tribal monarchy, government would naturally be by a monarchy elected from a distinctly "royal" family by an assemblage of clan-

chieftains, such as the primitive Roman Senate or Saxon Witenagemote, and the actual power of the monarch would, of course, vary with his own strength of character. Further, in the case of all elective monarchies we can always discern a distinct conflict of power between the assembly which elects and the monarch who is elected, both alike are jealous of their powers. In Egypt and Babylon, for reasons already given, this struggle must at a very early period have been decided in favour of the monarch, whilst in Saxon England the dense forests and absence of means of ready inter-communication, as in Northern Europe generally, resulted in a slow and painful evolution of civilisation. In Rome, however, and the other city-states, whilst the natural conditions would not be so favourable to the assertion of royal power as with Egypt and Babylon, yet with the more open character of these countries and their more get-at-able natural resources and closer contact with the more highly developed civilisations of the south and east, civilisation would necessarily progress with great rapidity. Conditions, therefore, would be favourable to an assertion of power by the clan-chieftains, the common jealousy of royal power would lend to these an impulse to combination which they would otherwise lack, whilst the possession of readily defensible strongholds would render resistance to the regal authority much less hazardous than would be the case in the great river-civilisations of Babylon, Egypt, and China.

Just, therefore, as the arbitrary exercise of the royal power provoked a series of revolts among the English aristocracy, the “Barons’ War” against John, culminating in De Montfort’s struggle against Henry III and the first summoning of a Parliament, the great Civil War, and finally the Revolution and dethronement of James II, so there would be successive revolts of the clan-chieftains, with finally either the banishment of the king and proclamation of a Republic or the reduction of the monarch to a mere ornamental figure-head. Doubtless the Roman tradition of the expulsion of the Tarquins compresses into a single reign a struggle which in reality lasted at least a century.

Just to what stage of evolution Roman or Greek culture had reached at the time of the supremacy of the clan-chieftains it is difficult to surmise. The probabilities are, however, that it was a low one. The absence of clearly defined records of the struggle with the monarchy would tend to suggest that the art of writing must have been either unknown during this period or practised but among a very limited circle. Again, the regulations of Servius Tullius, if authentic, bear a family likeness to the military regulations of Charlemagne and the various “Assizes of Arms” drawn up by our own mediæval monarchs from Edward I upwards. There is the same system of property qualifications, etc. From all of which one would conclude that we should form an approximately clear conception

of the primitive Roman state if we imagine the barons to have been successful in their war against Henry, the king and his son to have been de-throned and exiled, and an England ruled by a Parliament under influence of the barons and presidency of one or more of the most influential barons as substitute for Consuls.

The actual cities of Rome, Athens, etc., must, during this formative period, have been of comparatively little importance. The semi-feudal clan-chieftains, with their following of freeborn kinsmen, would be the real ruling power in the state in like manner as England down to the early Nineteenth Century was in reality ruled by a few great aristocratic families. With the development of commerce and civilisation, however, the mercantile class would become of increasing importance ; just as London, Paris, and Berlin have become all-important centres of commerce for England, France, and Germany, so Rome, Athens, Thebes, etc., would gradually increase in wealth and population until they overshadowed the agricultural village-communities which had originally formed the state. And in natural evolution with the growing importance of the mercantile class there would develop a conflict of power between the wealthy merchants and the land-owning aristocracy which monopolised the control of public affairs. The probabilities are that the prolonged struggle between plebeians and patricians in Rome was in reality a struggle analogous to the

fight for the Reform Bill in England, and it was ended in the same manner, by the absorption of the wealthy plutocrats into the ranks of the patricians through intermarriage.

The city-state, therefore, of the Greeks and Romans was not in origin a municipality, but a tribal government based on territorial divisions, the primitive Roman "tribe" must have been analogous to the Saxon "shire," and just as the primitive Saxon military organisation was by the "shire-levy," so the primitive military organisation of the Romans was by the tribal legion—legion comes from *legio* = picking, which, allowing for idiomatic differences, is certainly as near as possible to the Anglo-Saxon "levy." Each tribe¹ consisted of a number of clans, each of which in the assemblage by Curiæ had its recognised station and order of precedence. But whilst doubtless each clan-chieftain came to the assemblage with as many followers as possible, the individual clansmen could have but little influence, and it would be a majority of clans assenting to any proposed measure which could alone pass it. And in the feuds of clan with clan we can discern a plentiful source of faction-fighting and intrigues such as cursed all these city-states alike.

Owing to the small area of primitive Rome or Athens, probably no greater than that of a modern English county, the idea of representative govern-

¹ There were originally four of these "tribes," cf. the three "ridings" of Yorkshire.

ment would naturally be little likely to occur. From the much more slow evolution of English culture it was not until there had risen a great monarchy extending over the whole of England that the general culture-level had risen sufficiently high for the idea of general resistance to the authority of the Crown to germinate and develop into successful action : thus the barons being obliged to act over a very much wider area than the Romans naturally developed the idea of a representative assembly. It was obviously impossible to call a mass meeting of the whole of the English landowners, the idea of requesting them to send delegates would thus naturally occur, and, equally, the shire would form a natural unit for the election of such delegates. Again, the towns could not be ignored ; thus in logical sequence of evolution we get the summoning of knights to represent the shires, burgesses to represent the towns, and the great nobles, who were well able to travel and represented large estates, to form a general meeting of Lords and Commons to concert common action against the Crown, which menaced all alike. Thus De Montfort summoned our first Parliament.

With the small area of the primitive city-state, however, such a development of the representative principle would be at once unnecessary and impossible, and when one city-state had achieved supremacy over others its citizens would naturally be reluctant to share their sovereign-

power with the conquered peoples. Thus as the most virile of the states fought its way to supremacy over the others there would develop a system by which general power was exercised by the governing assembly of the sovereign state, whilst the conquered states were either ruled by governors, proconsuls, or left in varying degrees to manage their own internal affairs.

Finally, this narrow oligarchy would develop into a system such as the Roman Empire. Owing to the development of the manorial system or the slave-worked farm the small freeholding farmers who originally held a measure of political power would be displaced, whilst in the constant warring of faction against faction some one family would fight its way to supreme power and be thankfully accepted by the people as a whole in preference to the incessant wars of factions. A government strictly analogous to the Greek "tyrannies" would thus develop.

The absence of the city-state from modern Europe is to be attributed mainly to the slow evolution of culture among the northern European peoples. City-states such as Venice, Genoa, and Milan were evolved in mediæval Italy, whilst the old "free" towns of Germany indicate a certain tendency to the formation of city-states in this region. By the time, however, these cities had evolved monarchy was too strongly entrenched as a ruling principle for its yoke to be lightly thrown off. And with the evolution of strong

centralised monarchies such as that of the Bourbons or English Tudors ruling over homogeneous peoples there evolved coincidentally the conception of nationalism, which in turn led to the evolution of the representative principle and of the modern nation as distinct from the city-state.

III

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY : TO THE MODERN ERA

IN like manner as the civilisation of Babylonia was successively overwhelmed by waves of barbarian invasion, so the Roman Republic and Empire were throughout their history perpetually menaced by the movement of the savage northern peoples towards the more fertile south. The causes of these invasions were economic, and due to the inevitable tendency of these peoples to develop more rapidly in population than in culture. The tribes in the forest-clad regions of Gaul, Germany, and Scythia were obviously handicapped in the development of culture by absence of ready means of communication and also by the greater difficulty in reaching natural resources such as iron, copper, etc., hidden as were these by dense forest. Even the development of agriculture would mean arduous labour in clearing land from which inhabitants of more open regions would be exempt. For these reasons the culture-level among these peoples would develop far less rapidly than with countries such as Greece and Rome. At the same time, however, population would tend to increase

with equal rapidity as in the more favoured regions. The inevitable result of these conditions would be a migratory movement, whether by tribes or individuals. Among the ancient Germans it was a normal custom for a band of youths and maidens surplus to the subsistence-level of the community to be expelled to found fresh homes as best they might. Again, some tribes would live in poor barren lands, whilst some would live in more fertile regions. It would naturally happen then that after a few bad seasons the chiefs of the poorer villages would cast longing eyes at the domains of their richer rivals, the stray reports of hunters would tell of lands "flowing with milk and honey" in bitter contrast to their own poor circumstances, and would be eagerly discussed at tribal-councils, sacrifices would be made to the tribal-gods ; then the warriors would grip swords and spears, the women would take their children by the hand, the scanty goods and chattels of the tribes would be piled on lumbering ox-waggons, and the whole would eagerly journey towards the promised land. And from this there would follow a whole series of wars as the peoples attacked either stood up to the invaders and met them in bloody battle, or, as would be more often the case, threw themselves in like manner upon *their* neighbours occupying fertile regions. So there would follow a general movement of the tribes into more fertile regions, the whole culminating in one of those great waves of invasion which periodically

menaced the Roman civilisation, and eventually overwhelmed it in a riot of bloodshed and rapine.

When the Roman Empire had fallen there ensued the settlement of the Roman provinces by the northern peoples, even Italy itself falling ultimately into barbarian hands. Successive waves of northerners overwhelmed Britain, Gaul, Spain, Italy, and the northern African coast-region, whilst from Hungary and Scythia waves of invasion burst upon the Eastern Empire. Nor was the movement of invasion confined to the northern peoples, there ensued the Arab outburst under Islam with the overwhelming of Persia, part of Asia Minor, Egypt (with ultimately the African coast-region), and Spain. There followed a welter of wars and bloodshed. The steady sweep of migration from barren to fertile regions hitherto checked by the development of Roman civilisation and Roman military science sent in swift succession wave after wave of fresh invaders ere the first-comers had time to settle down and develop a civilisation capable of resisting the fresh assailants. Thus Saxons were harried by Danes and Normans, whilst Central Europe, France, Italy, and Spain were in a state of flux and reflux. From Central Asia came wave after wave of Turks to overwhelm the nascent civilisation of the Baghdad Caliphate ere it had time to develop and eventually overrun South-East Europe: barbarian tribe fought with barbarian tribe, Arab with Arab, Turk with Turk,

the whole of the erstwhile Roman civilised world was once more in the melting-pot. Under these conditions there developed the feudal system. The later invaders of the Continental provinces of the Roman Empire were horse-mounted archers, of a type analogous to those Parthians who inflicted so terrible a disaster upon Crassus. Against these rapidly moving bands of marauders the slow, heavy-armed Roman foot was, of course, useless ; it could neither catch the lightly equipped foemen nor face their Parthian tactics if by any chance it were successful in bringing them to action. As a result the Romans developed the system of warfare best calculated to meet the altered conditions : they created a light cavalry capable of overtaking and fighting the foe, whilst arming their infantry with a longer and more powerful bow than the short one carried by the barbarian horse. But as the infantry could seldom, owing to its relatively slow rate of movement, be brought to the scene of action in time, it naturally became of little importance, and to be used almost exclusively for garrison purposes. The old heavy-armed legions thus developed into the light-armed cavalry of the later Empire, and in the incessant fighting of raid and counter-raid a system of shock-tactics would necessarily develop and lance and sword oust the bow. The Eastern Empire, using a professional army trained to these tactics, survived the barbarian inroads for more than a thousand years ; the Western Empire, however,

succumbed, less it appears to me from the general moral degeneracy so often alleged than from the accident of weak men being in power at critical moments, else why should the Eastern Empire, which must have been equally degenerate and which was menaced by even greater perils, have survived ? The triumph of the barbarian horse in the Western Empire, however, resulted in the overrunning of this region of the Roman world by bands of wild horsemen ; the barbarian monarchies were loosely knit tribal confederacies, which, when the common danger linking the constituent members into combined action had passed, or when the temporarily dominating influence of some prominent chieftain had been removed by death, possessed small cohesion and quickly fell to pieces. In the welter of wars and bloodshed then which followed the collapse of Roman military power each petty chieftain of a band of horse would act very much on his own initiative, fighting, plundering, and settling down wheresoever he listed. There would as a natural outcome of these circumstances develop an infinite number of petty sovereignties, just as in like manner, but hundreds of years later, the Baghdad Caliphate and Asiatic provinces of the Eastern Empire were overrun by the Seljouk Turks and split up into an infinity of petty Emirates and Sultanates. And in like manner as the strongest of the Sultans speedily fought his way to a recognised supremacy over the others, so in Europe there arose the great military Empires

of Charlemagne and his successors. The analogy between the military institutions of the Europe of the "Dark Ages" and mediæval period and those of the Seljouk and Othmanli Turks, if not readily apparent, is nevertheless a very close one, and affords a useful clue to much which is obscure in the history of the Western peoples.

We have already traced the evolution of the manorial system; the barbarian invaders of the Roman provinces, therefore, would naturally find this system ready to hand, and whilst the savage chieftain would require subsistence for his horses and men the small village-communities would be no less eager to obtain protection from the bands of savage marauders which scoured the country with fire and sword. Hence there would naturally develop a system under which the leader of a band of horse would assume lordship over a small area and divide up the various hamlets among his followers to afford them subsistence, men and horses cannot live on air, whilst in that period of general disorganisation money must have been a scarce commodity. So, necessarily by small groups, the band would be distributed over a considerable area, the largest group under the leader forming a general reserve against either external attack or internal disorder. Obviously, however, such a body composed exclusively of cavalry could rally with great rapidity. The building of castles and in general the development of the feudal system would be a natural evolution.

The most convenient unit for such a system would be the *comté*, with however the accession of a prominent chieftain to general power of a type analogous to that of a Turkish Sultan, *comtés* would be grouped into larger units, *duchies* and *marquisates*, the suzerains of which being appointed directly by the Crown, and undertaking in return definite obligations, would impose similar obligations upon their own subordinates, thus there would evolve the feudal hierarchy reaching from king down to knight.

In England, owing to the conquest by the Anglo-Saxons, who were seamen and footmen, Society developed on somewhat different lines to the feudal development of the Continent. The wandering band of Goths, Visigoths, Franks, and Hunnish horsemen swept down upon a fairly populous, fertile, and civilised land; they became lords of a servile population, whilst many of their leaders, having entered the military service of the Roman Empire, had imbibed a smattering of Roman manners and ideals much after the same fashion as wild Pathans from the North-West Frontier entering the service of Britain, carry glimmerings of the highly developed civilisation of the West back to their native hills. There thus developed along with the feudal system an exclusive caste of knights and nobles ruling over a servile race, the descendants of the old bands of roving horsemen, and cherishing along with vague traditions of Roman customs, such as a debased form of Chris-

tianity, the ideals naturally developed by a ruling caste. The very name applied collectively to these ideals sufficiently indicates their origin, for "Chivalry" comes from "Chevalerie" =cavalry, whilst Chevalier and Cavalier alike =horseman.

The colonisation of England by the Saxons, a race not yet accustomed to the use of horses, naturally led to a varying phase of evolution during the earlier centuries of our history to that developed on the Continent. The Saxons, like Goths, Visigoths, Franks, and Huns, came in war-bands, but the manorial system was not sufficiently developed among the Britons to form a natural unit for the development of a feudal caste, whilst the Saxons were not sufficiently civilised to refrain from the primitive impulse to pitilessly burn and slay. So the original inhabitants were mercilessly exterminated, whilst the Saxons seized possession of the vacant lands. The Saxon invasion of Britain, therefore, was of a type analogous to the previous invasions of Celts and Britons, a colonisation by a whole people, whilst the primitive populace was either exterminated, driven to inaccessible districts, or in a very small degree absorbed in the conquering race as slaves and concubines. The settlement of Goths, Visigoths, Franks, and Huns, however, in the Western Roman Empire resulted not in the formation of a new race as in the case of the Anglo-Saxons, but in the formation of a horse-riding, ruling caste in the midst of a distinctly servile population. It is necessary to grasp this

fact to appreciate the fundamental differences between English and Continental civilisation.

In England the savage war-bands of the invaders settled down in village-communities composed of kinsmen and freeholders, among whom the arable land was divided in strips in rotation with each sowing of the crops with co-operation in labour after the style already described. These communities in process of time gradually coalesced into the tribal monarchies of the Heptarchy, which, under stress of the Danish invasions and the natural tendency of the strongest monarch to gain general supremacy, were gradually absorbed into the Wessex monarchy of *Ælfred* and his successors. There followed coincidentally a development of commerce, and the manorial system analogous to the development described in the case of Babylonia, gatherings for religious and political reasons developed into fairs, fairs developed trade and the use of money as a means of exchange. There followed the specialisation of industry and growth of mercantile towns at points most suitable for the exchange of products, and industrial towns in regions best suited for mining and handicrafts. Simultaneously, with the tendency of wealth to accumulate, the land of the village-community passed into the control of a single family, and there developed the manorial system and a semi-feudal noblesse, thanes, and ealdormen.

Arrived at this phase of culture, there intervened the Norman Conquest. The actual influence of this

has, however, been greatly exaggerated. It made no change in economic tendencies ; the land had already passed to large landholders, the manorial system was in full swing, trade and commerce were already developing. Had therefore Harold been victorious at Hastings, it is difficult to see how the development of English civilisation could have been materially affected thereby. The Norman Conquest introduced into Britain a horse-riding feudal caste analogous to that which ruled on the Continent, but everyone knows how speedily this caste was absorbed into the Anglo-Saxon people.

Meanwhile that Anglo-Saxon civilisation was developing, as we have seen, the Continent was in a state of flux and reflux ; successive waves of barbarian horse sweeping down from north and east, Spain was overwhelmed by the Moors and France was barely saved from a similar fate by the victory of Charles Martel at Tours.¹

¹ For some reason Creasy terms this one of the decisive battles of the world. But would the development of French civilisation have been in reality materially affected had Tours been a Moorish victory ? Would the civilisation of Britain have been materially affected by a Moorish William the Conqueror ? The truth, of course, is that a Moorish ruling caste would have been assimilated by the Gallic and Anglo-Saxon peoples just as readily as were Franks and Normans, and that just as Spain developed a typically Western civilisation under the Moors, with a monogamous form of marriage, free intercourse between the sexes, and a high position for women, features declared by the more ignorant class of writers to be special attributes of Christianity in flat defiance of the fact that in no region of the world do women hold a more degraded position than among the Christian peoples of the Balkan peninsula, so in like manner would an England temporarily governed by a Moorish ruling caste have developed a typically English and Western civilisation.

The incessant sway and eddy of these waves of invasion resulted, as we have seen, in the feudal system, castle-building, and the evolution of an armour-clad cavalry. Fighting was under such circumstances a normal occurrence of life. Men, and women also, were hardened to bloody sights and cruel deeds ; lust and brutality reigned supreme. The influence of some strong chieftains would result in the creation of monarchies and empires such as those of William the Conqueror or Charlemagne, but such empires would, so far as actual ruling went, be evanescent : the power of the feudal monarch depended upon his own will-power and strength of character. England, France, Germany, and Italy alike were divided into an infinity of petty baronies and counties, the lords of which ruled their domains as practically independent sovereigns. Outward homage was paid to a marquis, margrave, landgrave, or duke, and these higher lords again paid homage and owed feudal service to a king or to the emperor. In reality, however, the careful observer notes throughout the Formative Period from the "Dark Ages" to the modern era an incessant sway and eddy of centripetal and centrifugal forces. Now a strong monarch such as William the Conqueror, Henry II, or Edward I, pre-eminent by far above his fellows, alike in military skill and the qualities which make for successful statesmanship, would fight his way to an universally recognised predominance within broad national boundaries, or

even, as in the case of Henry II or Edward III, by far overlapping them. These monarchs, for instance, ruled more of France than paid homage to the French king. The deaths, however, of such men of outstanding ability would be followed by the accession of weaker sovereigns and the revival of baronial power. Thus Henry II was followed by Richard I, whose prolonged absence abroad permitted the revival of the castle and retainer system, which again permitted the revolt of the barons under John and his successor Henry III. Edward I was in like manner succeeded by Edward II, Henry V by Henry VI, and thus it was not until the Wars of the Roses had resulted in the temporary exhaustion of the barons and predominance of the Tudors that there developed a truly national monarchy and the period of all-powerful despotism and comparative freedom from internal disorder, which resulted in the great economic development of the Elizabethan Age and the dawn of modern England. Whilst private warfare and anarchy desolated the land, whilst each baron was a petty sovereign perpetually embroiled either with his neighbours or the king, which latter was but a bigger baron, genuine progress was rendered impossible. Where no man had security that he would live to reap the harvest which he had sown, no man was likely to sow more than barely sufficed for his wants; and the same thing would apply to all other industries. Thus national stagnation would ensue, and it would not be until the advent

to power of strong rulers capable of repressing private warfare and enforcing an even-handed justice that the development of civilisation could proceed. Thus in the history of English culture one perceives throughout the Mediæval Period successive waves of progress and reaction as strong rulers were followed by weaker ones. During the reign of Edward I, for instance, England was more populous and possessed a higher level of culture than in the fifteenth century, two hundred years later, the reason being that Edward, perhaps the very ablest ruler we have ever had, had effectually crushed the baronial power, whilst under the weaker monarchs who succeeded him this was permitted to revive, with the result that the prolonged and bloody Wars of the Roses desolated the land.

The temporary exhaustion due to these struggles had the effect of momentarily breaking the power of the barons, and the country was afforded a breathing-space in which to develop the conception of nationality and make the first steps in an economic development by land and sea, which later resulted in the giant strides of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nevertheless, the despotic power of the Tudors was but a temporary phenomenon. The exhaustion of the barons was followed by the development of a squirearchy and landed aristocracy possessed of a territorial power little, if at all, inferior to that of the old baronage, and during the reigns of James I and Charles I

there again followed the inevitable conflict of power between monarchy and oligarchy with, throughout the Stuart period, successive revolts against the tendency of monarchy to become all-powerful. Cromwell was but the successor of Simon de Montfort. The eventual outcome of this struggle, the triumph of oligarchy with the reduction of the monarchy to a mere shadow of power and the passing of governance into the hands of the score or so great Whig families which ruled England throughout the eighteenth century, are facts so generally known for it to be scarcely necessary to mention them. Unfortunately, however, they are facts which if generally known are also generally misinterpreted. Who, for instance, to judge from our history books, would imagine that the Great Charter, the "foundation of English liberty," was extorted from John by a handful of great barons purely in the interest of themselves and their retainers? Or that the great Civil War was a revolt not of Puritans against Cavaliers, nor of Nonconformists against Anglicans, but of the landed aristocracy generally against the Crown? Or that during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Great Britain was governed by less than a score of families, and that the fight for the Reform Bill was a fight between Oligarchy and Plutocracy, about which the English people as a whole knew little and cared still less? Or that the governance of England to-day is not by Democracy, but by Plutocracy? All these are facts about which our

constitutional and political histories afford little real information.

Upon the Continent of Europe there developed a conflict between imperial royal and baronial power strictly analogous to that which proceeded simultaneously in Britain. The whole history of the Holy Roman Empire is the conflict of power between the Emperor and the powerful lords, nominally his vassals. Practically the whole history of France down to the wars of the Fronde is the effort of the nominal King of France to make himself truly lord within his own territories. And with Spain we observe the same phenomenon. There were powerful parliaments in Arragon and Castile which were far from disposed to submit quietly to any undue exercise of royal power.

In France the conflict of power between king and noblesse endured down to the days of Richelieu and Mazarin. Throughout the whole of the Mediæval Period a state of wellnigh perpetual civil war deluged France with blood, whilst the successive invasions of Edward III and Henry V were powerfully aided by the malcontent noblesse. It was a French noble, the Duke of Burgundy, who captured and burnt Jeanne d'Arc, and it was only through failure to keep the French noblesse attached to their alliance that the English finally lost their hold on France. It is really somewhat amusing, by the way, to read the constant complaints by English historians of the intrigues of the French king among the English

barons, when one remembers the precisely similar charges made by French historians against our own monarchs. But most national histories are filled with instances of the pot calling the kettle black. To paraphrase a famous saying one might write, "There are liars, *damned* liars, and popular historians!"

It was only very gradually that successive French monarchs consolidated their power over the turbulent noblesse. The conflict continued throughout the Mediæval Period, to flare up with renewed vigour after the comparatively successful reign of Louis XI during the Renaissance era. The whole of the prolonged struggle between Catholics and Huguenots in France was in reality a duel between the French monarchy and the noblesse. The leading Huguenots, for instance, were all great nobles, i.e. Gaspard de Coligny and Henri de Navarre, and religion had in reality far less than politics to do with the struggle.

Finally there ensued the advent to power of Richelieu under Louis XIII, with the final suppression of the Huguenots as an active political power, and the disarmament and repression of the noblesse as a whole. This culminated after the last feeble effort of the noblesse, known as the Fronde, in the absolute despotism of Louis XIV and his successors down to the ill-fated Louis XVI.

In Spain the same result, the evolution of a despotic monarchy, was accomplished much more rapidly, the suppression of parliamentary govern-

ment taking place early in the sixteenth century. In Germany and Italy, however, the evolution of a national monarchy was a plant of slower growth, and down to the nineteenth century these countries remained split up into a conglomeration of petty principalities, duchies, and electorates, owing general homage to the Holy Roman Empire, but for all practical purposes independent states, and not until the latter half of the last century was Germany absorbed into Prussia, the most vigorous of the German monarchies, and Italy overshadowed by the monarchy of Sardinia.

Glancing broadly at the development of government among the European peoples, we discern three distinct phases of national development—monarchy, oligarchy, and plutocracy, or, as it is more popularly termed, democracy. The gradual development of a despotic monarchy, such as that of the Tudors or Bourbons, ruling supreme within well-defined limits, is a phase of evolution necessary to develop the conception of nationality, and permit the development by the nation of the economic resources of the territory it inhabits. The tie of a common speech and community of social habits must at all periods of history have given a certain feeling of racial solidarity to people possessing these characteristics as against more alien people. Nevertheless, where the race is divided among a great number of petty lords eager to assert themselves against their suzerain, true national feeling obviously becomes impossible. The French noble

was always ready to intrigue with the English king against his lawful suzerain, and the English noble was equally ready to act in like manner. Thus it was not until the evolution of a strong monarchy holding unchallenged supremacy within racial limits that the primitive feeling of racial affinity could develop into the conception of nationality. Again, it was not until the suppression of private warfare with its attendant anarchy that the economic development of the nation could rise much above the subsistence-level. Thus alike in England and France it required the despotism of the Tudors and Bourbons to lay the foundations of future commercial greatness.

Despotic monarchy, therefore, is a necessary phase of evolution ; but it is obvious that when the circumstances which have enabled this institution to exercise a beneficent influence have disappeared, the institution itself becomes an anachronism fated to decay or disappear. The succession of strong, able rulers who have built up the royal power are inevitably followed by weaker ones, and the misgovernment of a despotic monarch is only a degree less burdensome than the misgovernment of a turbulent noblesse. When, therefore, thanks to the economic progress made under the able sovereigns, there has developed a wealthy aristocracy, a conflict of power between this and the decadent monarchy becomes inevitable. Thus in England we had the Civil War, the Revolution, the banishment of the Stuarts,

and development of an oligarchy ; in France and Spain, however, the royal power was, owing to the upkeep by the monarchs of large permanent standing armies, far too powerfully established to permit of a successful revolt by the aristocracy, which latter, it should be remembered, formed in these countries a small exclusive caste devoid of community with the nation as a whole, whereas in Britain the Norman conquerors had been absorbed by the British people ; thus Spain sank into a decay analogous to that of Turkey, whilst France was only spared a similar fate by the revolt of the *bourgeoisie*, popularly known as the French Revolution.

Up to the latter half of the Eighteenth Century the development of civilisation in England proceeded on analogous lines to the development of that of Babylonia previously described ; the only important difference being the absence, so far as England and Europe generally was concerned, of the system of chattel-slavery. This was not unknown during Anglo-Saxon days, and 80,000 thralls were returned in Domesday Book, whilst there are records of the sales of servants by their masters and mistresses during the early Norman period, and in one or two instances even down to the fourteenth century, a considerable export trade of slaves to Southern Europe can moreover be traced during Anglo-Saxon times. But chattel-slavery as an industrial system never seems to have had any existence within our isles, and it had

disappeared from Europe generally by the close of the Mediæval Period.

The causes of this absence of chattel-slavery were, of course, purely economic ; in those regions where the conditions were favourable to its growth a system of chattel-slavery evolved during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries in the West India Islands, and the British, French, Spanish, and Dutch colonial possessions in America and elsewhere, which system of chattel-slavery, moreover, survived down to the Nineteenth Century, and would have survived to this day but for the moral ideas evolved among peoples who, not being themselves slave-holders or in any way dependent economically upon the slave-system, were naturally in a position to appreciate its enormity ; there was from an ethical standpoint singularly little to choose between the slavery of an English factory ere the passage of the Factory Acts and that of a Georgia plantation. Obviously then to attribute the decline of chattel-slavery as an industrial system during the Middle Ages and its absence from English civilisation to the triumph of ethical and religious influences implies a lack either of historical knowledge or of common sense.

Whilst chattel-slavery was absent from our isles, villeinage or serfdom prevailed in the agricultural districts down to the fourteenth century, but it appears to have been in process of decay as early as the thirteenth. Under this system of cultivation the land of the village-com-

munity was divided into two portions—one the demesne, being the property of the lord, and the other being allotted in strips among the heads of families in the community either permanently or with each sowing. The community was required to work a varying number of days in the week upon the lord's land besides rendering various other services in return for the land granted to it by the lord. As previously remarked in tracing the evolution of the manorial system, these services performed by the villagers were in reality a rent paid for their lands and houses, or, in other words, these lands and houses were considered wages paid by the lord in return for the services of the community. The relations, therefore, between the lord and villein were not in reality more servile than those between the modern agricultural labourer and his employer.

This system of villein-service in payment for lands and houses, however, gradually gave place to a system by which the cottager paid to his lord a fixed sum in money as rent, by which the lord hired labourers to till his land and paid them wages in money. This was a natural economic evolution. Labour was plentiful and consequently cheap, whilst in agriculture much more labour is required at certain seasons of the year than at others, thus a system which gave a fixed quantity of labour all the year round was cumbersome and extravagant; besides that, as the cottagers regarded it as a burdensome impost and took much

less interest in the cultivation of their lord's land than their own, it was wasteful in the extreme. Thus it was to the interest of alike lord and cottager to replace villein-service by a more flexible system. In like manner, as all students of our military institutions are aware, the compulsory military service of the feudal era very early gave place in England to a system of commutations of service for money-payments, with which the king hired professional soldiers who were alike better disciplined, better armed, and more mobile than the tumultuous feudal levy, whilst they could be raised and disbanded at the king's pleasure instead of being available for only a limited period. Thus the armies with which Edward III and Henry V invaded France were not feudal forces, but composed of professional troops, who were enlisted by means of "Commissions of Array," granted by the king to powerful nobles and famous knights, and paid for by commutations of service on the part of those knights and nobles who owed military service to the Crown. The commutation of villein-service for a money-rent arose from precisely similar causes. And this commutation of villein-service had undoubtedly become a wellnigh universal custom by the date of Créci, 1346; for when the "Black Death" desolated the land soon after, and from the deadly havoc it caused had raised the value of labour to an unheard-of figure, we find an universal effort by the landlords to restore the old villein-service. When

wages had increased by one hundred per cent, owing to the scarcity of labour, it was no longer profitable for the landlord to accept the small money payments which had formerly sufficed to commute villein-service : when such commutations had been accepted, therefore, and this appears to have been the rule rather than the exception, the landlords hastened to repudiate them and to restore the old conditions of villein-service. As a result there ensued the widespread revolt of labour under Wat Tyler, and a whole series of "Statutes of Labourers" were passed by Parliament regulating the wages to be paid to free labour and restoring villein-service. All this, however, was but a temporary phenomenon due to the momentary rise in the value of labour caused by the "Black Death," and as the effects of this passed away the old tendency of labour to become free resumed its sway and was strengthened by the widespread adoption of sheep-farming by the land-owners. Cultivated lands were turned into pasture, and but little labour being required, the bulk of the populace employed erstwhile in agriculture was driven into the towns to seek new modes of livelihood.

From the slower development of culture among the English people and the fact that the towns received the economic overflow of the countryside, due to the passing of the land into the hands of large proprietors, it becomes obvious that from purely economic causes chattel-slavery could have no

development among the English people ; when as with the Babylonians, Greeks, and Romans labour was scarce and dear, it was worth while from a purely business standpoint for an employer to pay a considerable sum of money for a slave, with all the attendant risk that this slave might sicken and die, or prove obstreperous and take to flight ; but when, as in England from the Mediæval Period to the present day, labour is plentiful and cheap, it becomes obviously better policy for the employer to utilise free labour and make regular payments for wages than to risk the loss of a large sum of money, the purchase-price of a slave. In similar manner horses are at present valuable, because they are scarce in proportion to the demand for their labour. If, however, horses were to increase more rapidly than this demand for their labour, their value would steadily depreciate until it would not become worth while to purchase a horse, thus horses would either die of starvation, be painlessly put to death, or taken into service by whoever cared to utilise their services and was prepared to provide for their subsistence.¹ The modern wage-system has developed along precisely similar lines.

Save for the absence of the system of chattel-slavery due to the slower development of culture in proportion to the labour-power of the community, civilisation in England and Europe generally, developed down to the latter half of the

¹ Compare with this the economic position of the domestic cat.

eighteenth century along lines strictly analogous to the development of culture in the more ancient civilisations. Up to the close of the Mediaeval Period progress was, for the reasons previously given, slow and painful. The continual conflict of power between monarchy and baronage led to a continual recurrence of civil war and all its concomitant anarchy, thus the progress made under a strong, able monarch such as Edward I would be counteracted by a revival of disorder under weaker monarchs ; it was only very slowly, therefore, that even as with many a throw-back the monarchy gradually triumphed over the turbulent baronage, so commerce and culture developed by slow degrees under the shadow of monarchical power.

The triumph of monarchy under the Tudors, therefore, was the signal for a tremendous economic development, which raised this country at a bound to the level of the foremost commercial and industrial states of Europe and the world. With comparative freedom from internal disorder, thanks to the firmly established supremacy of the monarchy, trade developed by leaps and bounds, there was evolved the credit system, whilst English shipping began that great development which raised us to the foremost position among the maritime peoples of the world. Spain, under the firm rule of Ferdinand and Isabella, had made a similar development and at an even earlier period ; in France Louis XI and the Valois kings

had gained a temporary predominance over the noblesse : there followed from these circumstances and in Europe generally that period of economic and intellectual activity known as the Renaissance. And this was literally a “ rebirth ” of arts and sciences, for classical traditions and the revival generally of Greek learning had far less influence than is popularly imagined—the English seamen, like the old Vikings, would have reached America independently of Columbus ; even as matters were Sebastian Cabot was the first to reach the mainland, whilst Vasco da Gama was not influenced by classical tradition in rounding the Cape of Good Hope. The intellectual vigour of the Renaissance movement, therefore, could not have failed to evolve an art and literature of its own had the Greek and Latin models been absent.

During the period from the commencement of the sixteenth to the middle eighteenth centuries the culture of England and of Western Europe generally, developed in an analogous degree to the development of civilisation in the Roman Empire generally, in the period from the Augustan Age to the Age of the Antonines. The Rome which fought the Punic Wars and triumphed over Carthage could not have been at a materially higher culture-level than the England of the early sixteenth century—the advent of Rome to supremacy in the Mediterranean basin and over the lands adjacent, the suppression of piracy under Pompey, the develop-

ment of the network of great military roads which could be compared favourably with the great Continental *chaussées* of the early nineteenth century could not fail to result in a great economic development with the intellectual vigour and social reactions which inevitably accompany such developments. Thus coincidently with a vast development of the slave-trade and activity in every form of industrial enterprise there developed schools of philosophy—great mathematicians, astronomers, who anticipated many of the discoveries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, poets, architects, sculptors, and artists of every description. The whole Roman world felt the impulse, and Christianity, in its original form the most popular of all systems of philosophy, was brought into being.

In like manner the sixteenth century marked the commencement of a tremendous economic development of the Western European peoples, the end of which development is not yet in sight. This was a development, however, which took place over a far wider sphere of action than was comprised in the area of the old Roman Empire. Columbus had led the way to a New World, Vasco da Gama had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and opened the wealthy markets of India and Cathay to the hardy seamen of Portugal, Spain, Holland, and England. This increased sphere of action being opened to development at a time when a tremendous intellectual and economic movement

was in progress among the European peoples had a twofold reaction. First it shifted the economic centre of Europe from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, England thus came to enjoy the favourable position for international commerce formerly possessed by Mediterranean cities, such as Venice or Genoa. Thanks to this, England was the most favourably placed of all European countries for trade with either America or India and the Far East ; she formed, therefore, a natural *entrepôt* for trade between these countries and Europe, whilst she was possessed herself of rich natural resources and a hardy, energetic populace ; under such circumstances it was inevitable that she should win her way to a leading position in the world's commerce.

The second reaction is more obscure and seldom justly appreciated. With the greater area opened to development the natural resources available to be tapped were proportionately increased. It is a commonplace, for instance, that tobacco and potatoes were introduced from America. It naturally followed, therefore, that the number of drugs, metals, minerals, gums, etc., available for experiment by the European chemist was far greater than the number at the disposal of Greeks or Romans, with the result that chemistry and kindred sciences were able to develop with greater rapidity in modern civilisation than was the case with ancient ; whilst again, the wider area under development led to increased intensity of develop-

ment with consequently increased intellectual vigour. Thus there came about the invention of the steam-engine during the latter half of the eighteenth century, and of labour-saving machinery generally. The steam-engine was not a modern invention, and the probabilities are that rudimentary forms of labour-saving machinery were not unknown to the Ancients. But there was lacking the general social knowledge and command of varied resources necessary to translate these rudimentary efforts from the sphere of scientific toys to use as instruments of economic production.

The latter half of the eighteenth century marks the dawn of the modern economic system. Hitherto our general stage of culture and civilisation, whilst higher, was not materially different from that of the ancient civilisations. The position occupied by women was much inferior, whilst the gross manners of the Romans find an easy parallel with the state of society pictured by Smollett and Fielding. Our economic development had been a fairly even growth between towns and countryside, and methods of agriculture in general differed but little from those in use during the tenth and thirteenth centuries. The village was an almost self-sufficing community, the wool and flax for clothes and linen being spun by the wives and daughters of the agricultural labourers, whilst the surplus was sold to the towns. Boots and such few implements as were required were fabricated

by village craftsmen or purchased at neighbouring fairs.

The advent of labour-saving machinery, however, changed all this. The new machines were concentrated in large houses in some central and otherwise convenient spot, and required an influx of labour from the surrounding villages to work them. Thus there developed the modern system of factories and factory towns.

Simultaneously the old agricultural system, by which the land was held in common by the village community and divided among heads of families in strips, gave place to the system of separate holdings and permanent enclosures. The old system killed individual effort. No man could improve his land when he held it but scattered in tiny strips, nor did co-operation in labour tend to produce the maximum of result in proportion to the effort expended. As Protheroe remarks,¹ "Unless the whole body of farmers were agreed together, no individual could move hand or foot. It would be financial ruin for any member of the community to grow turnips or clover for the benefit of his neighbours. No winter crops could be grown so long as the arable fields were subjected to common rights of pasture. The land was wasted in innumerable footpaths and balks. The strips were too narrow to permit of cross-harrowing or cross-ploughing. Farmers spent their whole day in visiting the different parcels of which their hold-

¹ "Social England," Vol. V, p. 137.

ings were composed, and their expenses in reaping and carting were immensely increased by the remoteness of the strips. Drainage was impossible, for if one man drained his land or scoured his courses, his neighbour blocked his outfalls. Consequently the arable land was rarely cleaned : it was choked with docks and thistles, overrun with nettles and rushes, pitted with wet places, pimpled with ant-heaps and mole-hills. Litigation was perpetual when it was so easy for men to plough up the common-balks or headlands, remove their neighbours' landmarks, or poach their land by a turn of the plough, or filch their crops when reaping. As long ago as '*Piers Plowman*' there had been complaints against reapers reaping their neighbours' land, and in Robert of Brunne's '*Handling Sinne*' there is a reference to the false 'husbands' that 'ere [plough] aweye falsely mennys landys.' The manure of the live-stock of the village was wasted by the immense area over which the animals travelled. The promiscuous herding of the sheep and cattle generated every sort of infectious disorder. The scab was rarely absent from the common-fold, or the rot from the ill-drained field. No individual owner could improve his own live-stock when all the half-starved, diseased cattle and sheep of the village were crowded together on the same commons. Moreover, from the productive point of view, the wastes and commons were a standing reproach to the rural economy of the country, and were capable of being turned to more profitable

account in the hands of enterprising individuals than under the common control of a large body of ignorant, prejudiced, and suspicious co-partners."

The stimulation to agriculture given by the concentration of population in large factory towns which required to be fed by the countryside, together with the general increase in culture, rendered the breakdown of the old agricultural system inevitable. Under the influence of Tull, Lord Townshend, Bakewell, Young, and Coke there evolved the system of large separate holdings with permanent enclosures and scientific methods of farming, which revolutionised agriculture no less than the advent of labour-saving machinery revolutionised industry.

The result of all this was the development of our modern economic and political system. With the extension of commerce due to our military successes of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which opened vast and valuable markets to our traders in the East and West Indies, there resulted the growth of a powerful mercantile class, between which and the ruling landed aristocracy a struggle for power was inevitable. In France the economic development, whilst less than in England, had been on analogous lines, which, with the hopeless incapacity of the Bourbons, resulted in the widespread revolt of the mercantile class against the throne and noblesse, known as the French Revolution. In England, despite the greater economic development, the revolt was less sudden owing to

the greater efficiency of the Government and the greatly exaggerated excesses of the Jacobins. Nevertheless, the struggle could not for long be delayed, and within forty years of the French Revolution the conflict between Liberal capitalists and Tory landowners threatened a second great civil war. Only under actual threat of an armed revolt was the Reform Bill, which admitted the Liberal plutocrat to political equality with the Tory landlord, passed by the House of Lords.

But the struggle was not yet decided. Up to the repeal of the Corn Laws there was a very real and bitter conflict alike in ideals and material interests between Liberals of the "Manchester" school and Tory landowners. The Liberals abolished slavery, proclaimed against it as an odious institution, and chanted paeans of self-praise over their own generosity, but remained complacently blind to the even worse conditions of white slavery under which their own operatives laboured, and the same philanthropists who wept over the sufferings of the negro strenuously opposed the Factory Acts, which were only passed by influence of the landed aristocracy. The fight over the Corn Laws, again, resulted from a sharp line of economic cleavage between the Liberal manufacturers and the towns they influenced, and the Tory landholders and the countryside, which in like manner was under influence of these latter.

Speaking broadly, we may say that up to the Repeal of the Corn Laws the Liberals and Tories

represented the antagonistic interests of manufacturing towns and the countryside, and that the two parties were fundamentally opposed alike in material interests—the towns desired Free Trade, the countryside sought Protection—and in political ideals. After the Repeal of the Corn Laws, however, with the consequent depreciation in landed values and impoverishment of the aristocracy, there resulted a gradual absorption of the Liberal capitalist party into that of the Tories by intermarriage between the leading families on either side, much after the fashion of the absorption of Plebeians into Patricians, impoverished by analogous economic causes, in the old Roman city-state. The impoverished aristocracy was forced to replenish its coffers by marriage with the wealthy daughters of the *nouveaux riches*, whilst the Liberal capitalists accepted the social ideals of the formerly predominant caste; as a result, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the former fundamental differences between the two parties have disappeared, and our party-system is to-day a mere survival of obsolete forms.

On the Continent of Europe, despite the period of iron repression which followed the Napoleonic Wars, there followed with the economic revival after the exhaustion of these conflicts an assertion of power by the mercantile class and widespread propaganda of *bourgeoise* ideals, which resulted in the risings of the “year of revolutions,” 1848,

the movements toward unity in Germany and Italy, and in general, a determined effort by the capitalists and the classes they influenced to shake off the predominance of the landed aristocracy *cum* monarchism. In France, where alike throne and aristocracy were but feebly entrenched, this conflict of ideals produced ultimately the Third Republic. In Germany the wave of Liberalism was counterbalanced by a wave of reaction ; the Prussian monarchy fought its way to rule over a United Germany, and at present the conflict between aristocratic-monarchical ideals and those of plutocracy has not yet been decided. Italy, unified under the rule of the monarchy of Sardinia and under influence of *bourgeoise* ideals, is ruled by a balance of power between monarchism, aristocracy, and plutocracy ; but in Austria-Hungary the conflict between capitalism, veiled in the guise of nationalism, and the older traditions is yet in progress. Russia seethes with revolution under the imported ideals of *bourgeoisie*. The movement, however, is an alien, not a native growth : the economic development of the Russian Empire is not sufficient for the creation of a genuine *bourgeoisie*. For this reason the movement is unlikely to produce any lasting effects for at least a generation, and probably a much longer period.

The United States of America owes its independent existence to a revolt of the mercantile classes of our American colonies against the

economic policy of the Mother-Country. The causes which produced the American War of Independence were in reality strictly analogous to the causes of the revolts of the colonies of Spain —the attempts of the Mother-Country to exploit her colonies for her own economic advantage. It was against our Navigation Laws, not against the Stamp Acts, that the American colonies in reality revolted, and had the Stamp Acts never been passed the Americans would merely have seized upon another pretext for revolt.

With the triumphant issue of the War of Independence the governance of the United States passed into the hands of the mercantile classes, and governance is to-day by the form of plutocracy popularly termed Democracy. The governments of our colonies, despite the "Labour" movements in Australia and New Zealand, are similarly a veiled form of government by those who alone possess the means necessary to bribe the legislators.

IV

ECONOMIC TENDENCIES IN THEIR BEARING UPON THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE

WE have now traced the evolution of society and of human culture from the earliest origins to the present era; step by step we have followed the evolution of man from the earliest appearance of life upon this planet in the form of the primordial plasm, through the fish, amphibia, lizard, reptile, mammalian, and ape phases into the evolution of *Man qua Man*. And following the evolution of Man into a species distinct from the remainder of the animal kingdom we have traced the evolution of Man-made culture and Man-made law through the phases of the semi-nomadic hunting-tribe, the semi-agricultural hunting-tribe to the formation of permanent settlements and the evolution of a people dependent mainly upon agriculture, fisheries, and industries for the necessities of life.

Speaking broadly, we may divide the present inhabitants of the world's surface into nomadic, semi-nomadic, and permanently settled peoples; it is, however, in the highest degree improbable that the present-day nomadic races represent an

indigenous type of mankind. Man, as previously remarked, in order to have developed speech must necessarily have dwelt together in communities of considerable size and possessed of a certain rude social organisation, conditions incompatible, where Man is devoid of domesticated animals, with a purely nomadic mode of existence. For these reasons the probabilities are that the nomadic types of to-day represent a development from a semi-nomadic stage, the lowest type—the Bushmen and Hottentots—being the refuse swept by stronger types from the forest-belt; the highest—the nomad Arab—being due to the movement of a semi-nomadic, semi-agricultural race into regions favourable to the development of a pastoral type.

Glancing back through the history of civilisation, we can broadly distinguish three distinct phases in the evolution of culture. The first phase is that in which Man is dependent upon hunting and the gathering of edible roots and herbs for the necessities of life: this phase we may term the semi-nomadic hunting phase, and its duration was from the evolution of Man *qua* Man to the period immediately preceding the historic era. The second phase was that during which Man, owing to the increasing scarcity of game, was becoming more and more dependent upon agriculture: this may be termed the semi-nomadic, semi-agricultural phase and was a period of great migrations. The third phase was the settled agricultural phase, with the development of industries, arts, and

handicrafts, and may be termed the settled semi-agricultural, semi-industrial phase. It is important to realise, however, that these phases do not represent clear and distinct divisions in the history of the human race, but were, as a matter of fact, continually overlapping. Those peoples most favourably circumstanced developed the third phase, whilst the peoples adjacent were in the first or second. Babylonia, Greece, and Rome, for instance, had reached the last phase, whilst the more northern races were yet semi-nomadic, semi-agricultural peoples. Great Britain to-day is obviously in a different phase of evolution to the Dyaks or Polynesian peoples so far as is concerned the natural phase of evolution reached by these latter. We can, however, in applying these phases say definitely that any race which has evolved a civilisation has at some time or other passed through analogous epochs of development, or if it possesses the potentiality of civilisation will do so in the future.

The latter phase of development, the semi-agricultural, semi-industrial phase, may again be subdivided into three minor phases: the *major* agricultural and *minor* industrial phase, the agricultural-cum-industrial phase, and the *major* industrial and *minor* agricultural phase, each of which will reflect the social and political reactions of its economic circumstances.

In the first of these phases the people is mainly dependent upon agriculture, and the arts and

handicrafts are of the rudest description. The influence of the land and landowners is thus supreme and moulds social and political ideals ; woman's sphere is the "home," where, in an agricultural community, her services are of genuine value ; the social conventions generally are those of a nation of farmers, whilst politics represent the conflict of monarch with monarch, or of the great landowners against the tendency of monarchical power to become absolute. Primitive Babylon, Greece, and Rome in the Ancient World, and England and France up to the close of the Mediæval Period were in an analogous stage of economic development.

The second phase, that of agriculture *cum* industry, marks the growing importance of arts and handicrafts and those who organise industry, and during this period there inevitably develops a conflict between the ideals of *bourgeoisie* and those of aristocracy, industry slowly but surely forces its way to equality alike in economic and political importance with the land and landowning class.

In the third phase industry becomes predominant ; woman asserts her right to economic independence ; the ideals of the farmer and aristocrat are, generally speaking, replaced by those of the merchant, and the people become dependent for economic existence upon foreign trade. This phase was reached by Italia under the Roman Empire, and has been reached by modern England of to-day.

We have seen that the three broad phases of evolution into which we first divided the progress of civilisation, which phases may be for convenience termed the *major* phases of evolution, are phases which overlap one another, having been reached by various races at varying periods; so in like manner the three *minor* phases of the semi-agricultural, semi-industrial period are phases which overlap. England, for instance, is in the *major* industrial, *minor* agricultural phase, whilst Germany and France are in the agricultural-*cum*-industrial period, and Russia and India are in the *major* agricultural, *minor* industrial level of culture. And it can, moreover, be demonstrated that the higher levels of culture are directly dependent upon the maintenance of a general balance of culture-levels among the lower ones; for otherwise, whether the balance be raised or lowered, they must lose the markets for their industrial production, upon which they are economically dependent. If, for instance, Russia and India were to make a sudden rise in culture-level to the agricultural-*cum*-industrial phase they would no longer require manufactured products from Great Britain, which is in the *major* industrial, *minor* agricultural phase, thus this country losing her most valuable markets for the buying of foodstuffs and selling of manufactured products would find herself possessed of a surplus of population for which there would be neither food available nor employment by which they

could obtain means to purchase foodstuffs from abroad.

Similar instances might be multiplied a hundred-fold. From this we may deduce as an irrefutable law, *That the maintenance of the highest phase of culture by any state which has developed this culture-level is directly dependent upon the maintenance among those states upon which it is economically dependent of a culture-level lower than that reached by itself.* And a similar result must occur if the culture-level falls instead of being raised ; if, for instance, owing to foreign war or internal revolution the agricultural production of Russia or India were to cease, these countries would have nothing to give England in exchange for her manufactured goods with results precisely similar to those previously described. But obviously, however, neither the raising nor lowering of the Indian or Russian standards of economic production, which, in the long run, of course, means culture-level, could have any effect if these economic movements were counterbalanced by the opening up of new markets possessed of a standard of culture-level and economic production capable of replacing the lost markets. We can, therefore, deduce as a further law, *That the maintenance of the highest phase of culture by any state which has developed this culture-level is directly dependent upon the maintenance of a general balance of culture among the states upon which it is economically dependent.*

It is when once we have firmly grasped the two laws deduced above that we realise the cause of a phenomenon which has perpetually puzzled historians—the childhood, adolescence, and decay of civilisations. The underlying economic cause is, of course, that culture-levels are not constant but fluctuating and ever-varying quantities, thus the conditions which lead to the development of one great civilisation are inevitably in the course of time replaced by the conditions which lead to the development of another and conflicting civilisation. Did not the discovery of the Cape route to India and the development of English culture successively kill the greatness of Venice, Genoa, Spain, and Holland ? Thus there inevitably ensues a system of flux and reflux, of continual progress and decay. We must remember, too, that the higher culture-level has an inevitable tendency to react upon the lower, with the ultimate effect of raising this lower culture to its own level, and of destroying the general balance of culture-level upon which is dependent its own superiority. The comparatively high culture-level of Genoa, personified in Christopher Columbus, reacting upon the lower culture-level of Spain, resulted in the discovery of America ; a like reaction had the effect of discovering the Cape route to India, all of which had the ultimate result of destroying the economic greatness of the Mediterranean city-states ; the reaction of English culture on Germany and the United States has had the

effect of raising up formidable rivals to British commerce,¹ whilst a similar reaction upon the peoples of India has had the effect of creating a desire to foster and develop native industries, which economic tendency has its political reaction in a desire for self-government, with the power given by such self-government to protect native industries by preferential tariffs. It necessarily follows from this that the higher civilisation with its "missionary influence" is in reality and all unconsciously developing an alteration in the general economic balance which must inevitably in the long run entail its own economic ruin.

We have seen that the phases of culture-level described above are fluctuating and interacting quantities, and in this we have the basal cause of the ever-varying kaleidoscope of history. The high culture-level of Babylonia reacting upon surrounding barbarian peoples raised them ultimately to a dangerous rivalry with herself, whilst the high degree of civilisation reached eventually by the Chaldean peoples, as a whole, reacting upon their yet barbarous neighbours, resulted in successive waves of invasion which finally tore down the whole fabric of their civilisation in a riot of blood-shed, violence, and rapine. The history of Egypt, of Greece, of Rome in the Western World, and of India and China in the Eastern presents a similar phenomenon.

¹ The United States, of course, owes its being to British colonisation, whilst German industry has been built up under influence of British ideals and British capital.

In these varying phases of evolution reached by the various races of mankind, with their ever-varying action and reaction the one upon the other, we see then the basal cause why genuine internationalism must be for ever an impossibility. True internationalism is dependent upon economic solidarity between alien nations which, whilst preventing any conflict of material interest, will also render war as disastrous to all parties concerned as would a civil war in, say for instance, England or France. And yet, as we have seen, such conflicts of economic interests within the national boundaries have in times not so very far distant actually occurred and threatened to disrupt the national economic unit, e.g. the French Revolution, the struggle for the Reform Bill in England, and the in reality strictly analogous conflict in America between urban and rural economic interests which was the basal cause of the Civil War. If then in peoples so closely knit together as the French, English, and American nations the action and reaction of economic forces can result in a cleavage of economic interests within the national unit which threatens its disruption, how much more difficult would it be to create a real and lasting union between nations so sundered alike in economic interest and in culture-level as, say, England, Germany, and Russia ? Obviously the economic development in these latter countries must inevitably create a situation analogous to that between North and South at the commencement

of the American Civil War. Genuine economic solidarity between the races of mankind is the dream of a visionary, simply because economic development is a fluctuating, not a constant factor, thus the circumstances which create a temporary solidarity of interest between any two nations will inevitably in the course of time be replaced by differing economic circumstances, forcing the former friends into sharp antagonism.

We have seen that the higher civilisation is directly dependent upon the maintenance among those peoples upon which it is economically dependent of a general balance of culture-level, and that in the event of a general rise in this level it can retain its superiority only by the development of new markets. Obviously, however, this process of finding new markets must, the surface of the world being limited in area, come to an end some day, whilst it is necessary that the dominant civilisation possess the power to control the economic development of these new markets, else in the long run these must inevitably develop a degree of culture-level which will bring them sharply into conflict with the economic interests of the dominant civilisation. The American colonies of Great Britain, for instance, having been granted practically entire economic freedom developed a sharp cleavage of interest with the Motherland, which resulted in the Revolution, whilst Canada and Australia having been similarly granted economic freedom are now rapidly develop-

ing the agricultural-*cum*-industrial phase, which will ultimately mean the loss of these markets for British manufactured goods. A careful examination of the economic facts of the case and of the economic tendencies in history forces the impartial observer to the conclusion that in reality Imperialism is just as much a dream as Internationalism, there can be no more a permanent solidarity of economic interest between Great Britain and her present-day colonies than between the former country and alien nations such as France or Germany.

As we have seen, the surface of the world is of limited area; the process, therefore, of finding new markets must necessarily be a temporary phenomenon, unless a gigantic stride in civilisation, such is at present beyond our ken, shall have the effect of discovering a readily accessible means of navigating space, and that the planets prove fields for colonisation and exploitation, a theory which, whilst attractive, is a somewhat speculative one. Leaving this hypothesis aside, it becomes obvious that just as Rome conquered the whole of the then civilised world, so there must eventually develop in Europe a high culture-level which will extend throughout the civilised world. But obviously this must prove to be in the long run just as temporary a phenomenon as was the Roman Empire, and just as this latter was in the long run torn to pieces by the flux and eddy of economic forces, so a

latter-day world-empire must inevitably share a similar fate. Moreover, when we carefully examine the actual economic fabric of the modern civilised world, the vast gulf in culture-level which in reality divides England from Germany, Germany from Russia, and Russia from the United States, the conclusion is forced upon one that not only is the economic solidarity between the leading states of the world maintained by a certain school of writers in reality non-existent, but that the claim made by Socialist writers that the Capitalist system of production is a temporary phenomenon which is already in its old age and is fated to speedily give place to Socialism is equally illusory. The Capitalist system, so far from being in its old age, is not yet in adolescence: centuries must elapse ere the national units of Europe, America, and Asia are welded into the great world-empire in which alone the Capitalist system can attain its highest level of achievement.

Passing these abstract speculations, however, it remains for us to consider more in detail the actual economic fabric of modern Society and the economic and political tendencies of to-morrow.

V

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF SOCIETY

WE English in common with every other civilised race of mankind live under a system of the production and exchange of products by the individual for his own personal advantage. This system is called the Capitalist system, and has in reality nothing whatever to do with the possession of labour-saving machinery, with which it is so often confounded by Socialists of the Marxian school. The old Roman slave-owner was every whit as much a Capitalist as the modern philanthropic factory-owner of the Cadbury school: in both cases alike production is inaugurated and controlled by an individual primarily for his own benefit, the fundamental basis of the Capitalist system. Whatever differences exist in actual mechanism of production between the two systems are differences not in kind but of degree.

This system of the production and exchange of commodities for individual advantage is the result of the specialisation of industry. In the most primitive forms of Society this specialisation of industry is absent; every man knows how to

fabricate the few rude weapons he requires, every woman is expert in the few handicrafts and burdensome duties which fall to the lot of savage womankind. But even in the most barbarous communities the factor of the superior skill of some one individual in some one industry makes its influence felt. No two individuals in any community possess exactly the same tastes or exactly the same standard of attainment in one particular art or handicraft. There inevitably, therefore, develops a system of exchange which brings with it the specialisation of industry. A man specially skilled in hunting will accumulate a surplus of pelts, and this surplus he will exchange for weapons made by a man specially skilled in the fabrication of weapons; thus in the course of time it will inevitably ensue that the huntsman will abandon the fabrication of weapons at which he possesses little skill and concentrate all his energies upon the chase, whilst the weapon-maker will similarly abandon hunting at which he can attain little profit and devote himself to fabricating weapons, by exchanging which he can obtain meat, pelts, etc. And the same thing will apply to all industries.

In our preceding chapters we have already traced this process of the specialisation of industries, and the evolution of the monetary and credit systems and of a class of "middleman" or merchants by which this system of exchange is conducted: it may be here added that this pro-

cess of the specialisation of industry is a process continually at work with ever-increasing vigour, industry is continually broken up into more and more minute subdivisions which attain almost the importance of new industries. What an enormous gulf, for instance, lies between the primitive candle of our great-grandmothers and a modern electric light ! And how infinitely more complex is the subdivision of industry requisite to furnish the latter illuminant than was the case with the former ! Yet the purposes to be served by both alike are identical. From this greater complexity of economic production there necessarily results a higher attainment of skill in the fabrication of each minute part, which general rise in the level of industrial efficiency alone rendered possible the gigantic strides in invention made by the nineteenth century. But for accurate workmanship the steam-engine would have remained a scientific toy. And the specialisation of industry proceeds with ever-increasing vigour, thus the standard of skilful workmanship is increasing equally more and more rapidly. In this we see the true cause of the "Rate of Acceleration" by which civilisation progresses in ever-increasing ratio to time, progress at first slow and halting becomes ever more and more rapid as the subdivision of industry becomes more and more minute.

The exchange of commodities due to the specialisation of industry is, as we have seen, carried on by means of money and the credit system, and

is conducted by means of a gigantic system of "middlemen." The farmer exchanges his surplus production with a grain-merchant for money or its equivalent in credit-values, i.e. bank-notes or cheques, which again he can exchange for whatsoever other commodities he may desire for himself or family, and possesses power to purchase. The grain-merchant, again, exchanges his grain with millers, receiving money in exchange and endeavouring to get as much money as possible beyond the *purchase-price paid to the farmer*. And the miller, again, having turned the grain into flour, exchanges this flour with the baker, receiving money in exchange and doing his level best to get as much money as possible. And the baker having turned the flour into bread, similarly endeavours to sell it for as much money as possible.

This system of continual exchanges and conversion from raw material into a manufactured product applies to all commodities susceptible to improvement by industrial process, such as raw cotton or raw wool. In fact, only natural food-stuffs such as fruit can be said to be wholly exempt therefrom, for even meat and fish require a more or less elaborate process of cookery. Speaking broadly, however, we may divide all products into two classes of *raw materials* to be used in manufactures and *natural foodstuffs*, such as, omitting the process of cookery, meat, vegetables, etc.

All of these commodities are produced by the individual producer for his own benefit, and they

are exchanged through a complex system of "middlemen" and manufacturers until they reach the consumer. The process of exchanging commodities for money is called *selling*, and the process of exchanging money for commodities is called *buying*; whilst the amount of money against which a generally recognised quantity of any commodity, such as a *quarter* of wheat or a *pound* of butter, will exchange is called its *price*.

The *price*, therefore, of any quantity of any commodity represents the *general value* of such a quantity of such a commodity to the community as a whole, as evinced by the amount of gold or silver or copper people in general are prepared to exchange against it. It is necessary, however, for us to distinguish clearly between *price* and *abstract-value*; the more so as a great deal of controversial matter has been written upon the subject of *value*.

Broadly speaking, we may distinguish between *price* as representing the *exchange-value* of any particular commodity, and *abstract-value* as representing general utility without exchange. Thus the air and water are of immense *abstract-value* as being necessities of life, but have no *exchange-value* because they exist in such great quantities as to suffice for everyone's desires. Moreover, no one can drink more than a certain quantity of water nor breathe more than a certain quantity of air.

Commodities being created to satisfy *abstract-value*, their *exchange-value* once created is deter-

mined primarily by efficiency of production. A tremendous amount of controversial matter has been written about this subject in late years be it remarked, Hyndman, for instance, writes :—¹

“ It is remarkable that nearly all economists of note are agreed as to what constitutes value. They say, with one accord, that quantity of labour constitutes value ; the amount of human labour, that is to say, which it costs to produce the commodities or wares which are exchanged against one another.

“ Of late years, it is true, there has arisen a school—if school it can be called—in which mere word-spinning is reduced to a system, which hold that ‘utility’ or even ‘desire’ alone constitutes exchange-value. I shall deal with this strange aberration in a separate lecture. Meanwhile the following extracts give the views of those who are still reckoned the greatest English economists.

“ Thus Sir William Petty says, speaking of exchange-value with reference to corn :—

“ ‘ How much English money is this corn or rent worth ? I answer, so much as the money which another single man can save within the same time over and above his expense if he applied himself wholly to produce and make it ; viz., Let another man so travel into a country where there is silver, there dig it, refine it, bring it to the same place where the other man planted his corn, coin it, etc. ; the same person all the while of his

¹ “Economics of Socialism,” p. 40.

working for silver gathering also food for his necessary livelihood and procuring himself covering, etc. I say the silver of the one must be esteemed of equal value with the corn of the other, the one being perhaps twenty ounces and the other twenty bushels. From whence it follows that the price of this bushel of corn to be an ounce of silver.'

"' If a man can bring to London an ounce of silver out of the earth in Peru in the same time that he can produce a bushel of corn, then the one is the natural price of the other ; now, if by reason of new or more easy mines a man can get two ounces of silver as easily as formerly he did one, then corn will be as cheap at ten shillings a bushel as it was before at five shillings a bushel *cæteris paribus.*' ''

This, of course, reflects the Marxian theory of labour as the basis of value, itself based upon the theories of Ricardo, Benjamin Franklin, and Adam Smith ; its fallacy can as a matter of fact be very easily demonstrated. Let us imagine a gold-mine and copper-mine to lie equidistant from London. Let us imagine the amount of all kinds of labour, railway journeying, the provision of foodstuffs, skilled supervision of labour, etc., etc., requisite to develop the one to be precisely equal to the total labour-power required to develop the other ; then, according to the doctrine enunciated above, the product of the one should be precisely equal in value to the product of the other, ounce for ounce,

pound for pound, ton for ton. But will any sane man suggest that such would actually be the case ? In reality, of course, the product of the gold-mine would be, ounce for ounce, no less than *two hundred and forty times* as valuable as that of the copper-mine. And if we take less extreme instances, such as a copper-mine and a coal-mine, a coal-mine and a tin-mine, a tin-mine and a silver-mine, always in return for a precisely equal expenditure of labour-power we get an enormous discrepancy in the value of output in the one case above the value of output in the other. And yet, according to the Marxian theory, the products in all cases should be precisely equal to one another in exchange-value ! What, then, becomes of the assumption that equal expenditures of labour forms the basis of exchange-values ? The truth, of course, is that the assumed equal expenditures of labour have, in reality, no influence in fixing exchange-values whatever. What then shall we take as the basis of *exchange-value* ? First, it is well to note that there can be no permanent definition of exchange-value because this factor of exchange-value is an indefinite, not a definite quantity. That the prices of commodities are perpetually varying is a commonplace of daily observation, and a very little reflection suffices to make it clear that the exchange-value of any particular commodity to any particular individual is dependent simply and solely upon the special circumstances of that individual. Whilst a man is hungry,

he will be prepared to exchange a certain quantity of money against a certain amount of bread ; his hunger satisfied, however, he will no longer be prepared to make such an exchange, and bread at that particular moment will cease to have any exchange-value so far as concerns that particular individual. Like cases might be traced through an infinity of circumstances. It follows from this that the factor of exchange-value is an indeterminate quantity, and necessarily that the methods of expressing such values by mathematical formulæ, adopted by the late Professor Jevons, besides being complicated and extremely dry reading for the student, does not express value, for the simple reason that you cannot define the indefinite.

We cannot, then, adopt a fixed basis of exchange-value ; all that we can define are the influences which determine such *exchange-value* under a given set of circumstances, and these sets of circumstances vary in application hour by hour, day by day, and with each individual. For this reason the "utility" and "final utility" theories are not merely cumbrous, but inadequate to express a general conception of the influences which determine *exchange-values*.

Can we define the influences which, under *all* circumstances, determine the *exchange-values* of *all* commodities ? We will carefully consider this point. First, the factor of *exchange-value* as distinct from *abstract-value* can only apply where

commodities are exchanged, which connotes the specialisation of industry and development of a certain level of commerce. Secondly, it is obvious that the factor which *creates* commodities is the factor of *demand*¹ whether for use, for the maintenance of life, or for ornament. No one would have ever fabricated a spade, sowed a field, or killed a pig, unless there had been a demand for the products of agriculture and for pork. This is obvious ; it is therefore clear that it is the factor of *demand* which creates *all* commodities. Now what influences will, under *all* circumstances, determine their *exchange-values* ?

Let us imagine ten men to be at work in fabricating cabinets, and another ten men to be at work in fabricating spades, and the demand for both commodities to be equal. Let us also imagine that the rate of production for the average cabinet-maker or spade-maker is one cabinet and spade per hour. Let us, however, conceive that five of the spade-makers are exceptionally efficient workmen, and can produce two spades in the time taken by their less efficient fellow-workers to produce one, and let us also imagine that two of

¹ Or, in other words, the *demand* for any commodity represents the *abstract-value* of such a commodity to the community. It may be remarked that much of the controversial matter which has been written upon the subject of *exchange-value* is based upon a failure to distinguish clearly between the influences which *create* products, i.e. *abstract-value* and those which determine their *exchange-value* once created. This is the rock upon which Jevons slipped. Commodities may be created to satisfy "utility" or "sensuous gratification" without possessing *exchange-value*.

the cabinet-makers possess an equal superiority over their co-workers. Then, as a result of eight hours' work, five spade-makers working for eight hours, and producing two spades per hour each, will produce eighty spades whilst that five working for eight hours and producing one per hour apiece, will produce forty, a combined total of one hundred and twenty. In the same period, two cabinet-makers, working for eight hours and producing two per hour each, will produce thirty-two cabinets, whilst that eight working for a similar period and producing one per hour apiece, will produce sixty-four, a combined total of ninety-six. Thus, the demand for both commodities being equal, one hundred and twenty spades will exchange against ninety-six cabinets, or the individual spade be rendered much inferior in exchange-value to the individual cabinet. And this will be a result simply of the superior skill of the spade-makers as a body compared with the cabinet-makers. Here, then, we have the influence which together with the factor of *demand* under *all* circumstances fixes the exchange-values of commodities, and this is the *rate of production of such commodities by their most efficient producers*. This definition, moreover, has the special advantage that it compresses into a single phrase the whole mechanism of Capitalist production alike in historical evolution and in present-day practice. For what is it that has developed the superior skill in the spade-makers as a class but the competition between spade-

maker and spade-maker? And what but the same influence causes each to devote his full energies to production? If the ten spade-makers had each been equal in individual skill, if in like manner the ten cabinet-makers had been similarly equal in rate of production, and if the rate of production by the spade-makers as a whole had been equal to the rate of production by the cabinet-makers as a whole, then the individual spade would have been precisely equal in exchange-value to the individual cabinet, and the Marxian theory of equal expenditures of labour as the basis of *exchange-values* would have been justified. It is differences in individual skill which in reality upset this nice balance and render it illusory; it was the difference in relative efficiency between the spade-makers as a whole, and the cabinet-makers as a whole, which rendered the individual spade produced by the one class of workmen inferior in exchange-value to the individual cabinet produced by the other, and this difference in general skill had the effect not of *enhancing* the value of the product of the most skilful workmen, but of *depreciating* it; or, in other words, every increase made in efficiency of production has, unless it is counterbalanced by a precisely equivalent increase of demand, the effect of *depreciating* the *exchange-value* of the commodity produced. And this applies to all commodities and under all circumstances which call for exchange-values. Let us, for instance, take the

case of hats, and imagine hats to be very rare. They will, therefore, be regarded as articles of luxury, and worn only by the wealthy. There will ensue a demand for hats, and the most efficient producers of hats will, by means of their superior industrial skill, produce a larger number of hats and a superior quality of hats to their rivals. The result will be that producing their hats more rapidly they will have supplied all those people who possess means to purchase hats at the previous price ere that their rivals have reached the market, thus these must either reduce their prices in hopes of creating a new market, or be left with their stock on their hands. The first alternative, of course, in the long run prevails, thus there ensues a continual fall in the sale-values of hats proportionate to the continual increase in the efficiency of production. And if all the hat-makers decide to "pool" their efforts and maintain a fixed price it will still be the rate of production by the most efficient hat-makers which fixes this price; for if they continue to increase their ratio of production beyond the ratio of increase in other commodities nothing can prevent prices from falling.

The *exchange-value* or *price* of any commodity is, then, fixed by the rate of production by the most efficient producer of such a commodity; there is, however, a further influence at work in fixing *exchange-values*, being the maintenance of a general balance in the production of commodities. For it is not merely a case of *selling*, but also of

buying. The merchant who sells hats is in reality exchanging these hats for boots, shoes, food, etc. etc., or the *power to purchase such commodities*, the *exchange-value* of hats, therefore, will be dependent not only upon the production of hats, but upon the ratio such production bears to the general balance of production among all those commodities against which they are exchanged. If the production of hats increases disproportionately to the general increase of commodities, the value of hats will *fall*; if the production of commodities in general increases more rapidly than the production of hats, the value of hats will *rise* in consequence, and will be expressed in an increase of the money-price which forms a general measure of *exchange-values*.¹

We may therefore say that *exchange-value* is determined by the factor of *demand*² together with the *rate of production by the most efficient producer of any commodity balanced against the rate of production by the most efficient producers of com-*

¹ Or, putting the matter in its simplest form, if the production of hats increases disproportionately to the general increase in commodities there will be a relatively larger quantity of hats to be exchanged against a relatively smaller balance of general production, thus depreciating the exchange-value of hats. If, however, the production of commodities in general proceeds more rapidly than the production of hats there will be a relatively larger balance of general production to be exchanged against a relatively smaller quantity of hats, i.e. the exchange-value of hats will rise proportionately. As I have shown in "The Struggle for Bread," the basal cause of the rise in food prices during late years is the fact that the rate of production of foodstuffs has not increased proportionately to the rate of production of commodities in general.

² Which means *abstract-value*.

modities in general. And this will apply even to such parasitic growths as the Fine Arts and Literature, which can scarcely be considered in the same category as commodities, such as boots and shoes. The most efficient painter or sculptor, skimming the "cream" of the limited market for his wares, will necessarily force his less successful rivals to accept low prices for their products, and upon the maintenance by him of his standard of efficiency will be in the long run dependent his hold upon the market. Similarly the most efficient publisher securing the most efficient authors, will necessarily secure a hold upon the market for literature that, the market for literature being limited, will necessarily result in his rivals being obliged to sell off surplus stock at reduced prices. Does not every season see this sort of thing? Again, the most efficient publisher has it in his power by superior rate of production and quality of work to publish Literature at lower prices than his rivals, and thus force prices in general down. That, as a matter of fact, publishers generally work at recognised rates does not alter the fact that these are fixed by the most efficient publishers and dependent upon their adherence.

Having formed a clear conception of the influences which under all systems and conditions of exchange determine *exchange-values*, it is possible to go a step further and consider *surplus-value*. *Surplus-value* is in reality a necessary accompaniment of the specialisation of industry, the

farmer and the factory-owner alike produce a surplus of value beyond what they can personally consume, and this surplus they exchange with other producers of *surplus-values*. Such is the real significance of the term ; as used by Marx and his followers, however, it possesses a special signification arising from the theory of equal expenditures of labour-power as the basis of exchange-values. As this proposition has never been squarely met it would be as well to consider the matter carefully. According to the theory of equal expenditures of labour-power as the basis of *exchange-values*, it would be quite impossible to make an exchange for profit ; in the instance previously given of the cabinet-makers and spade-makers, one cabinet would in that case be precisely equal to one spade, and neither the spade-maker nor the cabinet-maker would make any profit by an exchange, the wants of both would be satisfied, and there it would end. As Hyndman, under influence of this theory, writes :—

“ Exchange means on the whole a transfer of equal values from one side to the other, and *vice versa*. In such an exchange there may be great advantage derived by both parties to the transaction, but there can be no profit to either. Neither side has possession of more value after the bargain is completed than it had before. Supposing it to be possible to barter directly a hat for a quarter of wheat, which represents roughly an equality on the London market to-day. The one side obtains

a hat, and the other side a quarter of wheat, and by our assumption each obtains what he wants ; the former a head-covering, the latter the means of making bread. Not only are their social desires both mutually satisfied in this particular regard, but, from the point of view of exchange-value, each has obtained an equivalent in social labour incorporated in a commodity in exchange for that which he has parted with."

It necessarily results from this theory that any exchange of commodities which redounds to the profit of an individual can only be the result of *unfair exchange*, i.e. robbery. If the hat and the quarter of wheat be equivalent to one another in general labour expenditure, but the seller of the wheat persuades the vendor of the hat to accept only seven bushels of wheat instead of eight, he will be richer by one bushel, whilst the vendor of the hat will by so much be the poorer. Any profit, therefore, by a system of exchange will according to this theory be the result of robbery, and wealth can only be obtained by taking it from other people, the "robbery and spoliation of the working-classes" cry of the Socialist ranter. The theory of *surplus-value* was a natural development of the theory of *value* enunciated above. Capital, Marx held to be a modern development of a basal system of unfair exchange, dating from the invention of labour-saving machinery, to the influence of which he attributed the creation of a new class, the Capitalists, and the creation

of *surplus-value*. As will be remembered, a few pages back we divided products into the two classes of *raw materials* and *natural foodstuffs*, and the effect of turning *raw materials* into manufactured articles is naturally to enhance the exchange-value of the original product. This enhancement of the original exchange-value, Marx termed *surplus-value*, and according to his theories this increase in value was the result simply and solely of the labour expended in the industrial processes by which the product was developed into a manufactured article. Therefore equal expenditures of labour-power being according to Marxian doctrine the basis of value, the Capitalist in taking the lion's share of this *surplus-value* is robbing his employees of the fruits of their industry. The Capitalist, according to Marx, pays his employees a wage which barely suffices for their subsistence, and the *surplus-value* added to the raw materials by their labour redounds simply and solely to the profit of the Capitalist who employs them. Wages represent simply and solely a subsistence-fund paid to the worker to provide for his maintenance in like manner as food and drink are given to a horse.

The fundamental fallacy upon which all this is based is, of course, the conception of equal expenditure of labour-power as the basis of values ; in reality, as we have already seen, the assumed equality in expenditures of labour-power has simply no influence whatever in fixing exchange-

values, these being determined by the factors of *demand* and *efficiency*, i.e. the rate of production by the most efficient producer of the one special commodity balanced against the rate of production by the most efficient producers of commodities in general, and from this it necessarily follows that the most efficient producers of commodities in general will accumulate a surplus in wealth beyond that possessed by their less fortunate co-workers. Take the case of the ten spade-makers of our previous analogy. Five of these being twice as efficient workmen as their fellows, they will therefore in eight hours, the rate of production for the less efficient workmen being one spade per hour, produce eighty spades as against the others' forty. Now this will not only have the effect of greatly lowering the *general exchange-value* of the individual spade, but it will mean that the more efficient workmen within the same time will sell twice as many spades as their less efficient co-workers, with the result that they will accumulate twice as much wealth in return for the same amount of industrial effort. And this will not be the result of unfair exchange, but of superior efficiency. Now with a like process to that described at work in every industry it becomes obvious that the result will be the creation of a comparatively wealthy class of producers, whilst from the fact that certain towns are much more suited than others to become centres for the exchange of commodities, there will in like manner

evolve a class of "middlemen" who arrange the general exchange of commodities. All this is natural evolution, not "robbery and spoliation."

We must now consider the actual origin and development of the Capitalist system. First, the phrase "Capital" implies, considered as an instrument of production, the possession of a surplus above the subsistence-level expressed in a recognised medium of exchange. It is necessary to think clearly upon this subject. No one commodity is in itself sufficient to produce wealth. Land is useless without labour and the implements of agriculture, and the same thing applies to all other industries. No one commodity, therefore, will suffice for the inauguration of any industrial enterprise whatsoever; it is necessary then to possess a sufficient quantity of the recognised medium of exchange to procure a supply of the various commodities necessary to inaugurate a proposed industrial enterprise. Take, for instance, the case of the earliest invention and application of labour-saving machinery. It was necessary for the inventors to possess a certain quantity of the recognised medium of exchange and a certain surplus above the bare subsistence-level ere they could construct their models and work out their ideas, whilst those people who were the first to use labour-saving machinery similarly required a surplus above subsistence-level and a certain quantity of the recognised medium of exchange ere it was possible for them to install labour-saving

machinery. Capital, therefore, considered as an instrument of production consists of the possession of a sufficient quantity of the recognised medium of exchange to inaugurate an industrial enterprise. How is this Capital obtained ? In the first instance Capital was created by a surplus production due to superior efficiency. We have already traced the evolution of a class of comparatively wealthy producers and "middlemen"; the evolution of this class was, as we have seen in our introductory chapters, coincident with the evolution of a recognised medium of exchange and of the credit system. And in this monetary system is, in reality, expressed the basis of the Capitalist system; for without it there could have been no specialisation of industry by reason of the impossibility of arranging the increasingly complex exchange of commodities upon which is dependent the increasingly complex specialisation of industry. It is a conventional habit to divide Capital into the two headings of "fixed" and "circulating" Capital, meaning fixed quantities such as land, houses, etc., by the former expression, and rapidly used products such as coal used in process of industrial production under the latter. But neither of these phrases adequately expresses the true significance of Capital. Could any process of production whatsoever continue without the use of a common medium of exchange ? The Capitalist system, therefore, is dependent upon the monetary system, without which or an analogous means of exchange

all processes of production would come to a sudden end.

Capital, then, may be most happily defined as the possession of a surplus above the subsistence-level expressed in a recognised medium of exchange and sufficient to inaugurate an industrial enterprise. This surplus may be acquired either by inheritance from efficient forbears or by individual effort in the way of saving and self-denial; however acquired it is this factor—Capital—which inaugurates and controls industry and commerce generally. But there is nothing philanthropic in our system of Society. The Capitalist is no large-hearted philanthropist working with a single eye to the ultimate benefit of the world in general, but a mere man working with a single eye to the benefit of a single individual or group of individuals—himself and his own family. Necessarily, therefore, in the industrial enterprises which he inauguates and controls the Capitalist seeks and does his level best to secure the maximum possible share of the profits of industry. This brings us to the distribution of products and the position of Labour.

Now products are produced by the joint operation of Capital and Labour, and the one is just as necessary to production as the other. All the Capital in the world could not develop the richest mine or produce crops from the most fertile land without a supply of Labour. Labour, then, is equally as necessary as Capital as a factor in the

creation of products. What, then, is the true relationship of Labour to Capital in industrial organisation, and to what share is Labour justly entitled of the products produced ?

To appreciate the true position held by Labour it is necessary to glance back into the dawn of industry. We have observed the influence of *efficiency* in developing the specialisation of industry, fixing exchange-values, and creating a class possessed of a surplus of value, it is now necessary to consider the factor of *competition*. Obviously when two men produce the same commodities there must inevitably ensue a competition between these two men to find purchasers. One man can only gain a customer by taking from the trade and profits of his fellow-producer, and each man must feel that were his rival absent his trade and profits would be twice as great. Now we must once more bear in mind the factor of *efficiency*. If one of these two producers be twice as efficient as his rival he will necessarily produce twice as much of the particular commodity produced within a given time as would his rival. It would, therefore, be possible for him to charge only three-quarters of the price charged by his rival and yet make a substantial profit by the transaction. If, for instance, this commodity be spades and the less efficient workman produces one per hour, selling them at one shilling each, then eight such spades will sell for eight shillings. The more efficient workman, however, producing twice

as many spades and selling them at ninepence apiece will, within the same period, have done trade to the value of twelve shillings. This underselling, however, will naturally have the result of distracting trade from the less efficient producer. People will not pay one shilling for an article which they can obtain elsewhere for ninepence. Obviously then the less efficient workman must either reduce his price to the level of his more successful rival or lose the whole of his trade. But there is a natural level beyond which the prices of the less efficient producer cannot be reduced, for the surplus between the cost of production and the selling-price represents the subsistence-fund of this producer and his family. The ultimate result then of the constant forcing down of prices by the more efficient producer must be to cut into this subsistence-level and drive the less efficient producer out of the market. It is obvious that the subsistence-fund of the most efficient producer will not have been touched, whilst the less efficient will have been reduced to starvation, whilst again the continual dropping of prices will naturally result in a continual increase of trade by the most efficient producer on the American principle of "small profits and quick returns."

Now in every sphere of industry there has been at work and is at work still this tendency of the more efficient producer to crush out the less efficient as an independent producer. The first great industry to feel this impulse was agriculture,

and we have already traced the evolution of the manorial system and of the great landed proprietors and "free" agricultural labourers of to-day. This system was not, considered as an agricultural system, the result of a military conquest, but of an economic movement which, whether in conception or development, can be traced in nearly every agricultural system in the world ; and the same economic law which in agriculture has resulted in the concentration of the land into the hands of great landed proprietors has, in other industries, resulted in the evolution of the great Capitalist. Just as the small freehold farmer of primitive Saxon times was crushed out of existence as an independent producer by the most efficient of his co-farmers, with the result that in order to obtain the right to till a piece of land to provide for the support of himself and family he was obliged to contract to dispose a certain amount of his labour for the use of his lord, so during the latter half of the eighteenth century the less efficient producers of various handicrafts were crushed out of existence by labour-saving machinery controlled by the most efficient producers, with the result that to obtain the necessaries of life for themselves and families they were obliged to hire out their labour to the more efficient producers. The factory is the logical successor of the manorial system.

The less efficient producer crushed out of existence by his more energetic rival has no resource but to either emigrate into a "new" land

or hire out his labour-power, and with the continual concentration of industry into the control of the most efficient producers these, of course, require labour-power to enable them to cope with the increased demand upon their resources. There thus emerges the two broad classes of the *organising class*, and the class *that is organised*. The man who hires out his labour-power gives over for a recognised period the control of his labour-power to the organising class. There is no philanthropy in the matter on either side. The man who hires out his labour does so simply and solely because he has got to do so or else starve or be sent to prison or workhouse. And the employer hires out this labour-power simply and solely as a necessary commodity to help in the creation of other commodities. All these commodities, the raw materials by which are created the manufactured products, the employer endeavours to purchase as cheaply as is compatible with the production of an article of the quality required. The surplus between the costs of production and the sale-price of the goods he calls *profit*, and part of this goes to extend the business or inaugurate new industrial enterprises, and part goes in the purchase of various articles of luxury : costly furniture, fine clothes, servants, etc., for the comfort of the Capitalist and his family.

The true influence, therefore, of superior efficiency of production is to cut into the subsistence-level of the less efficient producers and crush them

out of existence as independent producers, and driven from the ranks of the independent producers they can subsist only by selling their labour-power to the more efficient producers. And this tendency of the concentration of industry into the hands of the most efficient producers is an increasing tendency: just as the small landed proprietor was swallowed up by the large landed proprietor: just as the small producer was swallowed up by the large producer, so with ever-increasing momentum there proceeds a process by which industry tends to become concentrated into the hands of larger and larger groups of producers. There necessarily results from this that the organising class tends to become ever smaller and smaller, whilst the class that is organised becomes larger and larger.

We have seen that the less efficient producers, being forced from the ranks of independent producers, can subsist only by selling their labour-power, and that the effect of this process continued with ever-increasing momentum throughout the ages has been to produce, and is still producing, a class which is dependent for subsistence upon the selling of its labour-power: it follows from this that Labour, or more properly labour-power, is a commodity like unto all other commodities, and that in necessary consequence the *exchange-value* of labour-power will, under all circumstances, be determined by the same influences which, under all circumstances, determine the

exchange-values of all other commodities, viz. *the rate of production of labour-power by its most efficient producers balanced against the rate of production by the most efficient producers of commodities in general.* And this will apply to labour-power in the broadest signification of the term: to the labour-power of the author, the journalist, the engineer, and the doctor equally with the labour-power of the manual labourer, it will apply to all classes save the class of independent producers.¹

The phrase, “*rate of production of labour-power by its most efficient producers,*” on being analysed resolves itself into a question of prolific housewives together with hereditary and educational influences, the latter being mainly dependent upon the former, for obviously the son of a doctor is more likely to receive an education likely to conduce to a high degree of efficiency of labour than the son of a blacksmith. And just as we have previously noted that increased efficiency in the production of any commodity has the effect of lowering the general exchange-value of what for convenience we may term the *units* of the products produced, i.e. the individual spade or individual labourer, so increased efficiency in the production of labour-power must have the general effect of reducing the *exchange-value* of the individual unit of labour-power unless this in-

¹ And those directly dependent upon them for support, such as wives and daughters.

creased efficiency of production be coincident with an increased rate of production by the most efficient producers of commodities in general. Let us, for instance, take the case of ten labourers engaged to work at one shilling per hour, and let us imagine that three of these suddenly develop twice as much efficiency as is possessed by their co-workers. They will thus be equal in labour-power to six ordinary men, and it would obviously be profitable to the management to pay these men one shilling and sixpence per hour and dismiss the three superfluous men hitherto employed at one shilling per hour. They would thus obtain the labour-power equivalent to six men at the price hitherto paid for four, i.e. wages would be reduced from one shilling per hour to ninepence. And there would be a further consequence. The three men unemployed and without subsistence would be willing to accept a much lower wage than would otherwise be the case. Now imagine this process at work on a more extended scale and in all industries alike and it becomes obvious that the actual effect of the increased efficiency is to create a general lowering of the wage-standard and a surplus of unemployed which by its eager competition for work pulls wages down yet further. Only in the event of this increased efficiency being counterbalanced by an increased rate of production of products in general, which, of course, means an increased demand for labour-power, can the tendency of the increased general efficiency to

lower the general wage-standard be counteracted.

It was this last influence, the fact that the *exchange-value* of labour-power is determined not only by the quantity and quality of the labour-power available, but also by the general rate of production of commodities in general by their most efficient producers, which Marx failed to appreciate, a fact which led him to deduce that a rise in wages beyond barest subsistence-level was impossible, and which has been made the target of endless destructive criticism by economists of the conventional school, who, it must be confessed, do not in general appear to be able to see one inch before their own noses. In reality the immense development of new markets in the Americas, Oceania, Africa, and the Middle and Far East had the effect during the latter half of the nineteenth century of immensely stimulating the production of commodities in general, with the result of, despite the great increase of industrial efficiency, slightly raising the general wage-standard alike in nominal value and actual purchasing-power. Obviously, however, this process of developing new markets cannot be prolonged indefinitely : it is a process, in fact, already on the wane, and a slight but unmistakable decline in wage-standards can already be discerned. In the long run, therefore, the essential truth of Marx's theory of wages will have to be realised.

Now let us return to our basal question. To

what share is Labour justly entitled of the products produced ? The answer to this is simply that "justice," ethical right or wrong, has in reality nothing to do with the matter. The Labour agitator who assumes the divine right of Labour to a minimum-wage, or an eight-hour day, or anything else is in reality assuming the same standpoint as the metaphysician who assumes that the world was made in seven days, or that men are born into the world cursed with original sin, i.e. taking something for granted which is not susceptible to proof. The actual share of Labour in the distribution of products is not determined by considerations of right and wrong, and not in the least by claims to this or that based upon an assumed divine ordinance, but simply and solely by the *exchange-value* of labour-power as a commodity as determined by the same economic laws which determine the *exchange-values* of other commodities. The coal-miner who works a mine is, from the economic standpoint, just as much a commodity as the implements he uses or the pit-ponies, and the *exchange-value* of his labour-power is determined by precisely the same economic laws which fix the *exchange-value* of his tools or of the labour-power of the pit-ponies. And no amount of agitation by the coal-miner, no amount of "strikes," will, in the long run, raise the *exchange-value* of the coal-miner's labour-power by one farthing. Let us assume that there be another great coal-strike, let us assume this "strike" to

be completely successful : what follows ? First, the sale-price of coal will be raised proportionately to the increased cost of production ; secondly, all industries being dependent upon coal for motive-power, there follows a general rise in prices proportionate to the increased price of coal, i.e. the purchasing-power of the increased wage paid to the coal-miner will be precisely equal, neither more nor less, to the purchasing-power of the lesser wage paid heretofore, i.e. the *exchange-value* of the coal-miner's labour-power remains unaltered. There would, however, be a further consequence that the increased cost of production would gravely handicap our export trade upon which, when all is said and done, is vitally dependent our national life. If only the time wasted in teaching mediæval superstition in our schools were devoted to teaching Political Economy, it is possible that we should have less industrial unrest.

The *exchange-value* of labour-power is, then, determined in the long run by economic laws, and therefore cannot be permanently affected, advantageously, by the political action of Labour as a class. Under a system of Capitalistic production nothing can prevent the Capitalist from raising his prices to meet the increased, artificial cost of production, thus general political action by Labour in the form of " strikes " can only have the effect of producing a general rise in sale-prices which must render any increase in wage-standard illusory and can only have the effect of benefiting the

foreign competitor. And the same thing applies to all countries alike.

Labour, then, considered from an economic standpoint is a mere commodity, such as iron, lead, or other necessary products in the creation of wealth, and the purchasing of labour-power is conducted upon precisely the same principles as the purchasing of the labour-power of horses or, in the ancient world, the labour-power of a slave. And we have seen that the tendency of the concentration of industry into the hands of the most efficient producers is an increasing tendency, whilst with the more and more minute specialisation of industry there follows an ever-increasing development of efficiency in each subdivision with, as a result, the continual invention of labour-saving machinery. That since the process of developing new markets can only be a temporary phenomenon, the eventual result of all this must be to cheapen labour-power is obvious. Let us closely examine the influence of labour-saving machinery. On a larger scale the influence of this latter is precisely the same as that of increased efficiency of labour previously traced. Let us take ten men working at one shilling per hour and imagine a machine to be invented which at a cost in running expenses equivalent to sixpence per hour can perform the work of five men—no exaggerated estimate—obviously the ten men heretofore working will be replaced by two machines tended by two men with as a result an enormous saving in expense

of production. Now the question is : Whom does this saving benefit ? The Capitalist or his employees ? The conventional argument is, of course, that the reduction in the expenses of production will result in a tremendous development of trade. Competition between Capitalist and Capitalist it is argued will have the effect of forcing prices down, whilst lower prices will mean increased demand with the result that there will be a demand for labour in the working and production of machinery, whilst the community, as a whole, will benefit from the lower prices. The employer of the ten men of our analogy, it is said, will be obliged by trade-competition to steadily reduce his prices, whilst accompanying this cheapening of prices will proceed a commensurate increase in the number of sales, thus to cope with the increased trade he will be obliged ultimately to re-engage the ten men and actually add to their number. And the economists who use these arguments point to the tremendous increase in British commerce during the nineteenth century, the increase of wages, the cheapening of prices, and immense increase in the standards of comfort generally as conclusive proof of the justice of their views.

Unfortunately, however, all this overlooks one little factor : that to sell goods you must first have people in a position to pay for them. Now, the labour-power which produces wealth also consumes it ; if, then, you decrease the value of

labour-power you simultaneously decrease the potentiality of labour-power to consume products. Taking again the ten men of our previous analogy, these men are not only producers, but consumers of wealth. By the purchasing-power of their wages they support other industries, and the same thing applies to industry generally—the operatives of one factory consume the products of others. If, then, we assume an all-round increase of fifty per cent in the efficiency of industry due to labour-saving machinery, or, in fact, any other means of increased efficiency, obviously the first result will be the displacement of labour-power in commensurate degree, i.e. either fifty per cent of the labour-power previously employed will be discharged or else wages will fall by fifty per cent. But, as we have seen, labour-power is not merely a producer, but also a consumer of wealth: it follows, then, that the purchasing-power of labour being reduced by one-half, *the market heretofore open to products will similarly be reduced by one-half unless there be opened new markets to restore the equilibrium of purchasing-power.* The actual influence, then, of labour-saving machinery is to reduce, not to increase, the volume of trade; there is, however, a further influence which must be traced. Repeating our analogy and conceiving an all-round increase of industrial efficiency by fifty per cent, which increase has *not* been counterbalanced by an equivalent development of new markets, it becomes obvious that, as

we have seen, the first result is the displacement of labour by fifty per cent, with a proportionate reduction in general trade, but this reduction in trade is so far as concerns the organising class counterbalanced by the reduced cost of production. *Their* margin of profit, therefore, remains unaltered. More, accompanying this general increase of efficiency there will inevitably have proceeded a quickening of the process, previously traced, of the tendency of the most efficient producers to crush the less efficient out of independent existence, and as a result the concentration of industry and profits into fewer hands—meaning, of course, larger profits for the fewer individual producers. This is the true result of increased efficiency when there are no new markets available to counterbalance its influence in cheapening prices and labour-power. Now, let us examine its real influence when accompanied and counterbalanced by the opening of new markets. Let us assume an increase of efficiency by fifty per cent exactly counterbalanced by a proportionate development of new markets. Then obviously the general balance of purchasing-power remains unaltered, for the increased markets abroad will only counterbalance the reduction in purchasing-power at home due to the displacement of labour. But from the circumstance of the displacement of labour the costs of production will have been reduced by fifty per cent as concerns the commodity of labour-power, with the result that the profits of the

Capitalist are proportionately increased. And this is quite independently of the sale-prices at which he sells his goods. Whether he sells ten hatchets at one shilling apiece, making a profit of ten per cent above costs of production, or two hatchets at five shillings apiece, making the same profit ten per cent above costs of production, is to the Capitalist a mere matter of indifference, his margin of profit remains unaltered. As we have seen, the general purchasing-power of the community will, owing to the development of new markets, counterbalancing the development of industrial efficiency, remain unaltered. And whilst the competition between Capitalist and Capitalist will have the effect of forcing prices down, yet since the purchasing-power of the community remains unaltered, the fall in the *values* of sales will be compensated for by an increased *number* of sales. The general total value of sales will thus remain constant. But as we have seen, the effect of the increased industrial efficiency is to reduce the cost of production and add proportionately to the profits of the Capitalist, from this it follows that the amount of money available to be spent on luxuries for the comfort of the latter and his family will be proportionately increased, i.e. the actual influence of the increased industrial efficiency will be to divert industry from what are conventionally termed "productive" into what are termed in similar fashion "non-productive" channels. And since the labour-power employed

in these "non-productive" industries would require food, clothes, etc., there will be a proportionate stimulation of the "productive" industries. Moreover, part of the increased profits of the Capitalists, whether deposited in banks or used by the individual Capitalists in individual enterprises, will be devoted to extending trade. There will thus result an increase in trade proportionate to the increased purchasing-power of the organising class.¹

¹ Perhaps I should make it clear that all "surplus value" represents a wage-fund paid to Labour. Let us imagine the general trade of a country to be £100,000,000 : *the whole* of this sum represents ultimately money paid to Labour in wages. Articles of luxury, foodstuffs, and raw materials of all kinds are all produced by Labour, which Labour must have a subsistence-fund, as of course must also servants. Money which is hoarded possesses no purchasing-power, and is therefore valueless ; money which is put into circulation in any fashion supports Labour. We may, however, distinguish broadly between productive and non-productive Labour. Servants, for instance, do not themselves produce commodities, they merely minister to the wants of the most active agents in the production of wealth. In like manner the producers of raw materials for the creation of luxuries or the various industrial processes connected with the manufacture of articles of luxury, together with the Labour employed therein, are dependent upon the "productive" industries. But this division between "productive" and "non-productive" industry is in reality a conventional distinction only : it is in practice quite impossible to make any hard-and-fast division between articles of luxury and articles of use. Is not, for instance, the workman's Sunday suit just as much a luxury as the nobleman's servants ? If everything above bare subsistence-level is a luxury, one is reduced to living on bread and water, roosting in a wattle-hut, and, as far as clothing is concerned, to the barest requirements of decency. And if once you rise above bare subsistence-level where are you going to stop in defining "luxuries" ?

When, therefore, the first result of increased industrial efficiency in reducing the purchasing-power of the community is counteracted by the development of new markets, the ultimate effect of the increased efficiency will be to increase the general volume of trade owing to the increased purchasing-power developed by the organising class : much more then will this be the case when the development of new markets proceeds in greater ratio than the development of industrial efficiency. It is this which explains the immense strides made by the commerce of England during the last century. But obviously, as previously remarked, this process of developing new markets can only be a temporary phenomenon, and the development of industrial efficiency must inevitably, in the course of time, overlap the development of new markets, with the inevitable result of cutting down wages to a bare subsistence-level.

Broadly summarising the influence of Industrial Efficiency, we may say that it expresses the art of obtaining the maximum of result for the minimum of effort, and that the first influence of the increased development of this art is to force down

Obviously it is entirely a matter of heredity and custom. One man will feel to be necessaries of life what another man would consider luxuries ; one man will feel poor on £500 per annum, which to another would represent wealth beyond dreams of avarice. And the process of increased momentum of industrial efficiency applies to the creation of articles of luxury no less than to all other industries.

the general exchange-value of the *units* of the commodity produced, *provided that the production of commodities in general remains constant*, and that under the same circumstances its second and third influences are to create a surplus of wealth and concentrate industry into fewer hands.

To obtain this maximum of result for the minimum of effort it is necessary, the *exchange-value* of the commodity produced being determined by the general balance of commodities, to reduce the expenses of production to the last farthing. Raw materials, including the commodity of labour-power and running expenses, must all be reduced to the last degree compatible with the maintenance of the standard of efficiency in the product of industry. And since the *exchange-values* or prices of the raw materials to be used in industry will be determined by the same laws which fix the *exchange-value* of the manufactured product, it follows that it is with regard to one commodity only that the Capitalist can make any material reduction in costs of production: the commodity of *labour-power*. The amounts of coal or gas or cotton requisite to manufacture a given quantity of raw cotton into cotton-cloth are all fixed quantities which cannot be reduced, and whose exchange-values whilst fluctuating cannot be determined by the action of an individual Capitalist. Coal as a motive-power for machinery may be replaced by electricity, and chemical discoveries slightly alter

the composition, supply, and proportions of raw materials ; but these are influences beyond control by an individual Capitalist. Only in one way can this latter directly reduce the costs of production : by economising in the commodity of labour-power whether by labour-saving machinery or other means. From this fact has arisen the gigantic strides made by labour-saving machinery during the last century, and the realisation of this fact forces home upon us the basal truth that every increase of Industrial Efficiency is made ultimately at the expense of Labour.

We have examined the influences which determine *exchange-value*, we have observed the influence of Industrial Efficiency, we have considered the relationship between Capital and Labour, and have noted that the tendency of Industrial Efficiency to create an ever more and more minute specialisation of industry and an ever larger and larger concentration of industry into the hands of the most efficient producers proceeds with ever-increasing momentum. From this it necessarily follows that the competition between efficient producer and efficient producer must inevitably tend to become more and more intense as the number of independent producers becomes ever less and less. It is necessary to clearly appreciate this latter factor : that the competition between independent producers must increase in intensity proportionately to the increased momentum of Industrial Efficiency, as it affords the key to the

inevitable outcome of the present international situation. For we must bear in mind that producers are divided into national groups swayed by national sentiment. There are in all commodities and fields of industrial enterprise groups of English producers, German producers, French producers, and similar groups of all nationalities. And competition must tend to become more and more intense proportionately to the increased momentum of Industrial Efficiency. When, therefore, a group of English or French or German or of producers of any other nationality is competing with a group of alien nationality, obviously it is merely a question of whether the competing groups of producers comprise the main economic interests of their national units to decide whether such competition will result in war. If, for instance, the main economic interest of the British nation is in the production and exchange of manufactured articles, and if this main economic interest competes with the similar economic interest of the German nation, then since this competition must become more and more intense with the increased momentum of Industrial Efficiency, it becomes obvious that it is a mere matter of time ere such competition results in war. For there is no International Policeman to hold trade rivalry in bounds ; and in the long run it will be the group of producers most efficient in all-round qualities, in military skill as in Industrial Efficiency, which will finally triumph. Since then the nations are economic units, and in

the main conflicting economic units,¹ it becomes obvious that the increased momentum of Industrial Efficiency must inevitably culminate in war.

¹ I demonstrated this point in "The Struggle for Bread."

VI

THE REACTION OF ECONOMICS UPON ETHICS

IT is a fact seldom appreciated but nevertheless true that civilisation, like an army, marches upon its belly. As we have seen in our introductory chapters, it was the necessity of finding new food-resources, owing to alteration of environment, which originally led to the differentiation of types and the evolution of Man *qua* Man. And just as it was the continual alteration in economic circumstances due to the continual cooling of the world's surface which led to the continual evolution of higher types, so it was in regions of the world making the greatest demands upon human intellect and adaptability that there has evolved the highest types of Mankind.

The periods of human progress may, broadly speaking, be roughly divided into three epochs : the Formative Period, during which Mankind is engaged in active war with his environment ; the Period of Maturity, during which he has triumphed over his environment ; and the Period of Decadence, when, having made the maximum progress possible, subject to the conditions of his environment, Man

strikes a balance with this environment and ceases to progress ; his civilisation loses its freshness and vigour, methods of production become stereotyped, and, save from the external influence of an alien race, further progress becomes impossible under the conditions of such an environment.

The English people and Caucasian peoples generally are yet in the Formative Period, but all other races of Mankind, including the Japanese, are in the third or Period of Decadence, in which they have struck a balance with their environment which renders them unable to progress save by influence of an alien race.¹ In the Ancient World the Roman Empire of the period immediately succeeding the Augustan Age represents with fair accuracy the Period of Maturity, whilst the Age of the Antonines marks the beginnings of decadence.

Applying analogous reasoning to the future progress of the Caucasian peoples, it becomes obvious that this must inevitably proceed along the same lines of a Period of Maturity and a Period of Decadence which have overtaken the other peoples of the world whether in ancient or modern times. The Period of Maturity must obviously arrive when the Capitalist system has reached its logical conclusion in the formation of small groups of producers controlling industry throughout the civilised world. When the production of boots,

¹ It should be remembered that the historical period is a mere insignificant fraction of the total history of Mankind.

for instance, all through the globe is controlled by a single group of producers and when all other industries are similarly controlled, competition with all its potent influence in developing Industrial Efficiency will have ceased, and whilst doubtless the first influence will be a development of Arts and luxuries due to the increased purchasing-power of the organising class, yet in the long run the ultimate result must necessarily be that all implements of production, all forms of art, all systems of philosophy will become stereotyped forms. Compressing the matter into a single phrase, the European peoples will then have struck a balance with their environment beyond which further progress will become impossible, and the Period of Maturity will be followed by a Period of Decadence. But all this is centuries ahead.¹

Considering what is of more practical importance, the present-day tendencies of Society, it is well for us to clearly distinguish the relationship between Economics and Ethics, the more so from the tremendous amount of popular claptrap commonly written about the latter subject.

First, what *are* Ethics? The answer to this is that they are simply and solely the reflection of economic circumstances. Our codes of property and sexual morality are not due to "divine" revelation, but merely reflect the economic in-

¹ We are at least one century from the Period of Maturity, and not improbably this is a yet further period ahead.

terests of a dominant class of property-holders and married men. Sexual morality alike in the "double" and "single" moral codes merely reflects the sentiment of private property in women, and property morality reflects the desire of the more efficient producers to protect themselves from the cupidity of the less efficient. Ethical sentiment being, therefore, merely a reflection of economic circumstances, it necessarily follows that as economic circumstances tend to become more and more complex so there will follow a corresponding development of ethical sentiment. "Love your neighbour as yourself," "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you," in reality merely reflect a high standard of enlightened selfishness, itself a reaction from the high economic level reached by Græco-Roman civilisation. Christianity, considered apart from the vulgarised and debased form of Fetish worship into which it degenerated among the barbarian conquerors of Rome, is a lofty development, perhaps the loftiest, of the Graeco-Roman philosophies, and in its primitive forms accurately reflected the economic circumstances of the world which gave it birth. This was at a period which may be roughly defined as between the Later Formative and Early Maturity phases of Græco-Roman civilisation, a period naturally of tremendous intellectual energy which witnessed great strides in all arts and sciences, and the development of many lofty systems of philosophy from which

it may be added Christianity borrowed many of its noblest sentiments. As these philosophers were for the most part dreamy, speculative individuals, many of their rhapsodies were of too visionary a character to either reflect or mould contemporary sentiment, e.g. Plato's "Republic" or the "Sermon on the Mount";¹ for the most part, however,

¹ The following extract from "Papers in Penology," dealing with the Elmira, New York State, Reformatory, gives an admirable exposition of the common-sense view of the "Sermon on the Mount," and is the more interesting as coming from a criminal under sentence.

"I have only attended up till now three lectures, and therefore do not know what may have been said in the other three. But in the lecture on the 24th I think you go a little out of the line. You say that if a man out of pure cussedness strikes you, it is better to let him alone. Reason, because a man in so doing hurts what we have agreed to call his soul. This is hardly 'Practical Morality.' That which is unnatural can hardly be called practical. Revenge is not only gratification of a desire, but also a mode of protection. All our legal punishments are based upon the spirit of revenge for the purpose of protection. A fine country we would have if the government were to let men go on doing all the wrong they pleased, consoling themselves by the knowledge that the men were injuring themselves more than anybody else. To show you that revenge is instinctive and a natural protection: a man strikes you one blow and your impulse is to strike him two, so as to let him see that it does not pay to strike you, and to make him from impulses of fear, quit. Therefore, revenge in such case is a natural protection, the impulses of which are instinctive and so universal that they must contain some good. Further on you say that a man in striking you has only hurt the flesh. Let us see. Suppose he has struck you on the cheek. It hurts. The organic matter has been hurt. But is that all? What makes your hands close and teeth come together? Ah, then another source of feeling has been touched, and let's see what it is. . . .

"Look at yourself and then see if the man who struck you is not better off. Besides, what kind of forgiveness do you call that where you allow a man to strike you when you believe that by so doing the man will in time pay dearly for his action. You will have the world think you turn to him the left cheek while in your heart you expect your pound of flesh."

their preachings undoubtedly reflected popular sentiment and ideals as all-unconsciously moulded by economic circumstances. Neither Christianity nor any other system of philosophy of the period, for instance, attacked nor in any way reprobated slavery, upon which at that period Graeco-Roman civilisation was economically dependent, whilst all systems of philosophy current at that age reflect an intense individualism characteristic of the strenuous energy of the period. Nothing can be more utterly fallacious than the claims of the Christian Socialists that Christianity can be considered a Socialistic creed : nothing could be more alien to the true spirit of Christianity. Christianity is the most intensely individualistic of all creeds : it makes its whole appeal to the individual ; it is the individual who is exhorted to repentance and good works, the individual who is menaced by divine wrath, whilst rich and poor, servants and masters, are accepted as the natural orderings of Providence. And what could be more individualistic than the parable of the servant who kept his talent wrapped in a napkin whilst his fellow judiciously laid out his in commercial enterprises and thereby increased it, with the praise given to enterprise and energy in this world's matters as compared with idleness and cowardice, and the moral drawn therefrom, "To him that hath shall be given ; from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." And again, "The poor ye shall always have with you."

How all this can be twisted into a divine mandate for Socialism is a matter which I must confess passes my understanding.¹

The other later Græco-Roman systems of philosophy reflect current economic circumstances in like manner to primitive Christianity ; Aristotle, for instance, cannot conceive of a Society in which slavery was absent any more than could the founders of Christianity.

Broadly speaking, we may say that the tendency of the later formative epoch of civilisation is to create a wealthy leisured class which, free from actual preoccupation with the struggle for wealth and surrounded from infancy with articles of luxury, loses at once the intense intellectual excitement of the race for riches, and the primitive animal appetite for luxurious surroundings. With this class which by its actual material wealth and power moulds social conventions and habits of thought, those primitive sensual cravings of mankind which are the most potent influences in creating wealth and civilisation, the craving for fair women, purple and fine linen, and the delights of wealth, become blunted from mere superfluity. The overloaded stomach will turn from the daintiest meats, and there comes a time when the loveliest women lose their sexual attraction for the most sensual of men. From this recoil of

¹ I make these observations with fear and trembling, as, alas ! it is the special beauty of the New Testament that one text can always be found to contradict another.

satisfied appetite from superfluity, there follows what is termed by conventional writers a craving for the "higher" life, and the development of ethics from their most primitive economic basis into idealised mystic philosophies. The wealthy man, remote from actual physical contact with the vulgar side of life, has leisure to speculate upon the infinite, and to dabble in an amateurish way into various arts and sciences. Surrounded with luxuries and with abundance of servants at his command, the kindlier and, from the abstract point of view, more intellectual side of his nature has time to develop, he begins to speculate about what, for the sake of argument, we will term his "soul," and recoils from the vulgar ostentation of wealth and brutal animalism of the previous generations. Finally, it becomes inevitable that the highest type of wealthy man will take refuge from materialism in a lofty philosophy, which, holding the affairs of this world in utter contempt, will maintain the dignity of Man as Man, reject with scorn the vulgar ambition and eagerness for wealth of the common herd, and preach the duty of Man to aid his fellow-man without hope of gratitude in this world nor expectation of reward in the next.¹ Such a philosophy, in reality far nobler than Christianity, was that reached by Marcus Aurelius : Christianity makes its fundamental appeal to selfishness ; do good and you

¹ "Ouida" admirably depicts this phase of character in her novels "Princess Napraxine" and "Othmar."

will be rewarded by "heaven," do evil and you will be punished by "hell." What "divinely" inspired creed is there which reaches the highest pagan level and rejects fear of punishment and hope of reward ?

Such a system of philosophy, however, must obviously be the result of the later maturity phase of civilisation and its ultimate result be negation. Too highly educated to credit the superstitions of the mob and lacking any incentive to effort, the organising class which, in general, has reached this level, will inevitably be shouldered aside from the actual administration of affairs in general by more practical and more energetic subordinates : whether thrust down into the ranks of the class that is organised, or merely set aside as nominal owners of wealth, in like manner as the Shoguns and Daimoyos shouldered the Mikados aside from practical power, and the Carlovingian monarchs were dominated by their Mayors of the Palace, there will inevitably result a period of flux and reflux in the ranks of the actual governing class as each usurping caste loses its primitive vigour and subsides into the philosophy of *laissez faire*. From this and economic causes a Period of Decadence will be the inevitable result.

We have seen that Ethics merely reflect economic circumstances, and that Ethics become more and more idealised in ratio to the increased wealth of the organising class ; it follows then

See Macaulay's "The last speech of
... the Duke of Wellington in the House of

that the development of Ethics will fall into the same three epochs as the development of civilisation generally ; a Formative Period, a Period of Maturity, and a Period of Decadence ; and that all these epochs will faithfully reflect the economic circumstances of the analogous economic epochs. The development of the Reformation in Northern Europe, for instance, merely reflected the economic development of the Renaissance, and the development of philanthropy during the latter eighteenth century merely reflected analogous economic circumstances. These being constant, John Howard would have been the same brave, kindly John Howard had he never opened a Bible in his life ! The development of Ethics, then, coincides with and reflects the development of Economics, and it is only under exceptional circumstances that the development of Ethics can run counter to and affect the development of Economics.

Taking the instance of modern slavery ; first, it was only within a limited sphere that the economic circumstances were favourable to slavery as an industrial system. In Europe¹ and the Northern States of America slavery disappeared under pressure of economic circumstances ; only in the West India Isles, Mauritius, and the Southern States of America did it linger on, thanks to exceptional conditions. Secondly, under all circumstances it was only under pressure

¹ The Russian serfdom, a system analogous to the English manorial system, was not slavery.

of external forces that slavery in these regions was finally abolished. The Christian slave-owners of the Southern States of America, of the West Indies, and Mauritius no more considered slavery an ethically reprehensible system than did the Fathers of the Christian Church. F. H. Marshall, M.A., writing in "A Companion to Latin Studies" on the subject of Slavery, tells us that "The other influence of incalculable force [in improving the lot of the slave] was that of Christianity. The runaway slave, Onesimus, is to be received back 'not as a slave, but as a brother beloved.' Christianity did not insist upon the actual liberation of the slave, but it did insist that he must no longer be regarded as a mere chattel. This in the long run meant the abolition of slavery." May one enquire whether the records of slavery among the Christian slave-owners of America, the West Indies, and Mauritius afford historical warrant for the assumption that among Christian slave-owners the runaway slave was received back "not as a slave, but as a brother beloved"? And if there is no historical warrant for such a statement, what becomes of the assumption that "this in the long run meant the abolition of slavery"? In reality, so far from insisting that the slave "must no longer be regarded as a mere chattel," the Southern Church upheld the exact contrary, maintained that slavery was a divinely appointed institution, and that the runaway slave (who is to be received back "not as a

slave, but as a brother beloved") committed a "sin" in stealing his own body from his divinely appointed master. And men of first-rate ability, such as Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson, listened to this nonsense seriously, an amazing instance of how readily the consciences of even high-minded, honourable men can be lulled into quiescence when their own economic interests or the economic interests of their own order are called into question.

Only under pressure from external influences was the system of chattel-slavery abolished, alike in the British colonial possessions and in the Southern States of the American Union; and when we come to examine these external influences more closely, we shall find that abstract philanthropy and the development of ethical sentiment had, in reality, far less to do with the matter than the clash of rival economic interests. Those Liberal Capitalists, for instance, to whose influence was due the abolition of slavery in the British possessions were themselves dependent upon a system of industrial slavery in no degree superior, either in the degree of genuine personal liberty enjoyed by the workers or in the degree of standard of comfort, to the system of chattel-slavery which they professed to abhor. It was far less genuine philanthropy, and far more dislike for the landed aristocracy economically interested as a class in the system of slavery, which led to the grant of freedom to the slaves. And the

same philanthropists who had freed the slaves, fought tooth and nail against the Factory Acts, fought strenuously against any attempt to come between *them* and *their* property.

Justin McCarthy writes : "The outcry raised by Lord Ashley's opponents was that his agitation was directed towards a legislative interference with the freedom of contract. There is a great tendency in the English mind to be governed by phrases, to turn some favourite phrase into an oracle, and allow it to deliver judgment in teeth of whatever evidences and facts. For years and years after Lord Ashley had started his movement, there were numbers of Englishmen filled with a fond belief that the words 'freedom of contract' settled every question which could possibly come within the reach of the principle which they were supposed to embody. Was it really proposed, Lord Ashley's opponents asked in stern accents, that Parliament should interfere with the freedom of contract ; with the right of one man to hire labour, and the right of another man to let it out for hire ? . . . It did not seem to have occurred to many of Lord Ashley's opponents to ask themselves whether, in such cases, there is always any real and equal freedom of contract. The hard-worked artisan in a city with half a dozen children whom he finds it hard to support—is he really quite as free in the contract for their labour as the capitalist who offers to hire it, and who can get plenty of offers from others if

some one working-man declines to agree with his terms ?

" The opposition to Lord Ashley's measures did not always come, however, from hard-headed and hard-hearted economists who believed in freedom of contract, because the freedom was all on their own side. Men of the highest character and the most unselfish motives, many owners of factories, who had, through all their lives, been filled with the kindest feelings towards their work-people, were bitterly opposed to the whole principle underlying Lord Ashley's efforts. . . . Lord Ashley was supported by a great many land-owners, for whom, naturally, the working of factories had no direct personal concern, and who could therefore afford to be philanthropic at the expense of the factory-owners."

In like manner the Liberal factory-owners had been philanthropic at the expense of West India slave-owners, and in later years, the Northern Capitalists considered the slave-system of the Southern planters a most abominable institution ; the above paragraphs, however, written by a politician of the modern cheap claptrap school, are an instructive albeit unconscious instance of the true reaction of economics upon ethics. No amount of preaching Christianity nor the most eloquent appeals to principles of philanthropy and brotherly love could persuade the English factory-owners that it was an ethically reprehensible system which degraded Englishwomen to

the level of beasts of burden, and extorted the last ounce of effort from the puny mites born in the pestilent atmosphere of the early Victorian factory-hell ; and the very men who had waxed indignant over the sorrows of the African slave, and subscribed to missionary societies to preach the Gospel to the heathen, remained blissfully unconscious of the atmosphere of vice, immorality, and unremitting toil amid bestial surroundings, to which were condemned hundreds of thousands of their fellow-countrywomen and fellow-Christians. Nay, they deliberately shut their eyes against every attempt to enlighten them, soothed their ruffled consciences with vague platitudes, and strenuously opposed every attempt to better the lot of the victims of the industrial system to which they owed their wealth and power. And that the Factory Acts finally became law was due, not to an awakening of the factory-owners to the ethical wrong of their industrial system, but to the action of a class not economically dependent upon this system, the landowners, who, moreover, had the passing of the Reform Bill and Abolition of Slavery to avenge.

From all this it becomes clear that a reaction of ethical sentiment against economic conditions can only arise in classes not themselves economically dependent upon the circumstances at variance with ethical sentiment, and from this it follows that when upon these economic circumstances is dependent the general interest of a community, no

reaction of ethical sentiment against them upon a sufficient scale to modify the economic circumstances will be possible. Had the Southern planters and West India slave-owners been left to their own devices, chattel-slavery would still exist as an industrial system in these regions of the world ; had the factory-owners been similarly left to themselves the Factory Acts would never have become law. It follows from this that it is only under abnormal circumstances that a development of ethical sentiment can run counter to economic fact ; and that when such is the case it is only when the classes dependent upon the economic system at variance with ethical sentiment form a comparatively insignificant factor in the body-politic ; when, in fact, there exists an overwhelming superiority in that physical force which is the basis of all law on the side of the community as against the classes at variance with general ethical sentiment, that this sentiment will exercise real influence upon economic fact. And when the classes dependent upon the economic system at variance with general ethical sentiment are fairly evenly balanced in physical strength with the classes which are *not* dependent upon this economic system : only when there exists a fundamental economic antagonism between the two sections of the community will there result a strife of forces which may or may not have the effect of destroying the economic system at variance with general ethical sentiment. And

this fundamental economic antagonism between the two sections of the community must necessarily have the effect of creating a strife of forces, quite independently of any question of ethics. Taking the American Civil War for instance ; as anyone who has studied the history of this struggle will admit, the true causes of this conflict lay in the fundamental economic antagonism between North and South. The South, a non-manufacturing country, desired Free Trade, whilst the North, a manufacturing region, desired the maintenance of the policy of Protection, which would preserve the South as an exclusive market for Northern commerce. The revolt of the South against the economic policy of the North was, in fact, as inevitable a movement as the revolt of the American Colonies nearly a hundred years previously against the economic policy of Great Britain, and the party cries of " Save the Union ! " " States - Rights ! " " Slavery ! " had in reality as little real influence in creating the conflict as the analogous outcry against the Stamp Act. The War of the American Revolution would certainly have been brought about from economic causes had no Stamp Act ever been passed ; in like manner the fundamental economic antagonism between North and South must have eventuated in civil war quite independently of any question of " States-Rights " and " Slavery."¹

¹ The account of the American Civil War in Vol. VII, "The Cambridge Modern History," is the most superficial and one-sided

We have seen that, in general, the development of Ethics reflects the development of Economics, and that it is only under abnormal circumstances that the development of Ethical sentiment will run counter to economic fact; from all this we may deduce that a reaction of Ethics upon Economics can only take place subject to the following laws. First, *no such reaction of Ethics upon Economic fact can take place when the Economic system at variance with Ethical sentiment represents the general interest of the community*, e.g. the attitude of the Early Christian Church to slavery, and the failure of Ethical sentiment to affect British and American slave-holders. Secondly, *an awakening of Ethical sentiment against Economic fact can only take place among classes or peoples themselves*

attempt to describe that great struggle which I have ever read. This is explained when it is mentioned that it is written exclusively by Northern "historians," who naturally reflect the views at present popular in the North. I have not the slightest sympathy with the South, but surely in a work which is professedly a "history," and which is, moreover, written for the British public, one has a right to expect that ordinary fairness should be shown to the South. And it is remarkable that in the account of the War of American Independence no mention is made of the economic causes which rendered that struggle inevitable. We are told that there was a spirit of discontent in the Colonies previous to the passage of the Stamp Act, but *why* there was this spirit of discontent the writer does not condescend to explain. Nor is any mention made of the systematic persecution of the Loyalists which long preceded the actual outbreak of hostilities. The whole volume, in fact, is written in a spirit of slavish subservience to popular sentiment, particularly that of America, a fact which reflects very little credit upon one of our most famous Universities.

*Then do the Loyalists have their day
in the Northern voice.*

not economically dependent upon the Economic system at variance with Ethical sentiment. Thirdly, such an awakening of Ethical sentiment against Economic fact can be productive of practical result only when upon the system at variance with Ethical sentiment is dependent only a relatively unimportant section of the community, unless, Fourthly, there exists sharp economic antagonism between those classes in the community dependent upon the system at variance with Ethical sentiment and those which are not.

We live to-day under a system of Society which, from the standpoint of pure Ethics, is certainly no whit superior to the chattel-slave system of the Classical World or the chattel-slavery of America and the West Indies. It is a commonplace that we have men, women, and children starved to death in our midst, it is a commonplace that the denizens of the slums of our great cities are less civilised, less well fed, and, in a word, enjoy less of the pleasures of life than the meanest savages, it is a commonplace that the streets of our great cities are, after nightfall, crowded with "unfortunate" women ; yet certainly the average Englishman of to-day no more considers the system of civilisation which produces such results an "odious" system than the Roman of the Classical Period considered chattel-slavery "odious." And it is to be feared that the economist who considers the question dispassionately will find it very difficult to prove that from the standpoint of

pure Ethics there is any real difference between a man who hires a unit of the commodity of labour-power by the hour and he who purchases the same unit of the commodity of labour-power outright. It may be said, and has been said with wearisome repetition, that the "free" labourer is a "free" agent, free to make a contract for his labour and sell his services to the highest bidder; but surely this is a very superficial view to take? Has the landless artisan dependent for livelihood upon the hiring out of his labour-power any real freedom in fixing the price of his labour and for whom he shall or shall not work? And does not the pressure of economic circumstances result in quite as much breaking up of homes and separations between husbands and wives, parents and children under a system of "free" labour as under a system of chattel-slavery? Nor is it even correct to attribute the immunity of the "free" labourer from personal ill-treatment at the hands of the employers purely to the influence of "freedom." Down to the nineteenth century in Britain, and even now in many parts of the Continent, it was a recognised custom for employers to inflict "paternal" correction upon their employees. To the growing refinement of the leisured class, not to the influence of "freedom," was due the gradual abolition of corporal punishment in England and elsewhere.

From the standpoint of pure Ethics, it must be repeated, it is mere childishness to maintain

that there is any real difference between the employer who hires out his units of the commodity of labour-power for a weekly wage and the employer who purchases his units of the commodity of labour-power outright; and had the great American Civil War been truly fought upon the issue of chattel-slavery it would in reality have been a conflict analogous to the famous struggle between the Lilliputians and the inhabitants of Blefuscu over the momentous principle of whether they should crack their eggs at the small end or the large one.

This point was brought out with amusing *naïveté* by the English defenders of slavery: the stock argument of these latter was that there was quite as much misery of all kinds under a system of "free" labour as with slavery, and it never seemed to occur to the gentlemen who used this argument that it was less a defence of slavery than a condemnation of their own industrial system.

The system of Society under which we at present live is not, then, in any degree superior from the standpoint of pure Ethics to the system of Society of the days of the Cæsars, both systems of Society are equally dependent upon the buying and selling of the commodity of labour-power; yet the average Englishman of to-day does not consider the institution of wage-slavery an abhorrent institution, he does not in the least repudiate

the economic system upon which is based our present social system: all of which brings home the fact that the ethical sentiment evolved by a people merely reflects its economic circumstances.

VII

SOCIALISM

WE have seen that the Ethical sentiment evolved by a people merely reflects its Economic circumstances, and that the development of Ethics becomes more and more complex proportionately to the more and more complex development of Economics: in considering the development of Socialism we shall see the truth of those laws which we have traced as governing the reaction of Economics on Ethics and of Ethics on Economics strikingly exemplified.

Socialism whilst in its most popular forms based upon the pseudo-Economic theories of Marx and his followers is in reality a system of Ethics which reflects the Economic circumstances of the early nineteenth century. Alike in its Ethical sentiments and Economic doctrines it reflects the formation of a wealthy leisured class, the triumph of *bourgeois* ideals and the concentration of industry into the hands of large producers. The Ethics of Socialism, in fact, are a natural and inevitable reaction of the Ethics of Capitalism, whilst the Economic doctrines by which it is

sought to express these Ethics are merely an exaggeration of the current tendency towards the concentration of industry into the control of a few large groups of producers. The fundamental difference between Capitalism and Socialism is that the one is a natural development of Economics, whilst the other expresses an endeavour to mould the development of Economics in accordance with the development of Ethical sentiment.

The fundamental basis of Socialism, as well, in fact, as that of all schemes of Social Regeneration, is the conception of Ethical right and wrong, and this conception of Ethical right and wrong is itself a product of the development of organised Society and of the Capitalist system. There are no "divinely" implanted instincts of good and evil in Man, and we have elsewhere traced the evolution of property and sexual morality, of the specialisation of industry, of law, and of social organisation generally from the earliest times to the present epoch : that these lines of evolution must necessarily have culminated in the present-day Capitalistic system of Society only a very narrow-minded and ignorant critic would be disposed to deny, and with the development of a wealthy leisured class freed from the crude animalism of the struggle for wealth, yet possessed of power to mould social conventions, there must, as we have previously seen, necessarily ensue a more complex development of Ethical sentiment with in consequence a refinement of manners and

development of kindly feeling toward social inferiors. During the mid-eighteenth century, books such as "Tom Jones" or "Roderick Random" were read aloud before young girls, servants were beaten by their masters and mistresses, whilst an outspoken coarseness of manners dealt publicly with the most delicate subjects. As a result, however, of the tremendous economic development of the latter half of the eighteenth century, by the time of the early nineteenth there had resulted a corresponding refinement of manners and development of Ethics, and women of the highest reputation who had heard "Tom Jones" read aloud in mixed company lived to see the day when that and kindred works were banished from the drawing-rooms, never to reappear; and this development of refinement coincided with the development of philanthropy.

The conception of Ethical right and wrong having then been created by the Capitalist system, and the high level of development reached by this latter having created a corresponding development of ethical sentiment, it becomes inevitable that the ethical sentiment thus created should, subject to the laws elsewhere determined, react upon economic fact in the direction of endeavouring to soften its bitterness. We have an example of this in the development of philanthropy and the Anti-Slavery movement in England and America, and it becomes obvious that the more ardent and visionary the character of the philanthropist, the

more keenly he would be impressed by the inequalities and cruelties of our social system, and by the difficulty, nay, the sheer impossibility, of effecting any real and genuine reform save by the subversal of the entire system. From this it becomes inevitable that schemes of Social Reconstruction having as their aim the reorganisation of Society upon ethical principles and the removal of social inequalities and grievances should be developed. Plato's "Republic" and More's "Utopia" form early instances of these visionary schemes of social reconstruction, and with the development of the Capitalist system and of Economics and Ethics generally, it becomes equally inevitable that such schemes should become more and more numerous and more and more clearly defined alike as Ethical systems and Economic theories.

During the early nineteenth century there was published a whole crop of more or less crude and fanciful schemes of Social Regeneration advocating a vague communism and known generically as Socialism; these by the mid-nineteenth century culminated in the publication by Marx of his celebrated work, "Capital," following which and in the main based upon it have appeared a vast series of Socialistic writings down to the present day.

Broadly speaking, we may define Socialism as a reaction of Ethics upon Economics. At the back of all Socialistic theories and modes of thought, however ill-balanced and contradictory,

is the desire to reconstruct Society upon Ethical principles. In this lies the fundamental difference between what we may generically term Socialism, for under this heading one is forced to include many and contradictory schemes of social salvation, and any other system of Ethics such as Christianity. Christianity does not insist upon social reorganisation, but merely upon the practice by the individual of ethical virtues redounding to the general advantage of the community, such as kindness, chastity, etc., and all other systems of ethics save what for convenience we have agreed to call Socialism are based upon the same fundamental basis : their whole appeal is to the individual. And as a political system Socialism differs as markedly from any other system of polities as it does from any other scheme of Ethics. All other schemes of polities aim at securing the rights, liberty, and well-being of the individual : Socialism considering the individual but as an integer of the sum-total sacrifices the individual to the well-being of the community.

Socialism, then, is a reaction of Ethics upon Economics and differs in fundamental basis from any other system of Ethics or polities in the world's history. It is well to appreciate this last factor clearly. Socialists perpetually point to the French Revolution as a triumph of the "people" over forces of oppression, quite failing to realise that the French Revolution was in reality a revolt of the *bourgeoisie* against the political power

of the throne and noblesse, and thus forms no real analogy with a proposed revolt against economic conditions. And in like manner the revolutionary movements in Russia, Spain, and Portugal are all *bourgeoise* revolts against political conditions, and thus in no respect afford any analogy with Socialistic movements.

Whilst primarily a system of Ethics, Socialism, in the attempt to apply these Ethics to the affairs of everyday life, becomes at once an Economic doctrine and a Political creed. As an Economic doctrine its fundamental basis is Communism. Under Socialism all land is to be held by the State, all labour is to be organised by the State, and alike the creation of products and their distribution will be organised and controlled by the State for the benefit of the community as a whole—"From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." There are minor and hotly debated points of difference between various Socialistic schemes, the manner of electing officials and otherwise controlling industry, etc., but all are united upon the one broad principle of the "Socialisation" of industry for the benefit of the community in general. And in this economic doctrine is expressed an endeavour to remove the waste of products and social inequalities of our present system of Society ; the surplus wealth at present wasted in non-productive luxuries for the "idle" rich will, we are told, be evenly distributed among the populace as a whole, thus eliminating on the one

hand excessive wealth, on the other hand extreme poverty, and creating an even general standard of comfort which we are assured will result in mighty manifestations of Art, an immense development of Science, the removal of all social grievances, and, in short, the arrival of the millennium.

The case for Socialism is thus stated by a distinguished Labour leader :—

“ The attitude of multitudes of people towards Socialism is that of the man who could not see the wood for the trees. They are so engrossed in the contemplation of petty details that they never get even a remote glimpse of the great unifying principle underlying Socialism. Who is to blacken the boots and do the scavenging ? What about the dangerous and disagreeable occupations such as mining and seafaring ? How are we going to secure that each does his fair share and no more of the work, and receives his fair share and no more of the resultant wealth ? How is genius to be rewarded under Socialism, and how is Art to be recognised ? Since all are to be equal, what is to become of the man with exceptional ability ? Is he to be specially rewarded ? If not, what incentive will there be to his putting forth his special abilities ; and if he is, what becomes of the promised equality ? These and a hundred and one others of a like kind are the objections with which the Socialist advocate is continually being met. Unless he can give a detailed and circumstantial explanation of how each and every one of these difficulties

is to be overcome, his opponent goes away exulting in the belief that he has demolished the case for Socialism. With great respect I venture to submit that none of these things at all affect the issue in question, which is whether Socialism represents a desirable set of principles which, if acted upon, would materially lessen the burden of human woe and tend to the further development and improvement of the human race. If it be admitted that such results would follow the adoption of Socialism, then the adaptation of means to realise that end should present but few, and those easily overcome difficulties. It is only by leaving out all allowance for common sense that the difficulties appear to be great and insuperable."¹

Socialists may be broadly divided into the educated and semi-educated classes. The educated Socialist considers Socialism "a desirable set of principles which, if acted upon, would materially lessen the burden of human woe and tend to the further development and improvement of the human race"; the semi-educated Socialist, generally sprung from the working-classes, holds to the crude Marxian doctrine that all wealth is created by a system of unfair exchange, i.e. the robbery and spoliation of the working-classes. With the views of this class, however, it is unnecessary to deal in detail; albeit the most numerous and composing the most active propagandists of

¹ From the Foreword to "From Serfdom to Socialism," by J. Keir Hardie.

Socialism, it possesses little real influence with either the middle or working classes.

It remains for us to consider whether Socialism represents "a desirable set of principles which, if acted upon, would materially lessen the burden of human woe and tend to the further development and improvement of the human race." In this connection, however, it is well for us to start by clearly distinguishing between what is *desirable* and what is *practical*. For the last two thousand years the European peoples have been agreed that the Sermon on the Mount represents "a desirable set of principles which, if acted upon, would materially lessen the burden of human woe and tend to the further development and improvement of the human race"; but, alas! this general agreement as to the desirability of the aforesaid principles being put into practice has in no single case so far led to their actual application to the affairs of everyday life. It follows, then, that it is not sufficient for a system of Ethics to represent a desirable set of principles, etc., it must also represent a set of principles capable of being applied to the affairs of everyday life, if it is to become an active motive-power to lessen the burden of human woe and tend to the "further development and improvement of the human race"; and when we consider this question of the application of the set of Ethical principles known as Socialism to the affairs of everyday life, those petty details in the contemplation of which the critics of

Socialism are so engrossed that they never get even a remote glimpse of the great unifying principle underlying Socialism become of first-rate importance. Under Socialism, Who *is* to blacken the boots and do the scavenging ? What about the dangerous and disagreeable occupations such as mining and seafaring ? How *are* we going to secure that each does his fair share and no more of the work, and receives his fair share and no more of the resultant wealth ? How *is* genius to be rewarded under Socialism, and how *is* Art to be recognised ? Since all are to be equal, what *is* to become of the man with exceptional ability ? Is he to be specially rewarded ? If not, *what* incentive will there be to his putting forth his special abilities ; and if he is, *what* becomes of the promised equality ? All these questions our author dismisses as trivial details ; we are to confine ourselves to the question of whether Socialism represents "a desirable set of principles," etc. ; having decided which in the affirmative, the adaptation of means to realise that end should present but few, and those easily overcome difficulties. It is only, we are assured, by leaving out all allowance for common sense that the difficulties appear to be great and insuperable. The best commentary upon this is the fact that so far no two Socialist writers can be found in agreement as to the manner in which these "petty details" are to be worked out. Are we from this to conclude that all Socialist writers, with the single exception of Mr. Keir

Hardie, are lacking in an allowance of common sense ?

But let us consider the question, *Does Socialism represent a desirable set of principles which, if acted upon, would materially lessen the burden of human woe and tend to the further development and improvement of the human race?* First, since a careless phraseology, the hasty use of dimly understood phrases, is an unfortunate consequence of the “new” journalism, let us begin by clearly defining what is meant by these high-sounding expressions, “the burden of human woe” and “the development and improvement of the human race.” What *is* human woe? Woe or suffering can originate from two causes, physical and spiritual. Physical pain, hunger, cold, and kindred causes will create suffering, whilst in like manner the loss of a dearly loved son, daughter, husband, or wife will create grief. We may, then, distinguish between suffering as the result of physical causes, and woe as a result of spiritual, and it becomes obvious that to imagine that any conceivable scheme of social reorganisation can “lessen the burden of human woe” indicates a confusion between physical suffering and spiritual woe. Surely under Socialism, unless all ties of affection be by some means abolished, the grief of a husband over the loss of a dearly loved wife, or *vice versa*, will be just as acute as under our present Capitalist system?

And considering physical suffering and that

mental disquiet which is the reaction of physical circumstances, does Socialism represent a desirable set of principles, etc., capable of materially reducing the burden of such suffering and, at the same time, tend to the further development and improvement of the human race ? There is here a hopeless contradiction in terms, for the author quite fails to grasp the most essential factor in human progress : the struggle against an adverse environment. Remove the conditions which necessitate such a struggle and you remove all incentive to effort, you remove all incentive to mental strain, you remove all incentive to any state of Society higher than that of the lotus-eaters. You may or you may not reduce the sum-total of human suffering, but if successful you merely create a dead-level of stagnation which would mean the death of all that is virile in our civilisation. It is the desire for the luxuries and superfluities of life, for the sensual delights of fair women, for "purple and fine linen," for "The World, the Flesh, and the Devil," and all that is attractive in life, which is the most potent motive-power in our civilisation. Can you destroy this motive-power or replace it by an artificial sentiment ? It is not sufficiently realised that it is this motive-power, the desire of the individual for sensual gratification, whether it be of the sexual appetite or of other appetites, which is the root-basis of all our systems of Ethics and all our Ethical sentiment. How, then, is it conceivable

that any development of Ethical sentiment can run counter to and destroy the dominant instincts of Mankind, instincts, moreover, upon which is based the very ethical sentiment which is to provide the motive-power for their suppression ? Obviously any system of Ethics which repudiates the dominant instincts of Mankind will in practice, even if outwardly acquiesced in, remain a dead letter, even as the sentimental rhapsodies of the Sermon on the Mount, despite the lip-service paid to them by generations of Christians, have remained a dead letter to the present day. And yet Christianity could command far more potent influence upon the imaginations of Mankind than can Socialism : Christianity could reward with heaven and terrify with hell, this life was but an infinitesimal span compared with the golden visions of the life-everlasting held out to the Christian who faithfully followed the behests of the Master. And yet in an age when men sincerely believed in Christianity, when heaven was a glorious vision and hell with its fiery flames a tangible reality, neither hopes of the one nor fears of the other availed to persuade men to practise Christianity as well as preach it. Which merely emphasises the dictum elsewhere expounded that general Ethical sentiment cannot run counter to general Economic fact. How much chance then has Socialism, which is a system of Ethics running counter to general Economic fact, of securing any but a nominal triumph ?

And, again, surely every broad-minded man who considers the question must realise that human suffering and human happiness are all comparative, not definite and unvarying quantities ? Happiness is dependent upon the gratification of tastes, and tastes are formed by environment : the tastes, for instance, of a navvy differ widely from the tastes of a member of the "idle" rich class, and so long as the navvy and the "idle" rich man possess the power to gratify their respective tastes the sum-total of the sensual gratification received by each will be exactly equal, subject, of course, to adventitious influences, such as the death or suffering of dearly loved friends and relatives. And if from any cause whatsoever either the navvy or the rich man be unable to gratify the tastes created by his environment, the suffering experienced by each will be in exact proportion to the degree in which they are unable to gratify their respective tastes. Human happiness, therefore, may be considered as dependent upon three influences : spiritual causes or woe, such as grief ; physical suffering from blows, accident, or sickness ; and the power possessed by the individual to gratify the tastes formed by his environment. Can it be seriously asserted by any broad-minded man that any of these influences is likely to be more rapidly or more widely affected to the advantage of the human race by a hasty and enforced effort at an artificial scheme of social reorganisation than by the natural

evolution of the Capitalist system ? It may be said : Socialism will lessen the sum-total of human grief by lessening the number of deaths from causes preventable and directly arising from the Capitalist system, such as war. Socialism will lessen the sum-total of physical suffering from wounds, accidents, and sickness by abolishing war, feverish competition, and pestilent slums ; Socialism will increase the sum-total of human happiness by raising up the millions of our populace trembling on the verge of starvation ; but is it not obvious that the natural evolution of the Capitalist system must, in the long run, achieve all these results quite independently of any system of Socialism ? When, as is inevitable in natural process of evolution, the industries of the civilised world are concentrated under the control of large groups of producers there will be an end to competition, there will be an end to war, there will be an end to slums : just as the development of an "idle" rich class resulted in the development of ethical sentiment, so inevitably the ethical sentiment thus developed will develop further with the further development of the Capitalist system, and the ethical sentiment thus evolved, together with consciousness natural to an enlightened community that slums as centres of disease are a danger to the whole populace, will co-operate to insist upon their abolition. In similar manner the general ethical sentiment of the dominant caste will insist upon a certain general standard of com-

fort for the populace as a whole, the provision of educational facilities for the children, of adequate food and lodging for adults, and of pensions, etc., for the aged. The germs of these reactions of the ethical sentiment of the dominant caste upon Economic fact are to be seen in the recent legislation by our own Parliament and the Parliaments of Australia and New Zealand. Marx, whilst he foresaw the concentration of industry into the hands of great Capitalists, which is the logical and inevitable outcome of the Capitalist system, never seems to have realised that this natural and inevitable movement in Economics must be accompanied by an equally natural and inevitable movement in Ethics. He pictured, in Mallock's phrases, "a handful of idle and preposterous millionaires on the one hand, and a mass of miserable ragamuffins who provided all the millions on the other, having for themselves only enough food and clothing to enable them to move their muscles and protect their nakedness from the frost. Then, said Marx, when this contrast has completed itself the situation will be no longer tolerable. 'Then the knell of the capitalistic system will have sounded. The producers will assert themselves under pressure of an irresistible impulse ; they will repossess themselves of the implements of production of which they have been so long deprived.' 'The expropriators will in their turn be expropriated,' and the labourers thenceforth owning the implements of production collectively, all the

wealth of the world will for ever afterwards be theirs."

That in reality, the Capitalistic system having reached such a phase of evolution, there could be any successful revolt by Labour as a whole against the dominant caste of Capitalists may be dismissed as preposterous : there is no instance in all history¹ of a successful revolt of slaves against their masters or against economic conditions ; and when we consider the highly complex organisation of such a Society as that depicted above, the fact that the servile caste must necessarily lack arms, ammunition, discipline, and rations, whilst for a certainty numerous traitors would convey intelligence of their plans and movements to the dominant caste, it becomes obvious that only by conceiving an altogether incredible degree of ineptitude to paralyse this latter can we imagine any attempted revolt to be successful.

That, then, a state of Socialism could, under such circumstances, be achieved by physical force must be dismissed as a crude idea, and it is equally absurd to imagine that the propagation of Socialistic theories and sentiments among the working-classes can, under any circumstances, produce more tangible results. For mere theories are useless unless followed by an attempt to realise them in practice, and it is only by the use of force,

¹ Save, perhaps, the case of Hayti, which, however, was affected by a combination of climatic and adventitious causes scarcely likely to be repeated.

whether directly or indirectly in the form of "strikes" or "Syndicalism," that the working-classes, if converted generally to Socialistic theories, can endeavour to realise them in practice, and all such efforts at physical force are obviously foredoomed to failure. By the time the Capitalist system has reached its natural climax, however, there will, as we have seen, have been evolved an analogous development in the Ethical sentiment of the dominant caste, a development which must render the intellectual triumph of theories akin to Socialism as inevitable a movement in Ethics as the triumph of Christianity in the period of Roman decadence, and it will be an intellectual triumph as barren of practical influence for good as the similar intellectual triumph of Christianity. European civilisation being entered into its period of decadence, Socialism will be considered by the dominant caste "a desirable set of principles," etc.; but the practical difficulties in the way of applying these desirable principles will be found to be as insuperable as the difficulties in the way of applying the desirable principles of the "Sermon on the Mount." Whilst agreeing to the desirability of the principles of Socialism, the dominant caste will naturally be reluctant to abandon its control of industry, and admirable reasons will be found which would make its withdrawal from supreme control a terrible disaster to the human race. The working-people, it would be argued, were unfitted to suddenly assume great responsibility,

etc., and since it was they, the Capitalists, who had in the first place organised Society and were at present responsible for its guidance, it was only fair that they should have a disproportionate share of the wealth created, mainly, thanks to the exertions of themselves and their forbears. Thus the Capitalistic caste, whilst in theory and sincerely enough considering itself as holding a stewardship for mankind in general, would in practice cling to its power. There is no instance in all history of a ruling caste voluntarily relinquishing its power, and nothing is more certain than that the enlightened Capitalist of this phase of evolution, whilst ready to give the same theoretical assent to the principles of Socialism which the sincere Christian gives to the principles of the Sermon on the Mount, would be quite convinced that to suddenly dismiss his servants, cease his purchase of luxuries, and divide his wealth among the populace would merely create a general disorganisation of Society, and create a degree of general suffering which would merely intensify the worst evils of the Capitalistic system. What, it would be enquired, would become of the great mass of people directly dependent upon the purchasing-power of the dominant class ? What would the grant of power to the "people" mean in practice but the grant of power to unscrupulous demagogues ? Above all, the hopeless impracticability of making any such sudden and sweeping reorganisation of industry as that contemplated by the crude

Socialist of the Marxian type would be too apparent for any such scheme to be seriously entertained by the most feather-headed visionary once confronted with the practical difficulties in the way. In what manner, then, would the development of Ethical sentiment by the dominant class be most likely to react upon Economic fact ? Obviously in the direction of softening the most apparent evils of the Capitalistic system. Slums would be improved off the face of the earth ; "unemployment," intemperance, improvidence be met by special legislation, which, whilst it would redound to the physical benefit of the working-class, would yet crush all individuality and strangle all freedom ; legislation along the lines of the present Insurance Act would be developed until a cast-iron social system, synchronising with the elimination of competition and decay of individual enterprise, would culminate in general physical well-being and general spiritual stagnation, the apotheosis of a decadent civilisation. When there are no more wrongs to be righted, no more battles to be fought against violence and selfishness, no more crusades to be preached in favour of the weak and helpless : what will remain for Man but to curse God and die ? The mind shrinks from the vista of unutterable dullness opened out by so awful a prospect ; one feels that in sheer refuge from an infernal monotony a reaction of primitive animal instincts will plunge Man once more into the strangest and most unnatural forms

of vice, and that finally with the ruling caste thus weakened in physical vigour and *moral*, with a civilisation in general devoid of vigour and energy, with weapons of war and implements of production reduced to stereotyped, half-understood degenerated reproductions of the more early forms, it will be inevitable that the barbarian peoples as yet untouched by civilising influences shall tear down the whole decadent fabric in a cataclysm of invasion, which will set civilisation in the melting-pot anew.

VIII

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

WE have hitherto considered Socialism as an abstract doctrine and as a reaction of the Ethical sentiment of the dominant caste : it remains for us to consider this creed as a political doctrine, and trace its application to present-day politics and bearing upon future social tendencies. We have seen that all Ethical sentiment is a reaction from the Economic circumstances of the dominant caste, and that Ethics become more and more complex proportionately to the more and more complex development of the Economic system upon which they are dependent ; we have only to consider the personalities of the actual originators of Socialistic theories to have the truth of this essential fact made strikingly manifest, for it is a remarkable and very significant occurrence that in no instance have any of these schemes of Social Regeneration been originated by members of the class which might reasonably be supposed to be least in sympathy with the Capitalistic system. Robert Owen, Saint-Simon, Marx, and Prince Kropotkin come either from the ranks of the *bourgeoisie*, or the “idle” rich, whilst it is

from the ranks of the middle and lower middle classes that the most eloquent of modern Socialists, such men as Hyndman, Blatchford, or Bernard Shaw, are sprung. In its fundamental basis, therefore, Socialism is essentially a *bourgeoise* movement, reflecting, albeit unconsciously, the ideals of the dominant caste of *bourgeoisie*, and a very little reflection suffices to make it clear to a broad-minded man that such a reflection of the ideals of the dominant caste among the populace, as a whole, is inevitable. For men are in general unreflective, and their ideals are guided by their material interests : their natural instinct is to further these by all means in their power, thus it becomes inevitable that they should strive to curry favour with the dominant caste by vehemently protesting those sentiments which are in favour among their superiors. Again, the community in general being composed of unreflecting individuals passively accepts the sentiments so loudly inculcated by the individuals who stand to gain by the inculcation of such sentiments generally. From these dual causes, the natural instinct of man to profess those sentiments likely to redound to his material advantage and the generally unreflective character of the community, it follows in logical sequence that the general sentiment of a community will inevitably be moulded by the general sentiment of the dominant caste. And when we turn to the facts of history and of everyday life the justice of these views can be readily demonstrated. In

the Tudor period, when the English monarchy was all-powerful, there was a great profession of "loyalty" by the English people, which sentiment even yet lingers in the somewhat repugnant exhibitions of toadyism and snobbery with which our Press-writers see fit to disgust the moderately intelligent man on all occasions when Royalty, either in England or abroad, brings itself before the popular eye. In other European countries in like manner Royalty being the dominant caste, a loud-voiced "loyalty" became a general sentiment among the classes which stood to gain most by such a profession, and a sentiment so generally and passively accepted by the community as a whole that the traditional respect for monarchy survived the advent of the *bourgeoisie* to power and even the repudiation of the principle of monarchy: the snobbery of the American Press is even more offensive than that of our own. In like manner to the diffusion of the sentiment of loyalty and ideals of a monarchical state of Society, the advent to power successively of Aristocracy and *bourgeoisie* had the effect of successively diffusing aristocratic and *bourgeoise* sentiment among our populace as a whole: the fact that the English are even yet a nation of snobs is an inevitable sequence to the prolonged domination of aristocratic ideals, and to the growth of an artisan class under influence of *bourgeoise* ideals must be attributed the devolution of *bourgeoise* sentiment to the working-classes, the evolution of

modern democracy, and of the Labour movement.

To appreciate the true position of Labour in this country and abroad, and the true significance of the Labour movement, it is first of all necessary for us to form a just appreciation of the factor of the *exchange-value* of the commodity of labour-power in this country and in the more highly developed states of Europe and America generally, in its bearing upon the Ethical sentiment in relation to the commodity of labour-power developed by the dominant caste in the community, and the reaction of such Ethical sentiment upon the ideals of Labour as an individual class. We have elsewhere defined the influences which determine the exchange-value of the commodity of labour-power as well as the exchange-values of commodities in general : viz. the rate of production by the most efficient producers of any particular commodity balanced against the rates of production by the most efficient producers of commodities in general ; and in applying these principles to the commodity of labour-power we may summarise them in a terse phrase : viz. the ratio between the intelligence and organising power of a community, its population, and the circumstances of its environment. When a small but intelligent community possessed of a high degree of organising power inhabits a wealthy environment, it becomes obvious that in the endeavour of this community to exploit its environment, the

exchange-value of the commodity of labour-power will become very high, so high that there will ensue the importation of labour-power, and a system of more or less veiled chattel-slavery. And this extraordinarily high exchange-value of the commodity of labour-power will react upon the Ethical sentiment of the dominant caste, not in the direction of lightening the lot of the unit of this commodity, but on the direct contrary in the direction of creating a general desire to extract the last ounce of effort from this unit commensurately with its maintenance in due efficiency. When, for instance, a Capitalist has paid, say, two hundred pounds as the purchase-price of a slave, it will naturally be his desire to recover the purchase-price of the slave as speedily as possible ; he will thus reduce the cost of maintaining the slave as far as is commensurate with his maintenance in a state of physical efficiency, and similarly exact the uttermost volume of labour-power commensurate with the same standard of efficiency. Olmsted, in his works "The Seaboard Slave States" and "A Journey in the Back Country," speaks of slaves being worked on occasion *eighteen hours* a day, and as a matter of general occurrence for fourteen to fifteen hours daily ; he tells us, moreover, that he paid in wages to Irish labourers *twenty-one* times the maintenance cost of a Louisiana slave cotton-hand. This latter is not in reality a fair comparison, for, by reason of causes to be later touched on, the value of labour-power

in the North, whilst not so high as to render chattel-slavery of economic profit, was yet exceptionally high. Had the maintenance fund of the Louisiana slave cotton-hand, for instance, been compared with that of the English agricultural labourer of the same date there would, it is to be feared, have been found very little difference between the two, and that difference rather in favour of the slave than of the "free" man. Nevertheless, it sufficiently indicates that where the exchange-value of labour-power is high, there must necessarily ensue a system of "driving" to extract the uttermost effort from the labour-power available in the endeavour, first, to recover the cost of the importation of labour-power, and, secondly, to make the maximum profit upon the transaction of importing labour-power. This again will be reflected in the ethical sentiment of the dominant caste. The labour-power of men and women will be looked upon as a mere commodity in analogous fashion to the labour-power of horses and mules, and whilst general sentiment would reprobate wanton purposeless cruelty to men or women as to horses or mules, yet the idea of Labour as an individual class possessed of individual rights and aspirations would not yet have dawned. As, however, from the continual importation of labour-power and natural increase in population the exchange-value of labour-power becomes less and less, whilst with the evolution of a wealthy caste there proceeds a development of

Ethical sentiment and of intelligence and education generally, it will naturally result that this development of sentiment will combine with the development of Economics to react upon the position of Labour. The importation of labour-power being no longer of economic profit, such importation will naturally cease, meaning the abolition of chattel-slavery as an industrial system, for it is obvious that it will, under such circumstances, be no longer profitable to hold the units of labour-power in an involuntary thraldom. To put an extreme instance and compress into a few years a social movement which developed slowly during the course of centuries, let us imagine a slave-owner to have purchased one hundred slaves at a price of one hundred pounds each, and that these slaves cost him twenty pounds per head, per annum, for maintenance: now if the value of the labour-power of these slaves represents fifty pounds per head per annum, obviously in five years the slaves will have paid back their purchase-price and maintenance-fund, with a profit of twenty-five per cent; whilst, moreover, assuming the term of useful labour for each purchased slave to be twenty years, in the next fifteen years each slave will have earned his purchase-price four and a half times, after having repaid his original cost price (with a handsome profit) and, deducting the maintenance-fund, a total profit to the employer of slave-industry of four hundred and seventy-five per cent above the purchase-price of the slave.

Obviously, under such circumstances, chattel-slavery would be, from the economic standpoint, an extremely profitable institution. But let us imagine from a variety of circumstances the amount of slave labour-power to immensely increase beyond the demand by the Capitalist for such labour, obviously the purchase-price which the Capitalist is prepared to pay for his labour-power will decrease proportionately to the disproportionate increase in the labour-power available, thus it becomes inevitable that with the increase of population in greater ratio than the demand for labour-power, the purchase-price of the slave will fall to zero ; it will thus be no longer profitable to import slaves ; it will thus be no longer possible to sell slaves, and the children of slaves already in servitude will become "free" men and women, simply because their parents' owners, having no profitable use for their labour, will turn them adrift to provide themselves with maintenance as best they may. Thus there will be created a "free" labouring class which seeks a maintenance-fund in return for the "voluntary" hiring out of its labour. Economic fact will thus combine with Ethical sentiment to replace chattel-slavery by "free" labour, and there will thus be formed a separate labouring-class.

A little reflection, however, must suffice to make it clear that the circumstances under which a system of chattel-slavery can subsist and attain high development are necessarily limited, and

that such a system of industry must be the exception rather than the rule. In the case of an average community, in which the organising power of the dominant caste progresses in the normal proportion to the movement of its population and the circumstances of its environment, the supply of labour-power will tend to overflow or maintain an equilibrium with the demand for such labour-power in industrial and agricultural enterprises, whilst the slowly increasing momentum of **Industrial Efficiency**, with its tendency to concentrate the control of industry into fewer and fewer hands, together with the natural increase of population, will inevitably tend to increase the supply of labour-power disproportionately to the increased rate of production ; in other words, the exchange-value of labour-power by an inevitable movement in Economics must become ever less and less. Taking the case of England and Modern Europe generally, chattel-slavery has had no existence in this continent simply because the intelligence of the organising class in the community has developed less rapidly in proportion to the supply of labour-power available than was the case in the Ancient communities of Athens or Sparta. Who would pay two hundred pounds, the average price of an able-bodied slave, when he could engage an equally efficient labourer for the same weekly wage which would have formed the maintenance-fund of a slave ? And who would hold an unwilling labourer in involuntary subjection when

there were a dozen others willing to take his place for the same maintenance-fund ? In China and India chattel-slavery has no more existence as an industrial system than in Europe, and for precisely the same reasons.

Down to the latter half of the eighteenth century wages in England and in Europe generally represented a bare subsistence-level for Labour as a class ; there were exceptions in industries which demanded particular skill, nevertheless the standard of comfort for Labour generally was certainly no whit superior to the standard of comfort enjoyed by the slaves on the plantations of Virginia and Louisiana, so graphically described by Olmsted. The great mass of the populace could neither read nor write, dwelt in small, insanitary cottages, and were possessed alike in food, clothing, and furniture but of the bare necessities of life. It is, moreover, only necessary to recall the public whipping of male and female vagrants and beggars to have it borne upon us that even the lash was not lacking as an incentive to toil, for both sexes alike. We may also recall in this connection the awful floggings administered to soldiers and sailors, punishments which on occasions ran into *thousands* of lashes with the cat-o'-nine tails, which, of course, meant *nine* times the nominal punishment ; the conditions of our jails as described by John Howard, and the almost absolute power possessed by squire and landlord : facts which lead one to conclude that

the worst charges made by Olmsted against the Southern slave-holders, and which he makes the basis of a special attack upon the slave-system, can be easily paralleled by instances culled from the history of "free" English Labour.

During the latter half of the eighteenth century, however, there ensued in England the Economic revolution, alike in industry and agriculture, already alluded to ; and this Economic revolution was not itself a cause, but a result in which was expressed the sum-total of a variety of causes. Chief of these was the great though gradual Economic expansion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. England, welded into an homogeneous nation by the Wars of the Roses and supremacy of the Tudors, had commenced in earnest the development of her great natural resources, and participating in the general Economic movement of the Renaissance, reached out during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to great foreign markets in East and West Indies, America, and Cathay. So there ensued an all-round development in general knowledge and Industrial Efficiency which culminated in the invention of labour-saving machinery. And this invention of labour-saving machinery again continually reacted in the form of generally quickening the momentum of Industrial Efficiency. Nevertheless, it were well for us to realise that labour-saving machinery is not itself a cause but an effect of the economic expansion of Britain

during the eighteenth century. There is a great deal of misconception upon this point, and our present economic system is popularly supposed to have been originated by labour-saving machinery. But in reality the true though less generally recognised influence of labour-saving machinery was to prevent the development of a system of chattel-slavery. The invention of labour-saving machinery could have produced no practical effect, such inventions would in fact have remained mere scientific toys had there been no general desire for labour-power, and this general desire for labour-power was itself the product of our naval and military triumphs, of the economic movement which produced such triumphs, and of the opening up of wealthy markets to our commerce. Had there been no invention of labour-saving machinery, what, under such circumstances, would have been the inevitable sequence of such an economic movement? Obviously labour-power would have become of excessive value, and equally inevitably there would have followed the importation of labour-power. Had there been invented no machines capable of doing the work of ten men for the cost of one, there would have developed in Britain, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, an economic situation analogous to that which followed the Black Death; and just as this economic situation resulted in a recrudescence of compulsory labour, so inevitably there would have developed a more

or less veiled system of chattel-slavery, labour would have been imported under a system of "contract," whilst doubtless a development of the "apprenticeship" system would have resulted in a widespread selling of children into slavery. Surely no one who knows anything about eighteenth-century England will imagine that the Ethical sentiment of the community which fought with Spain for the "Assiento" contract, and sent English men and women by the thousand as slaves to the plantations of America and the West Indies, would have reprobated chattel-slavery at home if of Economic advantage? Had there been no invention of labour-saving machinery, we should still have had the modern factory system, but it would have been a system of slave-factories analogous to those of Ancient Babylon.

Despite the invention of labour-saving machinery, however, the value of labour-power in England steadily increased throughout the latter part of the eighteenth and up to the last decade of the nineteenth century. Great Britain formed, as though in lessening degree she still forms, the hub of the world's commerce, whilst great and increasingly valuable markets lay open to her wares: that under such conditions there resulted a gradual increase in the maintenance-fund paid to and general standard of comfort enjoyed by the British artisan and labouring classes is a fact which need cause no surprise; whilst the value of labour-power in Britain was not and is not suffi-

ciently great to render it of economic profit to import units of labour-power and hold them in involuntary subjection, yet the increased demand for labour-power to be used in the production of commodities, and the increased ratio of the production of commodities in general to the production of the commodity of labour-power, necessarily resulted in an increased exchange-value of the commodity of labour-power as compared with the general balance of commodities, with thus an all-round increase in the general standard of comfort enjoyed by Labour. And insomuch as but for the invention of labour-saving machinery there must have developed a system of chattel-slavery, in which case the share of the profits of industry received by Labour would have been a bare subsistence-level, we may say that this increased standard of comfort enjoyed by Labour is in a measure the result of labour-saving machinery.

We may say, then, that labour-saving machinery expresses a demand for labour-power, which demand is created by an economic expansion beyond the natural labour-power of the community: by the very circumstances, in fact, which, but for the invention of labour-saving machinery, would render a system of chattel-slavery inevitable. A little reflection, therefore, must suffice to make it clear that just as a system of chattel-slavery is the product of particular circumstances and a temporary phenomenon, so

in like manner a civilisation dependent upon labour-saving machinery must, as concerns labour-saving machinery and its indirect effects, be the product of particular circumstances and a temporary phenomenon. We have seen that a system of chattel-slavery is created when a small but intelligent community inhabits a wealthy environment or an environment which, from a variety of causes, forms a general centre of commerce; and we have seen also that this system of chattel-slavery can be maintained only so long as the general labour-power of the community remains disproportionate to the reaction of the organising power of the dominant caste upon the circumstances of its environment. To make this point clear, let us assume a country to be thinly populated but rich in copper-mines. There will inevitably be a period during which the community as a whole will be ignorant of the value of copper: there will follow a period during which, thanks to the enterprise of individuals, the value of copper will be appreciated, the mines will be developed, and copper-ore be extracted for commerce with the surrounding peoples. Now the exchange-value of labour-power in the community under consideration will obviously be determined by the natural supply of labour-power available, the richness of the copper-bearing district, and the level of intelligence of the organising class. This having developed sufficiently to appreciate the value of copper and the supply of labour-power

available being disproportionate to the rate of production of copper-ore, there will follow either the importation of labour and a system of chattel-slavery, or else the invention of labour-saving machinery to enhance the productive power of the supply of labour-power naturally available. Now in this analogy is expressed the actual circumstance of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain, of the Graeco-Roman civilisation of the Later Formative Period, of the United States of America, and our colonies. We have seen, however, that the history of all civilisation falls into three epochs : a Formative Period, in which Man is actively at war with his environment ; a brief Period of Maturity when, having made the full progress compatible with his surroundings, his civilisation is at the height of its vigour ; and a Period of Decadence when, having struck a balance with his environment, Man ceases to progress and stagnates into decay. Now obviously the development of chattel-slavery on a large scale as an industrial system or the invention of labour-saving machinery can only occur during the Later Formative Period of civilisation : during the period in which whilst Man is actively at war with his environment, whilst the demand for labour-power is yet in excess of the natural supply of labour-power available, yet Man has gained in a considerable degree mastery over the forces of nature and developed sufficient intelligence to control large bodies of men and inaugurate industrial enter-

prises upon a large scale. But obviously the Later Formative Period is a brief phase of civilisation, considered in the light of the countless millions of years through which our world has endured a mere pin-point of time, and with the speedy arrival of the Period of Maturity the creative vigour of the Formative Period is replaced by the stagnation of the Period of Decadence. Creative effort having ceased, the natural increase in the supply of labour-power available must necessarily overlap the organising power of the dominant caste, and the same economic movement which killed the chattel-slavery of the Græco-Roman world during the Period of Decadence must inevitably tend to replace labour-saving machinery by human labour. Just, in fact, as in the Southern States of the American Union labour-saving machinery is not used in cotton-factories upon a scale at all comparable with the use of machinery in the cotton-factories of Lancashire, simply on account of the fact that an excessively cheap supply of labour-power available from Black and "poor" Whites renders such a use of machinery economically unprofitable, so during the period of decadence not merely will the continual cheapening of labour-power prevent the further development of labour-saving machinery, but the actual use of human labour-power will, in many cases, replace the use of machinery. And obviously this continual cheapening of human labour-power will be expressed in the forcing of wages down to a bare subsistence-level.

We have elsewhere seen that the effect of labour-saving machinery is to cheapen the commodity of human labour-power, and that all increases of Industrial Efficiency are made ultimately at the expense of Labour. Whilst it is true that only the invention of labour-saving machinery prevented the development in Great Britain of a system of chattel-slavery analogous to that of Ancient Babylon, yet there can be no doubt that the introduction of such a system of slavery would have been as strenuously resisted by Labour as was the introduction of labour-saving machinery, even whilst there can be as little doubt that the issue of the struggle would have been the same. It would have been the true interest of Labour to resist chattel-slavery, just as it was undoubtedly the true interest of Labour as a class to resist labour-saving machinery. Had Labour been successful in its resistance alike to labour-saving machinery and chattel-slavery, and had—which is rather a large supposition—there been no such development either of machinery or slavery by our trade-rivals, it cannot be denied by a fair-minded man that wages would have ruled as high, and even higher, in Britain of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as in the period immediately following the Black Death, that the standard of *comfort*,¹ as distinct from *refinement*, enjoyed by Labour

¹ There would not have been electric light, safety razors, and other refinements of modern life, but rude plenty, comfortable homes, and light hours of labour.

as a class during this period would have been far in excess of that actually enjoyed, and that we should have been spared the horrors of the early nineteenth-century factory-hells : just, however, as Capital forced labour-saving machinery upon Labour, so there can be no doubt, had not labour-saving machinery been invented, Capital would have been equally successful in introducing a system of slavery.

In a previous chapter we considered the historical evolution of Labour as a class, and observed the tendency of the ever-increasing momentum of Industrial Efficiency to cut into the subsistence-level of the least efficient producers and render it impossible for them and their descendants to obtain subsistence save by the hiring out of their labour-power. We have seen that Labour, as a class, owes its being to the increased momentum of Industrial Efficiency, and that Labour, as a class, increases its numbers proportionately to the increased momentum of Industrial Efficiency and disproportionately to the natural increase in population : it necessarily follows then that with the development by Labour of a sense of class-consciousness there should inevitably develop a sense of a class-antagonism between the two classes, Capital and Labour. For Labour, despite conventional rant about British "freedom," is a subjected class in involuntary servitude, a class composed of the descendants of subjected forbears, a class the numbers of which are swelled from day to

day by the newly subjected in the form of the small tradesmen crushed out of existence as independent entities by their more efficient compeers, and the sons and daughters of these subjected tradesmen. Obviously, then, whilst there are individual exceptions, there can no more be real friendship or community of interest between Capital and Labour than between Englishmen if conquered by Germans and their German conquerors. The first bitterness of defeat might pass, but latent antagonism would remain ready to flare up into furious race-hatred. In like manner with Capital and Labour, if the interplay of forces which has produced, and is still producing, the *class which is organised* is as yet but dimly comprehended by organisers or organised, if there is no racial bar between Capitalist and employees, yet an instinctive economic bitterness stretches an impassable barrier between the two classes, and the fires of class-hatred but slumber ready to be fanned into flame.

The evolution of a "free" labouring class in England was, as we have seen, a result of the relatively slow evolution of culture in proportion to natural resources and population, which movement we shared in common with the other northern European peoples. Owing to this slow evolution of culture there resulted a fairly even all-round development of culture and Industrial Efficiency which, when we had made the economic expansion which led to our naval triumphs and the opening

up of the world's richest markets to our commerce, resulted in answer to the demand for increased labour-power in the development of labour-saving machinery. Whilst this latter rendered slavery economically impossible, yet, thanks to the great and wealthy markets opened to our commerce, not even labour-saving machinery could reduce or fully satisfy the demand for increased human labour-power; the result was, as we have seen, an increase alike in the nominal maintenance-fund paid to Labour and in its actual purchasing-power. Now the increased standard of comfort enjoyed by Labour as a class under these circumstances obviously could not fail to react upon the intelligence and ideals of Labour generally even whilst it coincided with the Ethical development of the dominant caste, which, in its most extreme forms, took the form of Socialism, and generally expressed itself in the development of philanthropy, the movement for popular education, the theory of the equality and rights of Man, and a general desire to soften the bitternesses of our social system. We may, then, in considering the Labour movements alike in England and those countries in Europe and America which have passed through analogous phases of social development distinguish clearly between two lines of sentiment developed by Labour. First, we have to consider the reaction upon Labour of the Ethical sentiment of the dominant caste. This, in the form of religion, patriotism, and political ideals generally, even yet

dominates the great mass of Labour alike in England and abroad. It may, in fact, be said that the ideals of Labour are a mere adaptation of the ideals of *bourgeoisie*. They may be expressed in a single phrase : the passive acceptance of such *bourgeoisie* sentiment as does not directly conflict with the interest of Labour as a class, and the adaptation of *bourgeoisie* sentiment and ideals to the special interests of Labour. In this latter we have the second of the influences which have moulded, and are moulding, Labour sentiment : the development of class-consciousness by Labour, the realisation that there is a divergence of interest between Labour as a class and Capital as a class, and the development of organisation by Labour in the effort to assert itself against Capital. The divergence of interest between Capital and Labour occurs in the division of the products of industry. We have elsewhere noted the influences which in reality determine the exchange-value of the commodity of human labour-power ; but the commodity of human labour-power differs from all other commodities in that it possesses human intelligence, albeit, to judge from the published utterances of Labour "leaders," in very limited degree, and a very human desire to obtain the maximum of return for the minimum of effort : thus the same influence which impels the Capitalist to obtain the highest possible price for his wares impels the unit of the commodity of human labour-power to change the highest possible price for the

labour-power upon the hiring-out of which is dependent his subsistence and the subsistence of those dependent upon his exertions. And in reality the exchange-value of the unit of the commodity of human labour-power is determined by the same iron, inexorable economic laws which determine the exchange-values of all other commodities, but these are economic laws which, thanks to our system of education, are very dimly if at all generally comprehended even by our "educated" classes, and we can hardly expect the semi-educated artisan to appreciate economic laws which, to judge from most of what has been written upon the subject, not even the leader-writers of the Liberal Press are able to understand. So there ensues a perennial struggle not so much between Labour and Capital as between Labour and Economics. Economics says to the unit of the commodity of human labour-power : The exchange-value of your labour-power is so and so much, neither more nor less ; you may rave and you may rant, you may agitate and you may educate, you may talk about your "soul" and your desire to lead a sweeter, holier¹ life to your heart's content, but whatever you may do will not raise the exchange-value of your labour-power by one farthing ! The unit of the commodity of human labour-power replies : I don't care a

¹ According to one of the "leaders" of the recent Coal Strike, the miners were actuated by a desire to lead a "sweeter, holier" life.

damn for Economics or whatever you like to say about Economics ! I say that the exchange-value of my labour-power is worth so and so much ; it is for *me* to fix the figure, and I'll get that figure or I'll know the reason why !

The inevitable result of this is an endeavour by Labour to gain control over Economics and fix the exchange-value of its own labour-power. And this endeavour of Labour to gain control over Economics is expressed in either one of four modes of operation, or a combination of any of the four, or the use of all simultaneously. First, there may be an attempt by Labour to hinder that increased momentum of Industrial Efficiency which, as we have elsewhere seen, is against the true interest of Labour as a class, by preventing the use of labour-saving machinery ; secondly, there may be an endeavour by Labour to prevent the importation of labour-power ; thirdly, there may be a combined refusal by Labour to hire out its labour-power save for a certain price—the “strike” ; fourthly, there may be an endeavour by Labour to make itself the dominant caste in the state by political means, and thus impose its own conditions of labour upon the caste of employers.

At various times in the history of the Labour movement alike in this country and abroad all four modes of operation have been practised by Labour : the first introduction of labour-saving machinery into Great Britain was marked by violent riots and efforts to destroy the new

machines ; there followed the trades-unions movement and an era of " strikes " and " lock-outs " by employers in retaliation for " strikes " ; in America and Australia the immigration of Chinese was more or less successfully resisted, whilst alike in Australia, England, and upon the continent of Europe, Labour has within recent years appeared as an organised force in the sphere of political action. And this movement of Labour as an organised force and possessed of class-consciousness into the sphere of political action is due to a growing sense with the development of education among the working-classes generally of the futility of the three first-named modes of action. Historical fact demonstrates the impotence of Labour as a class to hinder the development of labour-saving machinery. Against this Labour can develop two lines of action both equally foredoomed to defeat, Labour can riot and endeavour to destroy the machines by direct physical force or " strike " against their introduction. In the first case there ensues a direct trial of physical force between Capital and Labour : between the shrewdest, sharpest brains in the community backed by all the resources of an organised Society and a weight of traditional sentiment anent the divine rights of property and a mass of unorganised, unarmed Labour lacking genuine leaders or material resources : the history of every working-class movement, from the revolts of the Spartan helots and the servile revolt under Spartacus to the peasant

wars of Wat Tyler, the French Jacquerie, the German peasant wars of the sixteenth century, and the Luddite riots against labour-saving machinery, sufficiently indicates the ultimate outcome of such a direct trial of strength between Labour and the dominant caste, whatever the temporary success which greets the first outbreak of such a struggle.

The second mode of action against labour-saving machinery, the "strike," is obviously as foredoomed to failure as the first, for Labour lacks the first essential for success in such a struggle : staying-power. The Capitalist possesses reserve-funds and can afford to wait ; it is, moreover, in the long run cheaper for him to beat Labour to its knees once and for all than to have the risk of perennially recurring labour-troubles, whatever semi-educated press-writers may please to write : thus since the staying-power of the wealthy man is under all circumstances superior to the staying-power of the artisan, the ultimate triumph of Capital in such a trial of resources is a foregone conclusion.

We have seen then that Labour, as a class, is impotent to hinder the development of Industrial Efficiency, and since the modes of action by which alone Labour can resist the importation of labour-power are the same as those the futility of which has been already demonstrated when applied to the case of labour-saving machinery, viz. riots or " strikes," or the two combined, it will be seen that

Labour is in reality just as impotent to prevent the importation of "blacklegs" or cheap foreign labour-power as it is to prevent the use of labour-saving machinery. There has never yet been a "strike" in which Labour, by means of rioting, has been able to resist the importation of "blacklegs"; the laws against alien immigration into Great Britain and America were passed at the bidding of Capitalists, not of Labour; whilst it was a racial, not an economic bar which led to the barring out of Chinese and Asiatic labour generally from America, Canada, and Australia. Labour as an organised force does not exist (for practical purposes) in the two former countries, whilst the desire for a "white" Australia is equally common among all sections of the Australian people. Again, the use of labour-saving machinery made such importation unnecessary from an economic standpoint, but for which it is safe to say that not even the racial bar would have prevented the importation of Chinese labour-power into Australia, any more than racial antagonism hindered the importation of Black labour-power into eighteenth-century America.

The futility of the third mode of operation by which Labour may endeavour to affect the course of Economics favourably to its own interests, the "strike," has already been briefly touched upon; considering this mode of operation more in detail, it represents an endeavour of a body of Labour by means of a combined refusal to hire out its

labour-power save at a fixed price, to determine the exchange-value of its own labour-power. And just as it is possible for a Capitalist under special circumstances by the exercise of superior adroitness to extract from a customer a degree of exchange-value superior to the true exchange-value of the commodity purchased, so it is possible for Labour under special circumstances to secure a slight and temporary advantage by the use of the "strike"; but just as the general balance of exchange-values is determined by the general balance of interest among the individual producers controlling production, so in like manner the general balance of the exchange-value of the commodity of human labour-power is determined simply and solely by the general balance of interest among the individual producers controlling production, and in general cannot be affected otherwise than disadvantageously by the attempts of Labour to artificially raise the exchange-value of its own labour-power. Let us take the case of a small tradesman and assume that a newly married and bashful young man comes in to purchase a pound of tea: now it is possible that the tradesman in question might take advantage of the young man's ignorance and confusion to sell him a pound of tea the true exchange-value of which would be represented by one shilling and fourpence, for two shillings. Now in this particular instance a pound of tea, the true exchange-value of which is one shilling and fourpence, has exchanged for two

shillings ; but will anyone suggest that on account of this the exchange-value of a pound of tea heretofore valued at one shilling and fourpence will in general rise to two shillings ? This exchange-value of the pound of tea, one shilling and fourpence, has not been determined by any adventitious cause, it has been determined by a general balance of interest among the producers of the community, by an infinitely complex series of exchanges extending throughout the entire civilised world. The tea-planter in Assam or Ceylon barters his tea for means to support his wife and family, to support the wives and families of his employees and the employees themselves, and also to provide for the cultivation of future crops. And the price which the planter receives for his crop will be determined, not by his own individual exertions, but by the quantity and quality of tea produced by tea-planters in general measured against the quantities and qualities of the various commodities produced by the producers of commodities in general. A balance will thus be struck which will represent the general exchange-value of a given quantity of tea, and this general exchange-value expressed in terms of the common medium of exchange will express a certain value which the producers of other commodities are prepared to exchange against a recognised quantity and quality of tea. The sale-price of a pound of tea of a certain quality, one shilling and fourpence, does not merely mean that any member of the community is pre-

pared to exchange one shilling and fourpence against this pound of tea : it means that the producer of jam is prepared to exchange one shilling and fourpence worth of jam against this pound of tea : it means that the producer of tobacco is prepared to exchange one shilling and fourpence worth of tobacco against this pound of tea : it means that the producer of wheat is prepared to exchange one shilling and fourpence worth of wheat against this pound of tea : it means that the producers of all commodities from mustard to match-boxes are prepared to exchange an equivalent value of the commodities they produce against this pound of tea : in other words, that the exchange-value of this pound of tea is fixed by the general balance of interest among the individual producers controlling production.

Now we have only to apply the above reasoning to the commodity of human labour-power to have the hopelessness of the "strike" as an instrument for raising the general exchange-value of labour-power brought home to us. The exchange-value of labour-power is determined by precisely the same influence which determines the exchange-values of all other commodities, viz. the general balance of interest among the individual producers controlling production, and to imagine that you can alter this general exchange-value by artificial influences is mere futility. Imagine that the Labour employed in the production of any particular commodity "strikes" :

what happens ? The “ strike ” is either successful or unsuccessful ; general in all that branch of Labour or limited in scope. If successful and limited in scope it can obviously have no influence in fixing the *general* exchange-value of the labour-power employed in that particular branch of industry — will, in fact, be as adventitious a circumstance as the action of the tradesman in charging two shillings for a pound of tea the true exchange-value of which was one shilling and four-pence. But assume the “ strike ” to be general, such as that of the coal-miners or railwaymen, and to be successful : how will *this* affect the exchange-value of labour-power ? Not in the long run by one farthing ! The Capitalist, having no competition to fear, for all his trade-rivals will be suffering from a like cause and a like sense of injury, will raise his prices to meet the increased cost of production ; but this increase in the price of this particular commodity will mean a *depreciation* of the commodities which are exchanged against it, thus the appreciation in the exchange-value of the labour-power employed in this particular industry will be exactly counterbalanced by a *depreciation* in the exchange-value of the labour-power employed in industry generally, i.e. the general exchange-value of the commodity of labour-power will remain unaltered. We have an object-lesson in the working of this law in the increased fares charged by the railway companies since the recent Railway Strike : the increased

wages paid to the railwaymen are paid not by the companies, but their fellow-workers. But successful strikes are contagious diseases, and a success by one branch of workers will certainly be followed by "strikes" of other branches, with, if successful, on the reasoning shown above, an all-round increase in wages counterbalanced by an all-round rising of prices, which will leave things precisely as they were save for the degree of misery inflicted upon the working-classes by this short-sighted folly. And we are here considering the case only of successful "strikes," which successes form rare and temporary exceptions to a general rule of hopeless failure.

To a growing sense of the futility of the "strike" as a weapon of industrial warfare among the more thoughtful of the working-classes is due the organisation of Labour as a political force and the invasion of Labour into the sphere of political action. And in this invasion of Labour into the sphere of political action lies the great distinction between the modern Labour movement and any previous working-class movement in history. There have been developments of class-consciousness and revolts by Labour in other epochs in history, but it has been reserved for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to witness a deliberate organisation of Labour with a view to its ultimate capture of political control and emergence as the dominant caste in Society. In this movement into the sphere of political action Labour has been and is actuated

by an ultimate ideal and a variety of immediate objectives. The ultimate ideal is Socialism ; the immediate objectives may be defined as the raising of the wage-standard, and in general the improvement of the lot of the working-classes. The ultimate ideal, Socialism, bears to the Labour movement much the same relation which the Sermon on the Mount bears to Christianity. It is regarded by trades-unionists generally as representing a highly desirable set of principles, etc., which, from the abstract standpoint, commands their sympathies : nevertheless it is the more immediate and practical objectives which demand their fullest energies and the desire to achieve these which provides the motive-power of their movement. Questions such as the Minimum Wage or Eight Hours Day, which to the middle-class Socialist are trivialities incapable of materially ameliorating the lot of Labour, are to the working-class artisan topics of burning interest. Here we discern the fundamental cleavage between Socialism and the Labour movement. The latter has not, as is popularly supposed, any real connection with Socialism : the Labour movement would have developed independently of Socialism and Socialistic theories had these latter never been brought into being ; it is, on the contrary, a natural evolution from the trades-unions movement of the early nineteenth century.

We have seen that the economic expansion of nineteenth-century Britain, whilst thanks to the

influence of labour-saving machinery it did not sufficiently increase the exchange-value of labour-power to render possible a system of chattel-slavery, resulted in a general increase in the value of labour-power with in consequence an increase in the standard of comfort enjoyed by Labour, and this increased standard of comfort synchronising with the movement for popular education created by the ethical development of the dominant caste, could not fail to result in a great all-round increase in the standard of education and intelligence enjoyed by Labour. And this increase in standard of comfort, education, and intelligence enjoyed by Labour would not operate in the direction of rendering Labour satisfied with its lot, but would have an exactly reverse effect in creating new desires and aspirations, and new grievances in that the realisation of these was unattainable. Up to the point when sheer superfluity breeds reaction it is a law of nature that the more one has the more one wants: thus the increased standard of comfort enjoyed by Labour could not lessen the class antagonism between Labour and Capital, whilst with the increased intelligence of the working-classes the necessity for organisation and provision of new means of offence in the perennial warfare betwixt the two orders of Society would be a natural and inevitable evolution. And this movement in the aspirations and intelligence of the working-classes synchronised, it should be remembered, with the movement in the

ethical sentiment of the dominant caste, which, expressing itself in a mass of literature anent social problems, could not fail to react upon the ideals and aspirations of the working-classes. That under such circumstances there should develop a "Labour Movement" is obviously in natural process of evolution.

The movement of Labour into the sphere of politics has for its objective the attainment of control of the political machinery of the State by Labour as a caste, with as the immediate fruit of such a gain of control the improvement generally of the lot of Labour. And this movement of Labour into the sphere of politics is, as we have previously seen, itself the fruit of a growing realisation by Labour of the futility of a policy of "strikes." We must, then, in considering this policy latterly adopted by Labour enquire : How far can the political success of Labour as a caste react favourably upon the economic circumstances of Labour as a caste ? How far can the attainment of political control by Labour favourably affect the economic circumstances which determine the exchange-value of the commodity of human labour-power ?

Let us imagine Labour in England to have achieved a political success analogous to the success of Labour in Australia : then Labour must either immediately attempt the constructive (or rather destructive) task of achieving its ultimate ideal, Socialism, or, as has been the case

in Australia, abandoning its ultimate ideal as hopelessly impracticable, concentrate its energies upon the task of lightening the lot of Labour by more practicable, if less heroic, remedies.

Taking for the sake of argument the extremely unlikely alternative of a Labour Government endeavouring to achieve a state of Socialism, it may proceed along two lines of operation : it may arbitrarily confiscate all existing industrial enterprises, or it may take them over by means of purchase. Considering the first line of operation, surely no one will suggest that the Capitalists are in the least likely to submit to having their property confiscated without raising a finger to defend it ? Let us assume Mr. Keir Hardie or Mr. Lansbury to be accosted one dark night by a burly ruffian, who, suavely remarking that the watch and chain and other valuables possessed by his victim were the fruits of the robbery and spoliation of the working-classes, demanded that they be handed over to a more deserving recipient, to wit himself, surely we must imagine a great discrepancy alike in courage and physical strength between assailant and assailed if we are to assume that the transaction would be a peaceful one ? But do the records of past revolts against Capital by Labour suggest that the discrepancy in physical force is on the side of Capital ? Do the records of past revolts of Labour against Capital suggest that Capital has anything to fear from such a trial of physical

strength ? And is not this use of physical force by Labour to realise its control of the political machinery of the State merely a return to the policy of riot and physical force which in times past has always proved a failure ? Moreover, it must be remembered that we live in a highly complex social fabric dependent upon a highly complex credit system. What is likely to be the effect upon all this of the advent to power of a Government pledged to achieve Socialism by force and rumours of impending civil war ? Obviously stocks and shares would go tumbling down until they became mere worthless paper, there would be a rush to the banks to withdraw gold, with as a result a universal closing of banks. Thus employers would be unable to pay their employees, Capitalists would be unable to carry on their industrial enterprises, the whole social fabric which has taken countless thousands of years to evolve would be shattered in the space of a few days, the value of the sovereign would leap up twenty-fold, unemployment would be universal, and food at famine prices. Which under such circumstances would be likely to suffer most—Capital or Labour ? And with what feelings would Labour be likely to regard the leaders who had led it into such straits ? In reality, of course, the mere threat of such a catastrophe would suffice to bring the most zealous Labour Government to its senses, and a hasty disclaimer of any desire to attempt forcible

confiscation speedily restore things to their normal equilibrium.¹

That, then, the success of Labour in achieving control over the political machinery of the State is likely to result in an attempted forcible confiscation of private property may be dismissed as chimerical, whilst obviously no Government

¹ A similar argument drawn from the credit system has, as is well known, been used by Mr. Norman Angell, in his work "The Great Illusion," to demonstrate that war cannot be waged with economic advantage between two fully civilised states. There is, however, a tremendous difference between an attempted forcible Socialisation of Industry by a triumphant Labour Party such as depicted above and the case of an Anglo-German War depicted by Mr. Angell. In the latter case, Great Britain and Germany, as demonstrated by me in "The Struggle for Bread," are economic units and conflicting economic units. An armed conflict, then, between two economic units whose interests are divergent may result to the advantage of one or disadvantage of the other, but it cannot affect the internal stability of economic circumstances within the economic unit. Great Britain, for instance, is a great manufacturing country; so is Germany. We desire to sell our goods to non-manufacturing countries possessed of rich natural resources; so does Germany. The latter country, then, if victorious in war, can prevent us from gaining access to our markets save upon conditions dictated by herself, which markets will be open to her own commerce. This does not, however, in any degree represent an attack upon the "sacred" rights of private property analogous to Socialism, and cannot therefore produce any effect upon the credit system analogous to that which would follow an attempted forcible Socialisation of Industry. The German merchant is a Capitalist like unto the British merchant; the German Government is a Government of Capitalists like unto the British Government; whilst then there exists an antagonism of economic interest, there yet exists also a common basis of understanding: but there can obviously exist no common basis of understanding between a Socialist Government attempting the forcible seizure of *all* private property and the Capitalists whose property is attacked. The national economic unit, the fundamental basis of Society, is shattered.

could hope to raise the gigantic sums necessary for the Socialisation of Industry by peaceful purchase. At a moderate computation, for instance, a sum of more than £5,000,000,000 sterling would be required for the Socialisation of English industry, whilst the revenue from taxation upon the ordinary basis is upwards of £120,000,000. Obviously, then, the only course for the Labour Government would be to borrow £5,000,000,000, an altogether impossible feat under any circumstances, whilst in attempting this impossible feat the Labour Government would have to seek the aid of the very Capitalists whose dominance in the sphere of Economics it is sought to destroy ! And besides, how can you force the Capitalist to sell his property save by the alternative of forcible confiscation which has already been demonstrated impracticable ? What motive would the Capitalist have to accept the purchase-price offered ? Under a state of Socialism wealth will become valueless, all alike will be servants of the State, bound to labour daily upon such and such a task and for such and such a time. When no one is to be permitted luxuries or superfluities of life, save those enjoyed in common with his neighbours, obviously bank-notes and bonds will become mere waste-paper, incapable of adding in any way to the comforts of life enjoyed by their possessor. Can it be seriously imagined, then, that any Capitalist will voluntarily accept payment for his property as a purchase-price paid by the State when he would know that,

under the coming state of Society, such a purchase-price will be mere waste-paper ?

The logic of hard facts, then, must force the Labour Government to the conclusion that to immediately attempt the Socialisation of Industry is a hopelessly unpractical policy, with the result that Socialism, whilst remaining an ultimate ideal, will be shelved indefinitely as in Australia ; the Labour Government then, abandoning heroic measures of Social Regeneration, must content itself with the narrower policy of immediately improving the lot of Labour by means of Minimum Wage Bills and kindred legislation. Can Labour, under such circumstances, raise the exchange-value of its own labour-power by one farthing ? Let us imagine that Labour having by means of its voting-power gained control of the political machinery of the State passes Acts of Parliament limiting the hours of labour to six per day and fixing a minimum wage of thirty shillings per week, there follows the all-important question : How are these Acts to be enforced ? Mere Acts of Parliament in themselves are of no more practical effect than the resolutions passed by a debating society : they become practical influences for good or ill upon the national life only by dint of the forces which enforce their execution : the police and ultimately the Army ; but how are the police and Army going to enforce such Acts as those under consideration upon employers if these adopt a *non possumus* attitude ? What if Capital

retorts to Labour legislation which it deems to be against its interests by a general "lock-out"? By a refusal to carry on productive industry until the obnoxious legislation has been repealed? Short of arbitrarily confiscating the implements of production, a policy already shown to be hopelessly impracticable, the Labour Government, under such circumstances, would be utterly powerless; it cannot permit riots and the destruction of productive machinery, for that would be merely a case of "cutting off its own nose to spite its face," whilst in any case Capital, if not protected by the organised government, would speedily take measures to protect itself. And in a struggle of endurance between Capital and Labour the victory of the former caste is a foregone conclusion. The result obviously would be pressure brought to bear upon the Labour Government by its own supporters to repeal the obnoxious legislation and restore the old conditions of industry: in other words, the attempt of Labour to arbitrarily fix the exchange-value of its own labour-power by means of political action would be proved a failure.

The movement of Labour into the sphere of political action is, in fact, so far as concerns the extravagant hopes raised among its supporters by this movement, a curious instance of the failure of people educated in an atmosphere of popular claptrap to grasp the fundamental principles of governance. Taking, for instance, the present-day governance

of Great Britain, democracy in this country, as in all other countries and at all other periods of history, is a mere meaningless phrase, and Great Britain is no more governed by the "Will of the People" than is the case with Russia or China. The elaborate machinery of votes and elections no more controls the policy of the British Government than it controls the movement of the earth round the sun or of the moon round the earth. The people who in reality control the policy of the British Government are those people who control the means of forming Public Opinion, for the average voter, being densely ignorant and densely stupid, merely votes as other people tell him to. Now these "means of forming Public Opinion" comprise a vast machinery of Press-writers, platform-speakers, agents, etc., which again necessitates a great and constant outlay of money: these sums, of course, come from the wealthy families, and, as proverbially "he who pays the piper calls the tune," it is these families who in reality control the "party-machines" and the policies of both parties alike. The governance of England today is as much in the hands of a few influential families as was the case in the England of the Eighteenth Century, and these influential families, closely related by intermarriage whilst separated into two groups by differences, in the main sincerely held, upon minor matters, are united upon all points of fundamental importance. Now it is conceivable, although for reasons to be later

touched upon extremely improbable, that Labour in England will be successful in capturing the means of controlling Public Opinion so far as concerns the working-classes : it is not, however, sufficient to control Public Opinion for a party to achieve a desired end, this Public Opinion must be able to manifest itself in physical action, and this manifestation in physical action must not involve consequences disadvantageous to the general interest of the community, otherwise there will inevitably ensue a reaction of Public Opinion against the policy which has resulted to the general disadvantage of the community. Now, as we have seen, it will not be sufficient for Labour, having gained control of the Public Opinion of the working-classes, to legislate, such legislation must be enforced by physical or economic means, else it will be as impotent as an influence upon the community as a resolution of the Eighty Club. And, as we have seen, Labour can enforce its legislation upon Capital only by directly and arbitrarily confiscating all implements of industry, which policy must have results so disastrous to Labour as to create a reaction of Public Opinion which would hurl the Labour Government from office. If, on the other hand, Labour leaves Capital in control of the implements of production, then any legislation by Labour detrimental to the interests of Capital can always be vetoed by a general "lock-out" ; in other words, despite that Labour has gained control of the Public Opinion of the working-classes,

Capital remains the dominant caste in the community, Capital continues to be superior as a caste to Labour, as a caste in physical strength and economic resources, and the Government elected by Labour is as much the servant of Capital, is as much dependent upon Capital, as the Liberal and Tory Governments erstwhile elected directly under Capitalist influence. It will be the Public Opinion of the caste of Capitalists which will dominate the community, not the Public Opinion of the caste of Labour, and Labour will continue to be as much the servile caste under a Labour Government as under a Government directly controlled by Toriest of Tories.

If we turn to the actual case of a Labour Government in power, Australia, we see the justice of the views expressed above abundantly demonstrated. Labour in Australia faithfully reflects the sentiment of the dominant caste of Capitalists. Labour in Australia is anti-socialistic, Labour in Australia is militarist, Labour in Australia is Imperialist ; the Labour Government in Australia is, in other words, as much the servant of Australian Capitalists as the British Liberal Government is the servant of British Capitalists : the triumph of Labour in the sphere of political action has proved a failure.

But Labour in Australia has been favoured by a variety of economic and political conditions, such has have occurred in no other land : the intensely democratic spirit of a "new" land, the absence of a landed aristocracy or great and in-

fluential Capitalists, the high rate of the exchange-value of labour-power in a young and undeveloped country, and generally the high level of intelligence and organisation possessed by Labour, all combined to place Labour in an altogether exceptionally favourable position as against Capital. If, then, under such circumstances Labour in Australia has proved a failure so far as concerns the artificial raising of the exchange-value of its own labour-power—there have been “strikes” in Australia despite the Labour Government, be it remarked—what chance is there that the political action of Labour in older, more highly civilised countries, such as England, will be more successful? Obviously the attempt of Labour to achieve control over Economics by its movement as an organised force into the sphere of political action is foredoomed to failure, simply because Labour lacks the physical power and economic resources necessary to render such political action effective. Simply because Labour in the endeavour to render its political action effective must needs resort to methods already universally condemned as futile by all intelligent Labour men, the methods of armed revolt or indirect economic pressure in the form of “strikes,” the methods which have been repeatedly tried in times past and always found wanting.

NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII

I ALWAYS read the "New Age" with interest and profit, but I cannot agree that it is feasible for Labour to combine economic pressure with political action. Unfortunately it is not generally realised by the public at large that political action in itself is merely valueless. Of what value to the strikers in the recent Dock Strike was the fact that they had forty Labour M.P.'s in Parliament to support their cause? The Socialistic Press indulged in venomous abuse of these Members for their failure to intervene effectively to the strikers' aid, but none of these Press-writers condescended to explain in exactly what manner it was possible for the Labour Members to do more for the Dockers' assistance than they actually did do. Surely no one imagines that it would in any way have been productive of good to the strikers' cause had Messrs. Keir Hardie, Lansbury, Ramsay MacDonald, and Co. yelled abuse at the Speaker and Government generally, after the style of the Continental Socialists so greatly admired by "Justice"? Even had the Labour Members been sufficiently numerous to turn the Liberals out of office and form a Labour Government, it is safe to say that the course of the strike would not have been affected by such an act in the slightest. Imagine such an event to have actually taken place. How on earth, short of taking over the various businesses of the employers, could the Government have gained for the men rates which the employers declined to pay? And that the Government should deliberately confiscate private property is unthinkable, every employer in the country would be up in arms—and this is not meant merely in the metaphorical sense—against such a measure. With a

Labour Government in power, then, the strike must have been allowed to run its course just as was the case under a Liberal Government, i.e. the political action of Labour is altogether valueless. To combine political action then with economic pressure after the style suggested by many Socialists is a policy of simple futility, for the reason that the political action is mere wasted energy. Let us take the proposed combination of Socialism with Syndicalism. Syndicalism, it may be explained, is a policy by which the workers of any industry repeatedly "strike" until the Capitalist proprietors of this industry, finding it to be impossible to work this industry at a profit, abandon it, after which it is to be taken over by the erstwhile employees and worked for their own benefit. The hopeless folly of this policy is so apparent as to render it scarcely worthy of examination in detail. Capital can effectually retort by "locking-out" the operatives who resort to this policy of repeated "strikes" for good and all, and importing Labour influenced by less ambitious ideals, in which case the Syndicalists must either riot against importation of "Blacklegs," in which case their defeat is a foregone conclusion, or abandon all dreams of Syndicalism, and return to legitimate spheres of industry sadder and much less ambitious men. With all due humility I must confess that the idea of combining this policy with Socialism does not appear to me to afford any bright prospect of the speedy arrival of the Millennium. Apparently it is proposed to achieve the Socialisation of Industry by a policy of Syndicalist "strikes," which will result in the passing of all industries into the control of the operatives employed in these various industries. But surely it is obvious that such a series of "strikes" in every industry would have the result, if it is to achieve its ideal, the

rendering of production unprofitable, of creating a total stoppage of all industry, with what results to the working-classes may be readily conceived ! Surely it must be obvious to everyone who carefully studies the subject that in all struggles of endurance between Capital and Labour, it is the side which possesses least "staying-power," the working-classes with their wives and families, which must suffer most and whose defeat is a foregone conclusion ? Moreover, those Socialists who suggest these and kindred schemes do not appear to sufficiently realise that Capital is not in the least likely to permit their execution unimpeded. Organised Labour, it should be remembered, forms but a small section of the community, whilst, as Socialists are most insistent in bringing to our notice, there exist millions among us dwelling upon the verge of starvation. From these millions a practically unlimited supply of "Blackleg" labour can always be drawn. Against the use of this "Blackleg" labour organised Labour will protest by means of riot, thus it results that Syndicalism, like all other fine schemes of Social Regeneration, is dependent in the last resort on a trial of physical strength between Capital and Labour, a trial of physical strength in which the prospects of success for the latter caste are hopeless.

As to combining political action with a policy of Syndicalism or general "strikes," such political action in itself is, as we have seen, utterly useless ; Labour may vote to its heart's content, Labour may elect as many Members to Parliament as it pleases, but the political legislation of Labour can only translate itself into effective result by dint of pressure exercised upon Capital in the forms either of physical force or economic action, such as a general "strike" ; and, as has been already demonstrated, all attempts by Labour to exercise effective pressure upon Capital by physi-

cal force or economic action are foredoomed to failure. In the long run all attempts of Labour to achieve control over economic circumstances must resolve themselves into a trial of physical force between Capital and Labour, for, as demonstrated, political action in itself is useless, whilst against a policy of economic pressure in the form of strikes Capital can always retort by the use of "Blacklegs," which, if permitted, must render the collapse of the "strike" a foregone conclusion. Thus the ultimate issue between Capital and Labour is an issue which can only be decided by physical force, and in such a struggle, brains, organising-power, the possession of superior resources, and trained leadership, must, as always, ultimately triumph over mere numbers, whatever the momentary vicissitudes of the contest.

IX

FUTURE TENDENCIES

IN the preceding chapters we have noted that the increasing momentum of Industrial Efficiency, or, in other words, the "Rate of Acceleration" in civilisation, synchronises with the Formative Period, and that it is when this increased momentum or "Rate of Acceleration" has attained its maximum vigour that there follows the brief Period of Maturity which prefaces the inevitable decay. And we have seen that it is only during the later phases of the Formative Period that the exchange-value of human labour-power can be an increasing quantity. In considering then the future social tendencies of the Caucasian peoples, it is well to bear in mind that we are now entering upon the very latest phase of the Formative Period. It appears to be imagined by many writers that the "Rate of Acceleration" is a process which endures indefinitely; but in reality the end of this process, as concerns the Caucasian peoples, is already in sight. The process of finding new markets and of developing new lands, in other words, the period during which Caucasian Man is actively at war with his en-

vironment, is a period already nearing its close. We are now, then, at the commencement of an epoch of strenuous mental and physical activity as the process of Industrial Efficiency approaches its maximum development with ever-increasing momentum, an epoch which, whilst short in duration, must inevitably witness a more strenuous competition between rival groups of producers, a more furious trade-rivalry and more bitter racial antagonism between rival national groups than ever before in the world's history. We are on the threshold of an epoch of great wars, furious industrial upheavals, and prodigious all-round activity alike in industrial and military effort, the birth-throes in which will be born the brief but brilliant Period of Maturity, the last flicker of the creative energy of our civilisation.

We have seen that the actual influence of increased Industrial Efficiency is to cheapen the exchange-value of human labour-power, and we have seen that with the close of the process of opening up new markets, which has hitherto prevented the former movement from exerting its fullest influence in forcing down the exchange-value of human labour-power, the increasing momentum of Industrial Efficiency can have no other effect than of forcing down the general wage-standard to a bare subsistence-level. For we must bear in mind that the process of developing Industrial Efficiency will survive the process of developing new markets, owing to competition between the

various groups of producers. Each of these will endeavour to undersell its trade-rivals, each of these, therefore, will endeavour to reduce all working expenses to the last farthing by the use of labour-saving machinery, and generally by the development of the maximum Industrial Efficiency. It follows from this that there must develop in all great countries alike a steady fall in prices and wages until a few great groups of producers have won control over the whole machinery for the production and distribution of commodities. But it cannot be for a moment imagined that Labour, accustomed to the relatively high position which it enjoys to-day, will submit patiently to the continual worsening of its conditions : men accustomed to a certain lot in life from boyhood will submit patiently to evils which to a more fortunately placed individual appear to be intolerable ; far otherwise, however, is it with those evils which are sprung upon us unexpectedly : far otherwise is our attitude to the evil fortune which degrades us from comforts and aspirations previously enjoyed down to a situation of grinding poverty and toil. Intelligent and organised Labour cannot fail to rebel furiously against an economic movement with which it can have neither understanding nor sympathy, and under such conditions there cannot fail to develop a general conflict between Capital and Labour upon a more gigantic scale than ever heretofore in the history of Mankind. Again, alike racial antagonism and the clash of

economic interests cannot fail to create wars upon a gigantic scale between the rival national economic units. We have seen elsewhere that culture-levels are varying and interacting quantities, and the maintenance of the higher culture-level is dependent upon the maintenance of a general balance of culture-levels among those peoples upon whom it is economically dependent ; but, as we have also seen, the process of developing new markets to maintain this general balance of culture-levels is a process which has already ended. It follows, then, that the development of German, Russian, and American culture-levels, not to speak of a possible analogous development of China under European and American influences, must inevitably cut into the economic resources of the dominant culture-level, England, with the result that we must either fight to defend our markets or permit the decline of our commerce without an effort for its defence. And, again, the economic and racial antagonism between France and Germany, Austria and Russia, and the various other states must inevitably with the sharpening of trade-rivalry, due to the increased momentum of Industrial Efficiency, result in wars.

Alike, then, from external and internal causes we are on the eve of a tremendous strife of forces amid which will be evolved the highest phase of our civilisation. And it will be a strife of forces upon a mightier scale, and which will witness scenes of more awful suffering, of more savage

cruelty, than ever heretofore in the history of the human race. A momentary recrudescence of barbarism will check the ethical development of Mankind : a recoil from a highly developed civilisation to the crude animalism of strife will unlock the gates of a savage blood-lust, which, from the ethical standpoint, will throw Mankind hundreds of years back in the plane of civilisation. But it is a strife of forces which is as inevitable a movement in Economics as was the invention of labour-saving machinery and the immediate suffering caused thereby to the working-classes, a strife of forces which must inevitably develop from the increased momentum of Industrial Efficiency : a strife of forces which is an inevitable accompaniment of the further progress of the human race.

The question, then, for us English to ask ourselves : the question which, whether we like it or not, we shall at no distant period be called upon to answer, is not whether war is ethically just or ethically unjust : is not whether war is "horrible" or "glorious" : is not whether the use of armed force is a "method of barbarism," or not ; but simply : In this strife of forces, are we to triumph or to go under ?

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